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ABSTRACT 
 
Decentralization as a method for tackling regional disparities has been 
implemented in countries throughout the world in the last two decades. Some 
scholars have noticed that decentralization is a multi-dimensional concept. 
However, there is still no consensus about the dimensions’ selection. In this 
dissertation, based on the measurable and comparable principles, the 
relationships between three dimensions – fiscal, administrative and welfare 
decentralization – are considered, and the evolution of regional inequalities in 
OECD countries and in China are explored. Economic data of 26 OECD 
countries - 19 relatively rich countries, and 9 relatively poor countries - during 
the period from 1996 to 2009 was used to formulate regression models. It was 
found that fiscal decentralization, especially the decentralizing of tax authorities 
in relatively backward countries, has been associated with a significant rise in 
regional disparities. Moreover, according to the statistical results for the 
countries in the sample, welfare centralization and suitable local government 
size can lead to a reduction in regional disparities. In the case of China, data 
analysis and institutional analysis were paired in order to assess the dynamic 
relationships between decentralization and regional disparities (from the three 
dimensions mentioned above). An unstable, nonstandard and asymmetrical 
fiscal decentralization system directly results in regional disparities, which can 
be strengthened by a highly decentralized public service delivery system. In 
addition, rigid government size, segmented government structures and 
‘yardstick’ competition mechanisms (used for creating competition among local 
governments) hinder coordination and cooperation in and among regions, and 
further exacerbate regional disparities. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Reasons for the Research Project 
 
Internal regional disparities are common challenges, which are faced by almost all 
countries. Specifically in China, as a large country, there are major differences 
between regions, such as in terms of population, level of economic development, 
resource endowments, social culture and developmental potential. Regional 
disparities always present challenges for China’s policy makers. Since the foundation 
of the PRC (The People's Republic of China), regional balanced development has 
always been one of the most important strategic targets. 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the primary regional development strategy was 
based on heavy industry, which was learned and developed based on the Soviet 
Union model. The Chinese central government endeavored to redistribute 
industrial production, so as to reach a target of regional balance. Several 
resources were provided to the western regions and mountainous areas. One 
typical project was the Third Front Movement (三線建設 ).1 In general, the 
efficiency of the regional developmental strategy led by the central government was 
inadequate. Much resource was wasted in the remote mountain areas; however, the 
factories, roads and other infrastructure improvements located in the western and 
mountainous regions laid the foundation for the future development of the less 
developed regions. 
Because of these inefficiencies, the regionally balanced development strategy 
was changed to one targeting an imbalanced development. Mr. Deng Xiaoping 
proposed the idea of “two overall situations” (2 つの戦略), which meant that 
most resources should be applied to the eastern region in order to establish 
firmly the development of the eastern region first. Afterwards, through the 
industrial gradient transfer, the eastern region should then be expected to 
                                                   
1 Notes: “Third Front” is a geo-military concept. It was motivated by national defence considerations .The Third Front 
Movement was a massive industrial development by China in its interior which started in 1964. It involved large-scale 
investment in national defense, technology, basic industries (including manufacturing, mining, metal, and electricity), 
transportation and other infrastructure investments. 
2 
selflessly support the development of the western region. Led by this 
imbalanced development strategy, China’s overall GDP grew rapidly; however, 
the regional development gap enlarged rapidly. 
To ease the economic contradictions and in order to reduce the gap between 
the eastern and western regions, policy makers then decided to implement the 
“regional coordinated development strategy” at the beginning of the 21 st 
Century. This is based on the “grand western development” (西部大開発 ) 
program, with the developmental focal point now being transferred from the 
eastern region to western and other regions. A significant amount of fiscal and 
other resources were transfused into the western region. Much strategic 
infrastructure was built in order to enhance the linkage between the eastern and 
western regions, including highways, railways, transmission lines and gas 
pipelines. Thus, the widening trend of regional disparities was successfully 
curbed.2 Until now, the new coordinated development strategy has displayed some 
positive effects. 
However, the regional convergence trend is slow compared to the rapid expansion 
which took place over the past three decades; these regional disparities reflect a long-
term risk for China’s future development. In addition to the regional economic 
development gap, various other new challenges have begun to appear. Firstly, the 
need for capital, human resources and other factors of production continues to 
increase in the eastern region. Secondly, even though the regional economic data 
reflects a trend of growth, the quality of public service has not significantly improved 
in drawback regions. Thirdly, there is an un-constructive competitiveness between 
different regions which wastes resources; also the coordinating mechanisms still 
exhibit no significant effects. 
According to the regional governance experience of OECD countries in the 1980s, 
large-scale regional programs, financial transfer payments and infrastructure 
construction led by the central government may not produce the real and anticipated 
effects of regional balancing.3 The top-down regional intervention policy cannot be 
                                                   
2 Wang, X., & Fan, G. (2004). Analysis on the Regional Disparity in China and the Influential Factors. Economic 
Research Journal, 1, 33-44. 
3 Roura, J. R. C. (2011). Regional development policies in OECD Countries. Investigaciones Regionales, (19), 205-
208. 
3 
fully adapted to the diversity of different regional problems and the new and ongoing 
issues emerging in this globalized world. Thus, many OECD countries have 
attempted to move away from top-down regional intervention policy to a regional 
governance model, by decentralizing relevant powers to localities or regions. This 
decentralizing model is thought to have several advantages, such as encouraging 
innovation, maintaining a closer relationship with the citizenry, and promoting 
democracy. The aim is for the regional gap to be erased by the process of positive 
and progressive regional competition. 
Overall, the regional challenges now faced by China are similar to the problems 
that were faced by OECD countries in the 1980s. An important question facing the 
Chinese scholars and policy makers is now whether China should extrapolate from 
the experience of OECD countries and so convert the centralized model to a 
decentralized model. Some scholars postulate that the decentralized regional 
governance model may tend to undermine the control of the central government, 
intensify the regional contradictions and eventually even threaten the unity and 
harmony of China.4 Some other scholars posit that decentralization can stimulate 
local governmental momentum by stimulating creative development, encouraging 
voluntary interaction and cooperation between local governments, and benefit the 
coordinated development strategy. 5 
There is no consensus. Thus, based on the experience of OECD countries and the 
exploration of related issues in China, in this dissertation, possible answers are 
presented to the following questions: first, should China apply a decentralized model 
in order to more effectively manage increasingly complicated regional issues? 
Second, what category of powers should be decentralized, and what authority or 
powers should be centralized? 
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
1.2.1 Theories about Regional Development: from Centralization to 
Decentralization 
                                                   
4 Wang, S., & Hu, A. (1999). The political economy of uneven development: The case of China. ME Sharpe. 
5 Landry, P. F. (2008). Decentralized authoritarianism in China.  Cambridge University Press, p31. 
4 
Regional development is often a focus of academic research. Natural resources and 
human activities are distributed across different places, which cause particular 
disparities between different regions. Before the industrial revolution, natural factors, 
such as the condition of the land, the distance from the transport hub and the distance 
between production sites and consumer sites, accounted for the main reasons for 
regional differentiation, which were determined by the actual cost of production, 
transportation and trade. Some regions became central, while others became the 
marginal areas, which eventually led to the “Regional Autocracy” and caused 
regional inequalities.6 
After the industrial revolution, the effect of natural factors on regional issues was 
weakened, due to the increase in production efficiency, and the lower costs of 
production and improvements in transportation systems. However, the divisions in 
the production system and the expansion of industries became the novel factors 
which also affected various regional issues. In some regions, those where more 
industries were located, people, as well as capital, became the central players within 
these systemic  divisions, while other regions became, more or less, vassals to the 
centre. Regional inequalities grew sharply during the industrial era. The “edge-
central” structure became a nigh-universal phenomenon affecting most industrialized 
countries. 
Currently, in today’s globalized world, the older regional disparities have not 
disappeared, but have also spread all over the world with the expansion of 
transnational corporations, the international flow of capital and the development of 
an international division of labor. In the processes of global competition, only a few 
regions have the opportunity to succeed, such as the metropolitan areas, the new 
industrial areas, as well as scenic areas.7 The old transport hubs, industrial regions, 
agriculture areas and resource extraction areas have tended gradually to lose their 
competitiveness, while the polarization of regional development appears to be 
irreversible. 
                                                   
6 Pike, A., Pose, A. R., & Tomaney, J. (2006). Local and regional development. Routledge. 
7 Taylor, P. J., & Walker, D. R. F. (2001). World cities: a first multivariate analysis of their service complexes. Urban 
Studies, 38(1), 23-47. 
5 
From the industrial era to the age of globalization, there is ever a key question for 
scholars to investigate: that of regional disparities. Economists were among the first 
who have tried to answer this question and, in the beginning, they were not interested 
in the regions within the sovereign state. They regarded the state as a collective unity, 
where the factors relating to production could be assumed to flow freely. Thus, to 
them, there were no issues relating to differences between regions. The primary 
question, the one to which they paid close attention, was in the competition between 
countries; this was their primary concern. 
Based on this understanding, David Ricardo proposed the theory of comparative 
advantage. 8  Since the theory of comparative advantage could not be used to 
adequately explain the differences between the regions in a country, some scholars 
then tried to add the cost of transportation to the analysis and so they proposed the 
location theory.9 Although the location theory concentrates its attention upon regions, 
the focal point is on micro-enterprises, instead of on the macro-regional economy. 
At the beginning of the industrial era, the most significant issue was on the optimal 
siting of industrial enterprises. However, with the advance of the industrial revolution, 
some old industrial bases in industrialized countries began to show signs of decline 
and various new industrial centers began to appear. Regional inequalities were 
aggravated, due to the Great Depression in the 1930s. Since the location theory could 
not either to explain or address the regional issues, scholars proposed regional 
theories systematically, by combining the space thought from location theory and 
other economic theories, such as trade theory, price theory, transaction cost theory, 
and so on. Thus, the focus of their studies transferred from micro-enterprises to 
macro-regions. Typical theories include the following: 
(1) Regional balanced development theory, based on neoclassical economics.10 
The theory assumes that the factors of production are able to flow freely between 
regions; thus, seeking a high return on investment, which can lead to a reverse flow 
of capital and labor force. The mechanism of reverse flow will drive towards regional 
                                                   
8 Hunt, S. D., & Morgan, R. M. (1995). The comparative advantage theory of competition. The Journal of Marketing, 
59(2), 1-15. 
9 North, D. C. (1955). Location theory and regional economic growth. The Journal of Political Economy, 64(2), 243-
258. 
10 Barro, R. J., Mankiw, N. G., & Sala-I-Martin, X. (1995). Capital mobility in neoclassical models of growth. The 
American Economic Review, 85(1), 103. 
6 
convergence in the long term. Thus, the methods utilized to promote regional 
equality are to reduce market regulation, and to encourage the free flow of labor 
through selective regional assistance. 
(2) Regional unbalanced development theory is based on Keynesian economic 
theory. The theory argues that “regional income will tend to diverge, because of 
market forces, if left to their own devices, are spatially dis-equilibrating. Economies 
of scale and agglomeration of capital, labor, and output in certain regions at the 
expense of others: uneven regional development is self-reinforcing rather than self-
correcting”.11 Regional convergence cannot completely rely on the market, but must 
rely on other factors, such as comprehensive regional aid and regional intervention 
from the central government. Active regional policy and large-scale infrastructure 
construction are seen as good policy choices.12 
(3) Regional development theories of structural and temporal change. The theories 
are different from neo-classical and Keynesian theories, as they present regional 
development as being neither a convergent nor a divergent process, but as historical 
changing processes. “Theories have used metaphors of stages, cycles and waves to 
conceptualize the geographically uneven character of local and regional 
development.”13 One of the leading theories of structural and temporal change is the 
regional development theory; based on Marxism. Uneven spatial division of labor 
and geographical fragmentation leads to the differences between core and peripheral 
regions.14 With the change of production structure and methods, the uneven spatial 
divisions change episodically, as is seen in the shifting of industry from the north 
eastern ‘rustbelt’ to the southern and western ‘sunbelt’ of the United States. 
(4) Regional development theories are based on new institutionalism. Former 
regional development theories are primarily concerned with macro-spatial and 
macro-structural issues. These related studies have considered regions as units, 
which have no internal differences. Therefore, the specific and particular attributes 
of localities and regions become neglected in the longer term. Due to particular 
                                                   
11 Martin, R., & Sunley, P. (1998). Slow Convergence? The New Endogenous Growth Theory and Regional 
Development. Economic Geography, 74(3), 201. 
12 Armstrong, H., & Taylor, J. (2000). Regional economics and policy (3rd edn). Oxford: Blackwell, p211. 
13 Pike, A., Pose, A. R., & Tomaney, J. (2006). Local and regional development. Routledge, p78.  
14 Massey, D. B. (1995). Spatial divisions of labor: Social structures and the geography of production. Psychology 
Press. 
7 
drawbacks, some scholars have argued that it is the differences in institutional 
environments and arrangements between regions which results in the disparities in 
economic performance.15 Thus, the formal and informal institutions are taken as the 
foundation of local economic capabilities and potentials, and as the basis of local and 
regional competitiveness. The regional theories, based on institutionalism, have a 
clear microscopic orientation. Local networks, social trust, social capital, regional 
innovation, historical trajectories and institutions16 are key words used in the theories. 
The methods for correcting regional inequalities do not rely on central government's 
macro-control and comprehensive intervention, but instead they rely on 
decentralizing power to the localities and stimulating the innovation of institutions 
in order to foster momentum and inspire an enhanced innovation capacity. 
(5) Throughout the last two decades, many other new theories have been 
introduced in response to increasingly complex regional issues. For example, 
endogenous growth theory does not consider factors of production as being external 
or exogenous, but as being endogenous and ‘spill-overs’. Therefore, the regional 
development policy is no longer considered one of redistribution from rich regions 
to backward regions, but as the common development of both the growing and under-
performing regions.17 Also, sustainable development has become an important idea 
and has had a significant impact on regional policy. By challenging the economic-
central notion of previous regional theories, sustainable development theory argues 
that social inequalities, ecological crises, and environmental problems are equally 
important as income inequality. “Local and regional quality of life can vary 
substantially even when places appear to have similar levels of GDP per capita and 
income”.18 Therefore, the scholars who support sustainable development, not only 
seek economic growth, but also seek a more harmonious, equitable and sustainable 
relationship between person and person, region and region, people and environment, 
as well as the well-being of present and future generations.19 The key notions of 
                                                   
15 Martin, R. (2000). Institutional approaches in economic geography. A companion to economic geography, 77-94. 
16 Cooke, P., Gomez Uranga, M., & Etxebarria, G. (1997). Regional innovation systems: Institutional and 
organisational dimensions. Research Policy, 26(4), 475-491. 
17 Aufhauser, D. D. (2003). Terrorist financing: foxes run to ground. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 6(4), 301-
305. 
18 Pike, A., Pose, A. R., & Tomaney, J. (2006). Local and regional development. Routledge, p114. 
19 Hudson, R., & Weaver, P. (1997). In search of employment creation via environmental valorization: exploring a 
possible eco-Keynesian future for Europe. Environment and Planning A, 29(9), 1647-1661. 
8 
regional sustainable policies are health, happiness, education, top-down, grass-root, 
localization, self-reliance and mutual aid.20 Recently, post-developmentalism theory 
has challenged the popular notion of “development” based on capitalism. 
Contemporary “development” has posited that “eurocentrism” or western 
industrialization is the “one-best-way’ or the only route to adequate development.21 
The values, rights and diversities of backward regions and countries are neglected 
and constrained. Therefore, the aspirations by this theory aim toward de-
westernization, decentralization, empowering, grass-root leadership, self-identity 
and locally appropriate forms of development. 
Historically, the theories about regional disparities have undergone major change 
since the 1800s. Recently, scholars have begun not only to pay attention to regional 
economic issues, but also to those of social justice, environment crises, welfare 
inequality, human rights and diversified development paths. Policies to correct 
uneven regional development are not only reliant upon the use of top-down 
redistribution and intervention by central government, but also on local networks, 
regional partnerships, grass-roots democracy, citizen participation and multi-level 
governance. In general, the latest theories appear to be compatible with 
decentralization or devolving power to regional, local, civil society, citizens or to 
other lower-level organizations, as an effective method in order to confront the 
increasingly complicated regional issues, such as those mentioned above, including 
new institutionalism, sustainable development, post-developmentalism, and 
endogenous theories. 
 
1.2.2 Models to Reach Regional Equality: centralization vs decentralization 
Even though there are many theories about regional issues, contemporary nation 
states principally use the following methods to achieve regional balanced 
development. 
(1) The model of allocation of productive forces is based on absolute centralization. 
Productive forces is a central idea in Marxism, which covers all the factors applied 
                                                   
20 Chatterton, P. (2002). 'Be Realistic: Demand the Impossible'. Moving Towards' Strong’ Sustainable Development in 
an Old Industrial Region? Regional Studies, 36(5), 552-561. 
21 Gibson‐Graham, J. K. (2005). Surplus possibilities: post development and community economies. Singapore 
Journal of Tropical Geography, 26(1), 4-26. 
9 
by people in the production process, such as human labor, tools, machinery, land, 
infrastructure. In order to manage regional disparities, some countries - particularly 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries - tried to evenly redistribute the 
productive forces nationwide, by means of a planned economy.22 The model has 
many remarkable features, such as absolute centralization, absolute obedience of 
local government of regional development plans enacted from the central 
government. By using the structure of the productivity model, many comprehensive 
resources can be gathered and redistributed in a short period of time. The backward 
regions can then gather sufficient labor force, capital, technology and other resources 
to sufficiently create the foundations for further development, without the need for 
cooperation by the wealthy regions. 
However, the disadvantages of the model are distinct. The disciplines of the market, 
the differences between regions, the real needs of specific regions and the creativity 
of the local population are neglected. The subjective regional development plans 
cannot be used to fulfill the diverse needs of different regions, which may then lead 
to the waste of resources. According to the experiences in the Soviet Union and China 
during that economic period, the price of allocation of productive forces was too high 
to realize regional equality. Although this model had been proved to be ineffective, 
it had a significant impact on many countries’ regional policies, including western 
capitalist countries. Before the 1980s, regional policy had been conducted as a top 
down instrument of central government in most of the developed countries. Financial 
aid, transfer payment, infrastructure construction and other large-scale public 
investments were the main methods used to correct regional disparities.23 Since the 
1980s, large allocations of money for regional programs became unaffordable in 
times of economic recession and financial austerity. Therefore, some countries began 
to change from a model of top-down intervention to the bottom-up approach. 
Although new forms of policy have proved to be more effective, the options of 
financial aid, investment in infrastructure and other classical methods of allocating 
productive forces, are still on the list of many countries’ policy options. The methods 
                                                   
22 Dian-hua, W. (2006). Changes of theory in Russian productivity layout and meaning to china. Economic 
Geography, 26(6), 908-911. 
23 Author, S. (Ed.). (2009). Regions matter: Economic recovery, innovation and sustainable growth. OECD 
Publishing. 
10 
of redistribution and assistance have shifted from a planned economy to a market 
economy, from subjective decisions to scientific planning. 
(2) The model of the welfare state, with the trend toward decentralization. The 
central idea of this model is welfare equality. The central government should 
formulate policies for universal welfare standards and supply the relevant support 
mechanisms, such as funding, justice, institutions, and human resources. This model 
presents a scenario where it is a near impossible task to realize equity of economic 
development levels. Therefore, the principal way to eliminate regional disparities is 
through welfare equality, which can offer the same rights and opportunities for each 
citizen, which can facilitate the elimination of locational differences. Otherwise, 
smoothing out the regional economic disparities may raise serious questions 
regarding efficiency losses, viciousness of competition, regional conflicts and other 
similar policy failures. By using the model of the welfare state, these questions can 
be avoided, and the state can strengthen national identity, maintain national unity, 
and promote democracy through welfare equality.24 Generally, the welfare state is 
connected closely to the notion of centralization, where the central government 
dominates the policy process and distributes the resources equally, and local and 
regional governments are in a subordinate position. 
In practice, many welfare states are federal states, such as Switzerland and 
Germany. Decentralization is a common trend for welfare countries. Though 
different countries’ local governments have different functions and powers, most 
local governments implement the welfare policies established by the central 
government.25 The autonomy of local governments are strictly constrained and 
supervised by the central government. The model of the welfare state employs a 
different approach, so as to avoid the pitfalls of reshaping the economic landscape. 
The effects of narrowing regional developmental inequalities are also clear; however, 
many scholars have concluded “regional productivity differences prove to be the 
main determinant behind observed welfare inequality in the European context.”26 
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Though the welfare model is a positive one for promoting human equality, 
alleviating regional disparities and strengthening national identities, this model does 
not confront the differences in regional productivity, as it’s focus is on the treatment 
of the symptoms and not the root cause. Moreover, the welfare state model is 
dependant on the ability to develop economic policies effectively, while 
redistributing resources fairly, and continually collecting high taxes. In an age of 
economic slowdown, aging populations, a high cost of supplying welfare, and with 
forces tending towards localisation, the welfare state model is facing many 
challenges. Indeed, many scholars have predicted that the golden age of the welfare 
state now is over.27 The crises impacting upon the welfare state are not confined to 
financial crises, for there are also structural crises.28 Furthermore, the justification, 
reasonableness and fairness of the welfare model are questioned by neo-liberalism 
and other -isms.29 
(3) The model of federalism. Sub-national units, such as provinces, states and 
cantons are the central component of this model. The sub-national units should have 
comprehensive autonomous powers, such as the direct election of leaders, 
independent administration, tax powers and a financial authority. These units are also 
responsible for promoting economic development, supplying public services, 
distributing resources and providing welfare, while the responsibilities of the central 
government are redistribution and coordination. The supporters of federalism argue 
that regional disparities are inevitable and also represent normal phenomena in the 
development of human society. 30  Because of information asymmetry, the 
interventions from central government may intensify regional disparities and cause 
various other new problems. Therefore, the responsibilities of the central government 
are to guarantee the normal operation of the regional market and the free movement 
of production factors. The mechanisms of regional competition, market and voting 
will achieve the dynamic equilibrium of regional development.31 In contrast to the 
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welfare state model, which advocates equality and universality, the federalism model 
stands for the values of diversity and efficiency. 
Within the framework of federalism, the fiscal federalism theory, which can be 
used in unitary and centralized countries, has been widely discussed and considered 
since the 1970s.32 Fiscal federalism emphasizes the autonomy of power over tax and 
spending of the sub-national units; this is not a comprehensive autonomy. The 
financial competitions between regions not only enhance national economic 
efficiency, but also promote diversified development and supply, as well as 
diversified public services. The main functions of the central government are transfer 
payment and redistribution, which can guarantee that all regions have an approximate 
financial income per capita and equal access to public services.33 Theoretically, the 
model of federalism has some of the above mentioned advantages; however, the 
preconditions of this model - such as free competition, free movement of people, 
equal development opportunities, and equal political rights - are difficult to achieve 
thus the issue of regional economic inequality is difficult to correct using this 
particular model. Furthermore, the issue of welfare disparity between regions may 
deteriorate, because of a weak central government and the lack of a redistribution 
capacity. Thus, centralization - particularly fiscal centralization - is now a common 
trend in federal countries. 
There are no simple distinctions between the above models. Therefore, countries 
always use more than one model to control and manage regional issues during 
particular times. Historically, every model has had some positive effects on 
correcting regional disparities. However, as discussed above, the defects of each 
model are also clear and apparently insurmountable. In the era of globalization, 
regional development is not only affected by central and local governments, but also 
by individual entrepreneurs, enterprises, firms, NGOs, international organizations, 
multinational corporations and international financial institutions, which originate 
from both within and outside national boundaries.34 A country cannot solely rely on 
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central government or any other single body and policy to effectively deal with the 
increasingly complicated regional challenges. Moreover, because of successive 
economic recessions and budget restraints after the 1980s, large allocations for 
regional programs and subsidies have become unsustainable and effectively 
invalid.35 
The ambitious target of reducing regional disparities has been changed to a less 
distinct target - “regional competitiveness”. Regional growth and regional 
coordination are more favored by many national governments over regional 
redistribution; this policy approach reflects a new trend of decentralization to 
regional and local levels. Decentralization is considered to be flexible, inclusive, 
effective and adaptive. Decentralization can be used to stimulate endogenous 
development, exploit regional potential, and foster innovation-oriented initiatives 
with a relatively low cost factor. “Decentralization for past one and half decade or so 
has become the most favored policy priority among the policy makers”. 36 The 
paradigm of decentralization is widely adopted by western developed countries, such 
as Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Japan.37 Some scholars have 
determined that “decentralization in high income countries has, if anything, been 
linked with a reduction of regional inequality”.38 
However, some other scholars have argued that decentralization can increase 
regional disparities. They have determined that “the conclusion that emerges from 
both the analytical and empirical research is that national budgets tend to reduce 
regional disparities.”39 In general, most scholars and policy makers support this new 
and high-potential model, and increasingly more developing countries have begun 
the process of decentralization under the influence of international organizations and 
developed countries. “The phenomenon is geographically widespread, occurring 
simultaneously in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe”.40 However, 
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whether the model of decentralization can be used in order to ease the regional 
conflicts and reduce regional disparities in developing countries is still an unresolved 
question. 
 
1.3 Tentative Academic Innovations 
 
Through the literature review presented above, the global trend of decentralization 
is clear, not only according to theoretical research studies and reports, but also 
regional governance practices. However, there remains no general consensus on the 
relationship between decentralization and regional disparity, although much research 
has been done to investigate this relationship as a topic. For example, Calamai states 
that he had identified a clear relationship between the process of devolution and the 
reduction of spatial inequalities in a case study on Italy.41 In the case of the EU, the 
centralization trend has fostered a catching-up by lagging countries and has reduced 
the overall range of disparities.42 Other researchers have also presented the view that 
decentralization can reduce regional disparities; examples include Costa-Font’s 
research on Spain,43 and Albrechts’ research on Belgium.44 
However, other researchers have denied finding a positive relationship between 
decentralization and regional disparities. Bonet’s research on Colombia revealed 
strong evidence that the fiscal decentralization process has led to an increase in 
regional income disparities.45 Chakravorty’s research on India,46 and Hill’s research 
on Indonesia and the Philippines also supported this conclusion. As for China, most 
researchers state that a strong central government is the key factor in reducing 
regional disparities. For example, Fan et al. suggest that the fiscal decentralized 
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process, with the reforms and opening-up, may be an important reason for the 
increased regional disparities.47 From the examples mentioned above, it can be seen 
that there is still no consensus regarding the relationship between decentralization 
and regional disparities based on case studies. Some scholars have presented a valid 
answer by using cross-countries’ data. 
However, the same conflicting conclusions are apparent across the different 
research studies. For instance, after analysing data collected from 14 developing and 
developed countries, Shankar and Shah 48stated that decentralized countries perform 
better in restraining regional disparities. Ecurra et al. studied 26 developing and 
developed countries, and concluded “for the whole sample decentralization is 
completely dissociated from the evolution of regional disparities.” 49 
One of the reasons why these studies came to different conclusions is directly 
related to the definitions of decentralization and inequalities. Scholars still have not 
reached a basic agreement on the meaning of and measurement methods for 
decentralization. Most scholars regard fiscal decentralization as the entire concept of 
decentralization. Even here researchers diverge on how to measure the “fiscal” issue. 
Some scholars use local expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure as a measure 
of fiscal decentralization, while others use local revenues as a proportion of total 
revenue as the same measurement task. Furthermore, there are confusion and 
conflicting views over the meaning of decentralization, such as the difference 
between decentralization and democratization; the correlation and divergence 
between decentralization; deconcentrating; and devolution and federalism. 
Thus one of the tentative innovations of this study has been to define a clearer 
definition of decentralization, based on the rules on what is measurable, inclusive, 
and accurate. Specifically, in this dissertation, the opinion that decentralization is a 
multidimensional concept is presented. This concept includes basic structural 
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dimensions such as fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization, welfare 
decentralization, and political decentralization. Each of these dimensions can be 
evaluated by data collated in national statistics. 
Another reason why scholars cannot reach a consensus on the relationship between 
decentralization and regional disparities is because of the complexity and diversity 
of each country’s conditions. There are different effects of liberal democracy on 
different countries. Likewise, decentralization, as a recent development concept, in 
practice is based on different reasonings, and follows different evolutionary 
processes and targets towards different goals. For example, the decentralizing 
process in most of the developed countries is an active and ongoing adjustment which 
is used in order to meet the challenges of economic slowdown and centrally-set fiscal 
austerity. The aims of decentralization are to increase the effectiveness and 
competitiveness of regional development. However, in some developing countries, 
decentralization is a passive choice because the central government lacks adequate 
control over local governments or regions. 
The goals of decentralization are to strengthen national identity and raise people’s 
faith in central government. Due to the differences in levels of development and types 
of systems, decentralization will produce different results. The above case studies 
and transnational data analyses on this topic led to distinct conclusions. Therefore, 
another aim of this study was to draw conclusions after combining findings from 
transnational data analyses and case studies. First, the effects of decentralization in 
OECD countries was checked, based on transnational data. Then the results were 
tested via a comparative analysis of the situation in China. It should be noted that the 
case study of China was evaluated using both data analysis, and a study of the 
historical evolution of its decentralizing system. 
 
1.4 Key Concepts 
 
1.4.1 Debates around Decentralization 
Over the past two decades, decentralization has been a significant topic among 
scholars and policy makers: “Almost everyone has been in favor of it, from the 
centralized French to the already decentralized Germans; from the majoritarian 
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British to the consensual Danes and Dutch; from the West (USA) to the East (Japan), 
and from the North to the European South (Italy) and, indeed global south (New 
Zealand)”, 50  among both developed countries and developing countries. 51  In 
addition, decentralization also has been supported by different political factions. In 
many countries, decentralization programs are supported by political coalitions of 
right-wingers in order to reduce the excessive intervention of the central government, 
to strengthen the role of market mechanisms, and to reduce the cost of various 
welfare programs.52 In other countries, such as Spain and the UK, decentralization 
is supported by left-wing parties since they seek an enhancement of regional 
autonomous powers, e.g. abolition of charges for social care.53 
There are many reasons presented in support of decentralization. The most 
common reason is that decentralization can be used to transfer power nearer to the 
people, promote the quality of democracy, and make the politicians more visible and 
accountable.54 From the perspective of political administration, decentralization is 
able to significantly reduce the hierarchies of government, raise the responsiveness 
of policies, and inspire innovations.55 Another common argument in support of 
decentralization is that a decentralizing system can increase the efficiency of resource 
allocation and the rate of economic growth.56 Furthermore, since some countries are 
affected by localization forces, they have undergone a passive decentralization 
process. Some scholars have concluded that “it can promote a sense of autonomy in 
citizens, enhance social order by promoting the legitimacy of the state, and limit 
pressures for separatism by diverse regions or ethnic groups”. 57  Supporters of 
decentralization argue that this system is able to curtail long-standing regional 
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inequalities.58 Competitive and decentralized institutions tend to lead people to view 
regional inequalities and divergences as a “necessarily unjust”59 feature in long 
historical processes. 
Criticisms about decentralization abound. Prud'Homme60 summarized the dangers 
of decentralization. First, decentralization can increase disparities, because of 
unequal development at the starting point, destructive competition, missing or 
limited redistribution capabilities, and failure of regional coordination systems. 
Second, decentralization can jeopardize macro-economic stability brought about by 
the selfishness and exclusiveness at a local government level and by various special 
interest groups. Third, decentralization can undermine efficiency, since there are too 
many players within the fragmented system, and each of them will do their best to 
deter any policy which may harm their interests, rather than enhance collective 
welfare. Fourth, decentralization may lead to widespread corruption. Elitist control 
is easier at local and regional levels than at the central level, where the politicians 
and bureaucrats can succumb to the pressures and inducements of local special 
interest groups. Also, stable interest networks are easier to establish at lower levels. 
Moreover, some scholars have argued that it is difficult to adequately define the 
location of responsibility in a decentralized system as there are too many reasons and 
opportunities offered for “blame-shifting”.61 
There remains no consensus about the specific functions of decentralization. One 
reason for this may be the complexity of the definition of decentralization. 
Historically, the conception of decentralization emerged after the Second World War, 
when most Western countries tried to centralize governmental power, so as to 
establish a universal welfare system and implement comprehensive economic 
projects. During this period, decentralization was not a popular concept. However, 
because of economic stagflation and financial austerity during the 1970s, most 
governments had to decentralize their hierarchical structures and transfer more 
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powers to local administrations, in order to reduce the cost of public services. The 
decentralizing process was focused on three methods during this time: 
deconcentration, devolution, and delegation.62 
 
“Deconcentration sought to shift administrative responsibilities from central 
ministries and departments to regional and local administrative levels by 
establishing field offices of national departments and transferring some authority for 
decision-making to regional field staff. Devolution aimed to strengthen local 
governments by granting them the authority, responsibility, and resources to provide 
services and infrastructure, protect public health and safety, and formulate and 
implement local policies. Through delegation, national governments shifted 
management authority for specific functions to semiautonomous or parastatal 
organizations and state enterprises, regional planning and area development 
agencies, and multi- and single-purpose public authorities.”63 
 
After the 1980s, due to the rising effects of globalization and democratization, 
decentralization was met with a new and popular appeal, as people increasingly 
desired for an end to authoritarian control of central government; and wanted 
democracy, a market economy, privatization, and development of local 
government.64 Decentralization had also been connected with other concepts, such 
as democracy and market reforms.65 Moreover, there was a rising profile of some 
regional groups - such as ethnic, political, linguistic, religious and cultural groups - 
who began to fight for autonomous powers. Thus the drive towards decentralization 
was linked with local and regional autonomy. More importantly, in the age of 
globalization, powers now began to evolve into nation states with both international 
organizations and local organizations. 
More activities were established and implemented at the local and regional levels. 
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), international aid, global production chains and 
transnational exchanges strengthened local power. Decentralization has therefore 
become a popular institutional framework where different facets can cooperate 
together and establish new types of governance networks; and so decentralization 
has come to be connected with good governance. On the one hand, the proliferation 
of practices in decentralization has allowed this concept to prosper. On the other hand, 
there are so many meanings attached to this concept that it is difficult to coin a clear 
definition of decentralization.66 This is the reason why there are many opposing 
views over decentralization. 
Scholars have taken a variety of different approaches in their attempts to redress 
the confusion associated with the different meanings of decentralization. However, 
researchers must first of all form a basic consensus on the meaning behind this 
concept. Schneider states that, “although there is disagreement about the meaning of 
decentralization, most would agree that transferring power and resources to national 
governments is not decentralization”. 67  Macmahon investigated the meaning of 
decentralization from its Latin roots, which means “away from the centre”.68 Second, 
researchers must acknowledge the diversity of meanings associated with this concept, 
since decentralization describes a process of spreading a higher authority to a lower 
level. 
In practice there are many different methods that can be used to decentralize 
powers. Any single dimension, such as fiscal decentralization, cannot be taken to 
represent all the various dimensions of this complex concept. For example, Cheema 
and Rondinelli discussed four forms of decentralization: administrative, political, 
fiscal, and economic. 69  Treisman defined and distinguished six types of 
decentralization: vertical decentralization, decision-making decentralization, 
appointment decentralization, electoral decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and 
personnel decentralization.70 
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Third, the definition of decentralization should be one that is quantitative or 
measurable. A central reason for the conceptual confusion over decentralization is 
that there is no clear, reliable and commonly recognized measurement standard. In 
future research, “some basic questions about definitions and measurement need to be 
asked”.71 
In general, decentralization is a complex concept which is utilized in different 
fields, such as sociology, economics, management science, political economics, and 
political science. In different research studies, across different countries and even 
between different languages, it has different meanings. 72At the most basic level, 
decentralization is a process of transferring power from the traditional center of 
power, such as the central government (versus local government), government 
(versus society), state (versus market), and top management of a company (versus 
lower levels of a company), to the lower level, in order to bring the focus closer to 
the people, citizens or work practices. In political science, scholars have not reached 
a generally accepted consensus, which has led to some conceptual confusion. For 
example, in some studies, democratization and market-oriented reform are included 
in the definition of decentralization,73 but in other studies it is only taken to mean the 
more narrow definition of fiscal federalism theory, a system in which local 
expenditure is performed by the local government, and is based on local taxes.74 
For this research project and dissertation, the meaning of decentralization is 
confined to the relationship between the central and local governments. The report 
focuses on the powers transferred from a central government to a local government. 
Nonetheless, even when using this limited definition, it is difficult to confidently 
measure the degree of decentralization. This is because there are many and diverse 
conditions in different countries; so researchers in the field tend to adopt different 
indexes and methodologies in order to evaluate the different dimensions of 
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decentralization. According to the literature surveys by some scholars, 75 
decentralization can always be reduced to fiscal decentralization, which then can be 
measured easily through economic statistics. The share of subnational expenditures 
and revenues in total are considered to be the best indicators.76 However, other 
scholars have argued that this is problematic when used to describe decentralization 
by only using expenditure or revenue-based data.77 Such data cannot be used to 
determine whether the economic rights are controlled by the local government. 
Therefore, some scholars argue that a multi-perspective view on the concept should 
be developed in order to overcome conceptual confusion.78 
Within recently published research, almost all the scholars agree on the limitation 
of using “classical” decentralization measures, which are based solely on fiscal data. 
However, there are other problems. What dimensions should be included? What 
standards should be adopted for selecting dimensions? Schneider suggested that 
political, administrative and fiscal dimensions should be considered, 79but other 
scholars consider only the political and economic dimensions of decentralization. 
80 Lessmann states that the measures should reflect de jure and de facto 
decentralization.81 The institutional factors should not be ignored in the analysis, for 
example, whether a federal constitution exists (1) or does not exist (0) in a country; 
or the number of tiers in the country’s vertical structure.82 
Given these overall descriptions above, it can be viewed that an economic 
dimension is the baseline for evaluating the degree of decentralization, even though 
this cannot cover all aspects of decentralization. Therefore, in this research study, the 
economic dimension, or more precisely, the fiscal dimension was taken to be the 
primary factor used to assess the condition of decentralization of OECD countries 
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and that of China. The remaining problem was this - what other measures should be 
used to remedy the defects of fiscal methods? Across a range of literature, there are 
primarily three principles which need be considered: testability, comprehensiveness 
and simplicity. Theoretically, these three principles are mutually exclusive. In one 
research report it was stated that it is almost impossible to meet each of these 
principles; therefore, researchers should maintain a careful balance in evaluating 
specific issues. 
This research project was mainly focused on the decentralization conditions of 
OECD countries and China. China is always labeled as a highly centralized country; 
even as an authoritarian state. One of the reasons for this prejudice may be due to the 
stable communist party system which can control the promotion of local officials; 
second, the local leaders are not elected directly by local citizens. This form of system 
has remained stable since 1949, back when the People's Republic of China was 
founded. If the same political decentralization indexes are adopted to evaluate the 
situation in China (such as the indexes invented by Brancati83), which includes 
subnational elections, subnational legislative control over policies, and subnational 
veto over constitutional amendments, the results will always state that China is a 
highly centralized country, and has been the past 60 years. These indexes cannot be 
used with regard to this research project, because these parameters are not variables 
in China. They cannot be used to establish the relationship between China’s political 
decentralization with other variables, such as regional disparities for instance. In 
some research reports, China has been treated as a special case.84  
In addition, in most of the courtiers, political structure is relatively stable. In 
other words, political decentralization means constitutional change, which is a rarity 
in political life. For example, even though Japan started its decentralization process 
form 1995 which include many aspects,85 such as breaking up central government’s 
agency-delegated function system (kikan i’nin jimu) and setting up the conception of 
“legal authorized affairs” (hotei jutaku jimn) through which “60 percent of the 
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relevant duties became autonomous duties of local governments”, 86  the 
constitutional structure of japan has not changed. Japan still remain the character of 
“Controlled Decentralization”.87 Some inaccurate dummies cannot detailed describe 
this process. Belgium is a special case which changed from a centralized unitary 
country to a decentralized federal state in 1995.88 However, because of the limitation 
of data, this research use the data from 1996 to 2009. Therefore, based on the 
reasons and limitations mentioned above, the indexes of political decentralization 
were taken as invariants for this particular research project. The primary discussion 
will be on the fiscal, administrative, and welfare dimensions of decentralization. It 
should be noted that even though the indicators of political decentralization will not 
be included in this dissertation, political decentralization still is an important 
background knowledge. Especially in the chapters which concern Chinese 
decentralization, research into political institutions is used to supplement the 
knowledge gaps in quantitative research. 
 
Table 1-1 Different Dimensions of Decentralization and Measurement Methods 
Dimensions Indicators 
Fiscal Decentralization 
Subnational expenditures as a percentage of total expenditures 
Subnational revenues as a percentage of total revenues 
Administrative 
Decentralization 
Subnational taxes as a percentage of subnational revenues 
Transfers as a percentage of subnational revenues 
Subnational government expenditures of wage as a percentage of 
total Subnational expenditures 
Welfare Decentralization 
Subnational welfare expenditures as a percentage of total welfare 
expenditures 
 
Fiscal Decentralization: Most of the fiscal decentralization indices are calculated 
by relating the sum of sub-national expenditures (revenues) to total government 
expenditures (revenues). As discussed above, the classical fiscal indexes cannot be 
taken to represent the actual degree of decentralization. This was presented as an 
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analysis in Schakel’s research study: “[to say that] Scandinavian countries are as 
decentralized as federal countries would be wrong. Subnational governments in 
Scandinavian countries have less decision-making authority over policies, less 
taxation power, and they do not enjoy power-sharing.” 89 Despite these defects, 
because of the simplicity and ease of data collection, the classical fiscal 
decentralization indexes are still used by scholars. Moreover, subnational revenues 
as a percentage of total revenue are also used to measure regional disparity. 
Administrative Decentralization. Political decentralization means constitutional 
change, which is a rarity in political life. Administrative decentralization means a 
normal administrative or managerial adjustment, which may change frequently 
during a certain historical period. 90  Some scholars have divided administrative 
decentralization into delegation and devolution: 91  the former is internal 
decentralization, by which the local institutions remain legally accountable to the 
central government, but have some autonomy; the latter is external decentralization, 
by which the central government transfers the autonomic powers to the local 
government. This classification creates many difficulties regarding the measuring of 
decentralization. The best way may be by “paying attention to the degree of 
autonomy granted by the central government”.92 This simplification may neglect 
some interesting relationships between the central and local government, but it is 
enough to allow a measurement of the degree of decentralization. 
According to the method defined by Schneider,93 two indexes can be employed to 
measure the administrative decentralization. The only grammatically correct means 
by which to present these indexes is to compose the following questions: 
Of local revenues, what percentage are local tax revenues? Subnational revenues 
include taxes, transfer payments, grants, loans, and charges for public services. Taxes 
offer the greatest degree of autonomy. If tax revenues account for a large portion of 
                                                   
89 Schakel, A. H. (2008). Validation of the regional authority index. Regional and Federal Studies, 18(2-3), 143-166. 
90 Pollitt, C. (2005). Decentralization. A central concept in contemporary public management. The Oxford handbook 
of public management. 
91 Rondinelli, D. A. (1990). Decentralization, territorial power and the state: a critical response. Development and 
Change, 21(3), 491-500. 
92 Schneider, A. (2003). Decentralization: conceptualization and measurement. Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 38(3), 32-56. 
93 Schneider, A. (2003). Decentralization: conceptualization and measurement. Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 38(3), 32-56. 
26 
local revenue, then the local government enjoys a significant level of autonomy, and 
vice versa. 
Of local revenues, what percentage are transfer payments? If the income from 
transfer payments are accounted as being the greater part of the local revenue, then 
the central government has a significant impact on local government. However, the 
indexes of transfer payments are also, being a simplification, which cannot be used 
to illustrate the different types of transfer payments. For example, where the local 
government has total control over block grants, it may remain true that the local 
government has to obey the purpose and rules of earmarked transfers, which are 
enacted by the central government. However, the indexes of transfer payments are a 
straightforward way to evaluate the dependence of local governments on the central 
government. 
The size of the local government is also related to, and in direct proportion to the 
power of the local government. According to “leviathan hypothesis” of traditional 
fiscal federalism,94 decentralization can reduce the size of the government, because 
of the pressures from regional competition and local electoral oversight. However, 
some empirical research project have concluded that “decentralization leads to 
smaller national governments, [but] larger subnational governments”. 95 
Decentralization can relax the personnel control of the central government and 
stimulate the expansion drive of the local governments. Generally speaking, an 
overly large or an overly small form of local government, implies that power is 
relatively concentrated in the country. In a decentralizing country, the size of the 
local government will maintain a reasonable and equitable level of authority. For the 
purposes of this research project local government expenditures of wages, as a 
percentage of total local expenditure, will be adopted to evaluate the degree and 
quality of a country’s administrative decentralization. 
 Welfare or Public Service Decentralization: There is much controversy over the 
measurement of welfare or public service decentralization. One of the reasons is due 
to the complexity of deciding on the definition of welfare. In some countries, welfare 
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means to direct payments specifically to vulnerable groups, such as the poor, 
unemployed, ill, disabled, and elderly. But in some other countries - especially in 
some European countries - welfare refers to the social programs, such as universal 
healthcare, education, etc. Because of the widespread idea of the welfare state, most 
countries use the broader definition of welfare. Thus, welfare decentralization, as 
presented in this paper, means the decentralizing of the supply responsibility for 
healthcare, basic education, pension, social assistances and other public services. In 
this dissertation, sub-national welfare expenditure as a percentage of the total welfare 
expenditures can be used to measure welfare decentralization.  
 
1.4.2 Debates on Regional Inequalities 
Inequality is an imprecise word, which can be used to trigger different ideas in 
different people’s minds. At the basic level, inequality suggests a situation which 
exists in opposition to equality, which itself means two or more quantities of the same 
size. There are various disputations about the meaning of equality, and the conflict 
of opinions may have lasted now for thousands of years. Even though this research 
had its focus on the measurement by methods of inequality and an intention to avoid 
complex philosophical debates, the uncertainty of the definition of inequality still 
cannot be ignored. In addition to political and social inequality, economic inequality 
still remains a tangle of multiple meanings. According to the research by Rein and 
Miller, 96  nine separate methods can be employed to interpret the meaning of 
economic inequality: One-hundred-percentism, the social minimum, equalization of 
lifetime profiles, mobility, economic inclusion, income shares, lowering the ceiling, 
avoidance of income and wealth crystallization, and international yardsticks. 
Researchers have also created various measures to gauge and more accurately 
describe inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, the coefficient of variation, the Theil 
inequality index, and the Atkinson index. There also are different connotations which 
complicate relationships between the above methodologies. 97  Thus, another 
challenging obstacle faced by research is to clarify the basic concept of regional 
inequality and then to determine what would be appropriate methods to estimate 
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regional inequality within the background of wider regional issues. 
 
(1) The Range of Regional Inequality 
Most scholars treat regional inequality as being regional economic inequality. 
There are three reasons for this: firstly, the economic data can be collected with 
relative ease, compared to the fragmented social data;98 secondly, the economic 
indicators and data can be easily used in order to make international comparisons; 
thirdly, the measurement of economic inequality is a relatively mature and less 
controversial field, because of its widespread discussion during recent history.99 
Three kinds of data are primarily used to evaluate regional economic disparities: 
regional per capita income,100 regional GDP per capita,101 and regional GDP per 
worker.102 Regional income per capita has the distinct disadvantage that “it also 
includes social security benefits”103 and so it cannot be taken to reflect the overall 
conditions of economic development. Therefore, the GDP per capita (GDPpc) and 
GDP per worker (GDPpw) are better measurements for regional inequality 
calculations. GDPpw can avoid the distortion caused by inter-region commuting in 
metropolitan regions, such as around Berlin in Germany, Brussels in Belgium, Tokyo 
in Japan, Boston in the U.S., etc. However, different unemployment rates between 
regions may distort the results. 
Another drawback of GDPpw is that the data are not able to be easily gathered and 
analysed in some countries; including China, Japan, Canada and the U.S. Alternately, 
the GDPpc can be collected with relative ease and it avoids distortion caused by 
unemployment rates. However, it cannot avoid the possibility of errors caused by 
population movements or migration. “Another disadvantage of GDP per capita is that 
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it is influenced by the age structure of the population and activity rates”.104 In other 
words, GDPpc may be distorted, because of the different occurrence of working 
people, housewives, children and the elderly in different regions. According to 
China’s local conditions and following the main stream of academic research, the 
researcher selected GDPpc as a measure of regional economic inequality in this study 
and report. 
Another important question is whether welfare inequality should be included in the 
analysis. The underlying objective of studies of regional inequality is to comprehend 
the differences in the state of development, which should include the economic 
development and welfare development. However, some scholars have suggested, 
“Welfare is difficult to measure, as it depends on personal valuations and is a function 
of a wide range of social, economic, and physical factors”.105 Therefore, it is difficult 
to aggregate various factors of welfare into a clear indicator system. Furthermore, 
unlike economic inequality, which can be more easily calculated, based on the results 
of economic data, the data of welfare expenditure cannot be assumed to accurately 
represent the welfare output, because of other complicating factors such as: 
government capacity, market systems, cultural traditions, etc. The straightforward 
method to manage these difficult problems is to assume that outputs of welfare are 
equal to inputs or expenditures on welfare.106 
In simple terms, the more welfare spending exists, the higher the level of benefits. 
This hypothesis may also be used ignore the capability difference of welfare 
provision in different regions, and so may affect the credibility of the results; 
however, it makes it possible for welfare to be both calculated and compared. Based 
on the research as reported by Costa-Fon,107 the deflated per capita expenditure for 
education, health-care and long-term care activities was also utilized in this study to 
analyze the condition of regional welfare inequalities. Note however that, “per capita” 
expenditure of different components has various meanings: in the case of healthcare, 
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the whole regional population is used to divide the total regional expenditures on 
healthcare, as everyone can potentially enjoy the services of the healthcare system; 
in the case of education, the population of students is used, including primary 
education and higher education; in the case of the aged, the number of elderly people 
is used, which is an approach widely employed by scholars. 
 
(2) Three Concepts of Regional Inequality 
As mentioned above, for this study, GDPpc was adopted to calculate the degree of 
regional economic inequality. The researcher should also be careful what areas are 
precisely measured in a research study. There are three different concepts of regional 
inequality in scholarly research.108 The first concept of regional inequality measures 
inequalities within the mean GDP between regions. Each region is treated equally 
and no weighting is involved. The formula for obtaining the mean GDP is that 
regional GDP is divided by the population of the region. Concept 1 is the clearest 
intuitional index of the regional developmental condition. Based on this concept, 
some coefficients were defined in order to calculate regional inequality, such as the 
coefficient of variation (CV). Where the country's average GDPpc, yi is the GDPpc 
of region i, and n is the number of the sub-national units. 
 
CV =
1
?̅?
√
1
𝑛
∑ (?̅? − 𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1                                  (1.1)                                                                                                       
                                                                                                    
The second concept of a measurement for regional inequality is also based on the 
regional mean GDP, but weighted by a region’s population. In the model in Concept 
1, all regions are given the same importance, but in Concept 2, regions with more 
population are given more importance. Concept 2 may reflect the feeling of 
inequality within a nation better than Concept 1. The population-weighted inequality 
is a beneficial way to explore the relationship between regional inequality and 
population or population growth rate. One coefficient, based on Concept 2, is the 
population-weighted coefficient of variation, or WCV. By comparing formula (1) 
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and formula (2), the difference between the two concepts can be clarified: in Concept 
1, all regions are treated equally as 1/n , no matter the size of the population; in 
Concept 2, pi is the share of the country's total population in region i. 
 
WCV =
1
?̅?
√∑ 𝑝𝑖(?̅? − 𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1                                  (1.2)                                                                                                                
                                                                                                    
Note that it is the inequality between individuals which is disregarded, both in 
Concept 1 and Concept 2, which implies that each person in a specific region has 
some rating for GDPpc. The third concept of inequality describes inequality between 
all the individuals in a specific region. However, in some countries, such as China, 
there are no detailed individual-level data relative to income inequality. Some 
scholars state that “concept 2 regional inequality can be used, if our partitioning is 
sufficiently fine, to approximate the evolution in Concept 3 inequality”.109 In other 
words, if a country can be divided into many regions with a similar development 
level, which are the main sources of inequality, then Concept 3 can be approximated 
by the calculation of Concept 2. Some researchers have adopted this method in order 
to study Concept 3 inequalities in some developing countries.110 
In summary, the precise meaning of regional inequality in a specific research 
project must be described clearly; particularly in a comparative study. In this research, 
Concept 2, population-weighted inequality, was adopted as the primary focus in 
calculating China’s and other countries’ regional inequality. There were two reasons: 
first, most of the research on this topic selected population-weighted inequality; thus, 
it is simpler to compare it with other research results. Second, Concept 2 can be used 
to provide more information regarding the population. 
 
(3) Measurement of Regional Inequality 
Scholars have devised several methods to calculate regional inequality; however, 
the results obtained from the different methods may not be consistent. Different 
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indices of inequality have different characteristics and scopes of application.111 For 
instance, the Gini coefficient emphasizes the middle portion of the distribution; 
Theil index places greater emphasis on the tail of the distribution; the Atkinson 
family of indices have different characteristics, based on different parameters, 
A（ε）：A (1) for a low aversion to inequality, A (2) for a medium aversion, 
and A (3) for high inequality aversion. Furthermore, the indices have different 
degrees of sensitivity to transfer payments.112 We can see the following formulas: 
y
—
 is the country's average GDPpc; yi is the GDPpc of region i; yj is the GDPpc of 
region j; n is the number of sub-national units; pi is the share of the country's total 
population in region i: 
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It should be noted that each of the indices satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer 
principle, that an arithmetical transfer from rich to poor regions will produce an 
inequality decrease. According to the research strategy adopted by Shankar and Shah 
(2003), these indices - WCV, Gini, Theil and Atkinson - were all utilized to calculate 
the degree of regional inequality. 
 
1.4.3 Meaning of Region 
The meaning of the word, region, is also a complex concept, which is used in a 
variety of fields, such as geography, transportation, computer science, mathematics, 
corporations, politics, economics, etc. In political science, region means a broad 
geographic area, distinguished by similar features. However, it has multiple 
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meanings within other specific contexts. For example, according to different spatial 
levels, it can be divided into global regions, continental regions, national regions and 
state regions; according to the different types of borders, it can also be divided into 
historical regions, natural regions, cultural regions and administrative regions. In 
practice, the borders of different types of regions do not always coincide. For 
example, a natural region may be managed by several administrative regions. 
 
(1) Region and Local 
In this research, the scope of region was confined to that of a sovereign state. 
Before defining the region in a specific country, the relationships between regional 
and local must be made clear first. In political theory, local always has some 
connection with the local government, which means “a large number of relatively 
small governments wielding power over such critical matters as local land use 
regulation, local taxation, and the financing of local public services”.113 Before the 
1920s, politicians and scholars were mainly concerned with the relationship between 
local government and the state or central government. But with the change of 
economic and social life in the background of the formation of Fordism, the old 
central-local system could not be used to follow the needs of society. Louis Wirth 
stated that the old arrangements of political and administrative units were “obstacles 
rather than aids in social life”.114 
Scholars began to find some alternative methods to balance localism and 
centralization. Region is considered to be an appropriate space, in which different 
local organizations can coordinate with each other, without the excessive 
intervention of the central government. And so region means the space where some 
local governments cooperate together because of common problems or common 
interests.115 In other words, region can now be taken with a broader definition, which 
may thus contain some other similar local regions. 
Note that, according to Webster's Dictionary, the word "region" is taken from the 
Latin regio (derived from regere, to rule), which means an administrative area, 
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division, or district. Many countries use the term as the formal name for a type of 
subnational entity, such as England, Italy (regione) and France (région).  Thus, in 
different research contexts, region may refer to a unit containing many localities or 
only a single locality; however, it is the first meaning that has been used in most of 
the related research projects and reports.116 In this dissertation, the meanings of 
region may be changed according different context.  
 
(2) Size of Region 
A further problem is the size of regions. Based on different sizes, economic 
traditions, and the historical factors of the country, different standards are employed 
to divide regions. The regions of the USA are based on metropolitan areas, such as 
the metropolitan regions of New York, Portland, and Oregon. Historical and 
economic factors both had effects on the regional division of Japan. Most scholars 
studying Japanese regional problems have adopted the traditional standard, which 
divides Japan into Kanto, Toukai, Hokuriku, Kinkim, Chugoku, Hokkaido, Tohoku, 
Shikoku, Kyushu, and Okinawa. However, some other scholars have argued that 
there are mainly two kinds of regions in Japan, metropolitan areas (Tokyo MA, 
Osaka MA and Nagoya MA), and non-metropolitan areas.117 In the EU, the NUTS 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) system is used for the collection, 
development and harmonization of EU regional statistics.118 There are three levels 
of NUTS: NUTS 1, major socio-economic regions; NUTS 2, basic regions for the 
application of regional policies; and NUTS 3, small regions for specific diagnoses. 
In summary, the standards used for regional analysis should consider both the 
academic standards adopted by the majority of scholars and the specific conditions 
within the countries. Because this research was mainly focused on OECD countries’ 
and China’s regional problems, the official standard, the academic standards and also 
the research topic were thoroughly considered. Specific to China's official statistics, 
there are three methods for the process of region dividing: Coastal-Inland (1949-
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1985); East, Central, and West (1986-2005); East, Central, West and Northeast 
(2006-Now). In academic research, most of scholars have adopted the East-Central-
West approach because of the convenience of data collection and the significance of 
regional disparities.119 
 
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The core question driving this study was on the relationship between regional 
disparities and decentralization. By summarizing the experiences of OECD countries 
and the explorations of China, this paper presents answers to the questions of whether 
China, as well as other developing countries should adopt the decentralizing system, 
so as to handle the increasingly complex regional challenges. In the first place, the 
multiple connotations of decentralization are clarified, which are divided into fiscal 
decentralization, administrative decentralization and welfare decentralization. Then, 
how the three dimensions of decentralization affect one country’s regional 
development are discussed, based on the experiences and practices of OECD 
countries and China. 
Firstly, the transformations of OECD countries’ regional policies are discussed. 
Overall, there are three stages: the comprehensive intervention stage, in order to 
achieve equality of regional income, the focused intervention stage, so as to reduce 
regional unemployment, and the regional governance stage, for upgrading the 
regional competitiveness and coordinated development between regions. During this 
transformation process, the powers of the central government become gradually 
decentralized toward the local government, regional organizations and other 
governing bodies. However, whether the decentralization system can ease the 
regional challenges is still a controversial issue. Based on the panel data from 1996 
to 2009 of OECD countries, this project investigated the effects of three dimensions 
of decentralization on regional disparities, and also the various effects on relatively 
rich and relatively poor OECD countries. 
Some preliminary conclusions are presented: firstly, the higher degree of a 
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country’s expenditure on decentralization, the lower the degree of the country’s 
regional disparities. However, during the last decade, the decentralizing process of 
expenditure has led to the further deterioration of regional disparities. Secondly, 
taxation decentralization may also cause the escalation of regional inequalities. 
Thirdly, if the costs of the salaries of civil servants exceed one third of the total local 
expenditure, the degree of a country’s regionally imbalanced development may be 
exacerbated. Fourthly, welfare decentralization may not have the desired effects on 
reducing regional disparities. 
Secondly, the relationships between fiscal decentralization and regional disparities 
of China are discussed from a historical perspective. Before the processes of Reform 
and Opening up (改革開放), which were led by the regional balanced development 
strategy, China had experienced two stages of fiscal decentralization to stimulate the 
development initiatives of the local government. Although the purposes of the policy 
were good, the policy implementation had become chaotic, because of the 
contradiction caused by the planning system of the central government and the 
inward looking stance of the local governments. In the process of local government’s 
internecine competitiveness, even though there was a significant increase in the 
number of firms and investments, neither the production efficiency nor the business 
efficiency grew significantly. During the ensuing process of the economic crisis and 
power adjustment, the backward regions suffered greater losses and the regional 
disparities grew sharply. 
At the beginning of the process of Reform and Opening up, after an adjustment, 
policy makers continued the implementation of fiscal decentralization, so as to act in 
concert with the regional unbalanced development strategy. According to the 
previous experience, the weak central financial and control capabilities should lead 
to the increase of regional disparities; however, the situation of regional inequalities 
showed a decrease. The reason for this anomaly was because of the process of rural 
reform. The “Household Contract Responsibility System” (生産責任制) reform 
released the developmental potentials of rural areas, increased the income of farmers 
and stimulated the emerging of township enterprises. The convergence between the 
rural and the urban in turn led to convergence between regions. During this time, the 
central government's fiscal revenue, accounting for total revenue, reached historic 
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lows of around 22%. In response to the collapse of the central government’s 
capacities, fiscal power was recentralized by the reform named “Revenue-sharing” 
(分税制 ). 120  This reform was considered to have the characteristics of fiscal 
federalism, which afforded a clearer distribution of fiscal resources between the 
central and local governments. By this system, regional fiscal disparities enlarged 
significantly. In the meantime, reasonable and effective transfer payments and the 
financial aid system had not been established; therefore, regional disparities 
demonstrated a trend of increase. 
Thirdly, the relationships between administrative decentralization and regional 
disparities are discussed, based on the experiences of China. It is difficult to establish 
a clear definition of administrative decentralization, along the lines of fiscal 
decentralization. Using the reported experience of OECD countries, this study 
analyzed administrative decentralization from three perspectives. Firstly, how the 
structure of the Chinese government affects the implementation of regional policies. 
The structure of the Chinese government can be summarized as an “overall 
isomorphic structure” (职责同构), which demonstrates that all levels of government 
have exactly the same institutional settings. On the one hand, this rigid and aligned 
structure can guarantee control by the central government of the process of regional 
policy implementation. On the other hand, it promotes a rigid and expansive form of 
government, regardless of the economic conditions of specific regions, which leads 
to contradictory messages from the central and local governments, resulting in the 
conflicts between local governments and gives rise to the segmentation between 
central departments. Each of these issues harm the effective implementation of 
regional coordination policies. Secondly, how does the size of the local government 
affect regional balanced development? The size of the local government in China 
reflects the significant regional disparities. Both the number of government officials 
and administrative expenses of relatively backward regions are too large to stimulate 
the economic and social development which are the root cause of the regional 
development gap. Thirdly, how do the incentive mechanisms of the Chinese 
                                                   
120 Notes: The “revenue-sharing” reform is thought as a reform with features of fiscal federalism. In the Western 
context, fiscal federalism means fiscal decentralization. However, in the early 1990s, Chinese central government was 
on the verge of “bankruptcy”. So, the “revenue-sharing” reform means fiscal recentralization with a western 
institutional tool. It just like a “recentralization body” wearing a “decentralization coat”. 
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government affect the execution of regional policies. Scholars regularly use the terms 
“Political Championship” and “Yardstick Competition” to generalize the incentive 
mechanisms of the Chinese government, which are thought of as the secret of China's 
economic miracle. However, intense competition between local governments has led 
to a series of contradictions in the processes of regional development, such as unfair 
competition between the rich and poor regions, vicious competition for resources, 
and the plight of the cause of regional cooperation.  
Fourthly, the relationships between public service decentralization and regional 
disparities are discussed, based on the practices of China. In general, 95% of the basic 
public services are supplied by the local government; particularly the sub-provincial 
government. Fiscal centralization and public service decentralization causes an 
inversion effect between financial resources and expenditure responsibilities. This 
situation leads to diverse problems. Firstly, the economic and financial regional 
disparities convert to regional public service disparities, which in turn establish and 
solidify the inequalities between regions. Secondly, in order to avoid a region 
becoming a “welfare magnet”, it is hard to break down the welfare barriers between 
regions, such as the Household Registration System, which causes issues of unequal 
citizenship and other injustices. Thirdly, with respect to the background of regional 
welfare barriers, China's floating population cannot enjoy equal public services 
across the working and living regions. 
In practice, though developed regions enjoy the benefits of the human capital 
brought in and are enhanced by a floating population, these regions do not have to 
undertake the cost of training and culturing the human capital. This situation causes 
the subsidies from backward regions effectively to be transferred to developed 
regions, this is called reverse subsidies, which worsen and encourage regional 
inequalities. 
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Chapter 2 Decentralization and Regional Disparities: 
Experiences of OECD Countries 
 
In the era of globalization, the regional disparities of sovereign states are common 
challenges faced by most countries. Even though the uneven distributions in 
economy are inevitable results of an economic market, industrial agglomeration, and 
global division of labor, which can benefit one country’s development, there are only 
a few countries who adopt laissez-faire policies for regional disparities. Moreover, 
most countries employ active intervention policies to ease the regional 
developmental gaps, since regional disparities are not only economic issues, but also 
political and social issues, which may lead to regional conflicts, ethnic antagonism, 
civil war and even national secession in many developing countries.121 Developed 
countries also face the same challenges. For example, the problems of Spain's 
Catalonia, Belgium's North-South confrontation and the Scottish independence 
referendum, which are all caused directly and indirectly by regional disparities.  
 
2.1 The paradigm shift of regional governance in OECD countries 
 
Regional disparities are the “chronic illness” that concerns the development of 
OECD countries. To manage the problems, countries have attempted to employ a 
number of different theories and models. Several regional development theories have 
been postulated, such as the regional convergence theory based on neo-classical 
economics, regional invention theory based on Keynesian, theories of structural and 
temporal change based on Marxism, etc.122 Meanwhile, many countries, such as the 
USA, UK, Belgium, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Japan have tried different methods 
to coordinate regional development due to their different regional issues.123 Even 
though the theories and experiences are complex, a primary trend can be identified - 
decentralization. Most OECD countries’ regional policies have transferred from 
                                                   
121 Østby, G., Nordås, R., & Rød, J. K. (2009). Regional inequalities and civil conflict in sub-saharan 
Africa. International Studies Quarterly, 53(2), 301-324. 
122 Pike, A., Pose, A. R., & Tomaney, J. (2006). Local and regional development. Routledge. 
123 Roura, J. R. C. (2011). Regional development policies in OECD Countries. Investigaciones Regionales, (19), 205-
208. 
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those of a regional balanced development led by the central government to regional 
coordinated development based on the cooperation of and competition between the 
local or regional development area. Overall, the power of regional development has 
gradually been transferred from central government to local actors since the Second 
World War.  
 
2.1.1 The stage of pursuing regional income equality based on comprehensive 
intervention of central government  
After the Second World War, most OECD countries regarded regional income 
inequalities as the target of regional policies. They confidently employed ambitious 
projects, which originated from the high speed of economic growth, sufficient fiscal 
revenue, and significant reduction of unemployment from the 1950s to 1960s which 
is known as the golden age of western development. At the same time, large-scale 
industrial upgrading and transformation under the effects of Fordism caused the 
appearance of a highly concentrated production system, the decline of old industrial 
bases, and the widening gap between the rural and urban areas, which eventually led 
to the expansion of regional development. In this context, due to the impact of 
Keynesianism, most OECD countries attempted to achieve a spatial balanced 
distribution of economic activities and regional income equality through large-scale 
regional developmental programs, fiscal transfer payments, and infrastructure 
construction led by central government.  
For example, in the inter-war period,124 some old industrial bases of the UK 
declined sharply, such as those in south-western Scotland, south Wales and north-
east England. Though this terrible situation had obtained relief during the Second 
World War, because of the demands for iron, coal, ships and weapons, the regions 
fell into fiscal difficulty during peace-time. In 1945, the Labour government enacted 
a series of regional developmental policies, such as The Distribution of Industry Act 
1945 to provide assistance to the backward regions. Several measures were taken by 
the UK government to more effectively manage increasing regional issues, such as 
building factories for rental to private enterprises, improving the infrastructure, and 
establishing regional development agencies - like the Board of Trade, which had the 
                                                   
124 Note: The period between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II. 
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right to attract and coordinate investment from public and private sectors. Later, a 
second act, Distribution of Industry Act 1950, was passed by Parliament, which 
strengthened the power of the Board of Trade.  
 
“The Board of Trade (make) further provision for the acquisition of land, creation 
of easements and carrying out of work in development areas…to make grants, in 
exceptional cases in connection with the establishment in, or transfer to, development 
areas of industrial undertakings, and to make grants or loans to housing associations 
for the provision of dwellings in development areas.”125 
 
Another example is that of the U.S. As a country advocating a free market and 
local autonomy, and though many politicians and interest groups were opposed 
regional policies which were dominated by the federal government, the regional 
comprehensive governance policies and organizations were established by the New 
Deal. These included such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, which was designed 
to provide navigation, flood control, electricity generation, fertilizer manufacturing, 
and to further the economic development of this backward region. The regional 
intervention policies remained and were renewed after the Second World War. 
Further, a series of new regional policies were implemented to ameliorate the issue 
of regional disparities. A familiar form of the policies in action was the Area 
Redevelopment Administration (ARA) which was established in 1961. 126  As a 
branch of the Department of Commerce, the ARA was empowered to fund small 
businesses and infrastructure development. The Public Works Acceleration Act of 
1962 was an enabler for the supply of more money to the ARA to further the 
programs, since the financial support from the ARA had been criticized as lacking 
an appropriate strategy, which caused a significant waste of federal funds. In 1965, a 
more comprehensive regional program was enacted. The ARA was replaced by the 
Economic Development Administration (EDA) to help the backward regions by the 
Public Works and Economic Development Act. Meanwhile, another typical regional 
developmental program was presented, called the Appalachian Regional 
                                                   
125 Carter, C. F., & Roy, A. D. (1954). British economic statistics. Cambridge University Press, p14. 
126 Hall, P., & Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2010). Urban and regional planning. Routledge, p193. 
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Development Act of 1965. The Appalachian Regional Commission was established 
to help this failing region. Infrastructure developments - particularly by highway 
construction - were the main method to improving the accessibility of the region to 
and from other richer regions. Also, the total package of the program also included 
plans to increase the common welfare provision, by such as education, medical care 
and housing.  
Not only the UK and USA, but most of the developed countries have 
attempted several methods to reduce their regional disparities over the period. 
For example, to handle the country’s regional inequalities, the Japanese 
government formulated the “Comprehensive National Development Plan (全国
総合開発計画)” in 1962 based on the Multiple Purpose Land Development Law 
1950 (国土総合開発法 ). Many specific policies were established to limit 
regional disparities, such as by land reform, subsidies for agriculture, funds for 
local public works of developing areas and the building of roads, which have 
increased the accessibility of rural and undeveloped regions. 127  The 
“Comprehensive National Development Plan” was renewed in 1969 and some 
specific industrial distribution policies were established to balance the country's 
economic structure.128 The French also enacted ambitious regional development 
plans after the Second World War. A new central bureaucracy, the General Planning 
Commission (Commissariat général au plan) was empowered to be responsible to 
tackle the issues of regional unbalanced development in 1955. In parallel, the 
implementation of regional and national planning began to be integrated. France was 
divided into twenty-one economic planning regions in 1955. The economic regions 
helped formulate the regional developmental plan, together with the central planning 
agency, called the Inter-ministerial Delegation for Territorial Planning and Regional 
Attractiveness (DATAR) 129which was directly responsible to the Prime Minister.130 
The administrative structure can be seen in the following Figure 2-1. 
                                                   
127 Mutlu, S. (1991). Regional disparities, industry and government policy in Japan. Development and Change, 22(3), 
547-586. 
128 Fujita, M., & Tabuchi, T. (1997). Regional growth in postwar Japan. Regional Science and Urban 
Economics, 27(6), 643-670. 
129 Note: The French name is “Délégation Interministérielle à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Attractivité 
Régionale”. 
130 Hansen, N., Higgins, B., & Savoie, D. J. (1990). Regional policy in a changing world. Springer. 
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Even though they were confronting different regional issues and had different 
political systems, most of the developed countries regarded the tackling of regional 
equalities as one of the most important regional development strategies, through 
applying regional subsidies, improvement for regional employment, and 
infrastructure construction being the main policy instruments. In the regional 
intervention process, central government played the key role. The UK’s Board of 
Trade, the Area Redevelopment Administration of the U.S., and the Inter-ministerial 
Delegation for Territorial Planning and Regional Attractiveness of France were each 
controlled by central or federal development. Local governments and autonomous 
organizations were empowered in a relatively more passive position. However, 
because of the asymmetry of information, the central or federal government could 
not entirely determine all the needs of the local government. The effects of the 
centralized regional policies were limited to reducing regional disparities, as 
otherwise, the centralized provision of public goods could create a conflict of interest 
between different jurisdictions. 131  Objectively speaking, though the policy’s 
                                                   
131 Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political 
economy approach. Journal of Public Economics, 87(12), 2611-2637. 
Figure 2-1 The administrative structure of the French regional planning 
Resource: Hall, P., & Tewdwr-Jones, M. (2010). Urban and regional planning. Routledge, p154. 
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efficiency during this period was not high, ambitious regional programs and large 
scale infrastructure construction did reshape the spatial patterns in most of the 
developed countries, which laid the foundation for regional balanced development in 
the future.  
 
2.1.2 The stage of reducing regional unemployment, based on focused 
interventions of the central government 
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s, because of the effects of the economic 
crisis caused by high oil prices and industrial restructuring, many old industries lost 
their competitiveness in OECD countries including those pertaining to coal mining, 
the textile industry, etc. This is because most of the old industries belonged to an era 
of Fordist systems which resulted in a specific industry being gathered in a particular 
area. The decline of one industry then caused a localised gathering of unemployment, 
which then led to a series of social and political issues. Meanwhile, most OECD 
countries were facing financial pressures, because of economic slowdown and an 
increasing need for social welfare. The former comprehensive regional intervention 
policies became heavy burdens, as they pursued many ambitious targets, and 
included a number of expensive and inefficient programs. The target of regional 
policy refocused quickly on the then urgent challenge, and so employment creation 
became the key point for regional policies. The traditional ambitious targets of 
regional redistribution were replaced by fewer specific aims, such as strengthening 
regional competitiveness, creating enhanced investing environments, and improving 
the quality of human capital. All the targets were aimed to attract outside and inside 
investors to participate in regional development, to create employment and to 
improve regional competitiveness. The limited resources from the central 
government were used to subside local public sectors, and also to assist companies, 
labor and other micro-economic entities. The regional intervention strategy changed 
from “blood transfusion” to “hematopoiesis”.  
A typical example of a country’s approach during this period was the UK. During 
the 1970s, the policies for regional industry controls were loosened and the regional 
development funds were reduced sharply due to the background of economic 
stagnation, fiscal imbalances and a new incoming conservative form of government. 
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Acceding to the Office for National Statistics of the UK, the expenditures of regional 
policies reduced from 0.5% of national income during the 1970s, to 0.25% during 
the 1980s.132 The primary regional developmental goal was changed from being a 
broad “Regional Balanced Development” to a specific “Regional Equal Employment 
Opportunity”. 133  The policy tools were transferred from being regional 
comprehensive subsides to enterprise grants. For example, the government accepted 
the “Regional Employment Premium (REP)” to encourage investment in the 
backward regions in 1976. According to the REP, the manufacturing industry was 
not required to pay any tax in the backward areas and could receive subsidies from 
the government, according to the number of employees, about £100 per annum per 
worker.134 The REP became a powerful tool used to attract industry and investment 
to the backward regions. Moreover, the policy could reduce the government’s 
administrative costs and enhance the efficiency of the regional policy. In 1970, the 
incoming Conservative government attempted to cut the investment grant of REP 
further in order to save on financial expenditure; however, the conservative policy 
did not last long, because of the sharp increase of regional unemployment.  
During this period, the U.S. also suffered from the challenges of regional 
unemployment; regional policy still continued to be implemented according to the 
principles of the Area Redevelopment Act (ARA) of 1961. The main tasks included 
the following:135 providing communities with technical assistance grants, planning 
for industrial expansion, extending loans when sufficient private credits were 
unavailable, attracting new industries by providing loans and grants for the 
modernization of public facilities, etc. The regional policy aimed at creating larger 
employment was cut a lot by the Nixon administration in 1973, due to the lack of 
efficiency, diversity and the targeted regions. Though the regional policy appeared 
to be bankrupt, other new challenges allowed the above employment assistance 
program to have its life extended. During this time, the migration of African 
Americans from the southern to northern cities, and the movement of white middle 
                                                   
132 Taylor, J., & Wren, C. (1997). UK regional policy: an evaluation. Regional Studies, 31(9), 835-848. 
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class from the city to its suburbs led to a series of problems; particularly the decline 
of the city centres. The poor gathered in city centres, which did not provide sufficient 
job opportunities, education or medical care. These poor social conditions further 
induced an increase in violent crime, drug abuse, and illegitimate births. Because of 
the relocation of the middle class and businesses, city governments did not have 
adequate financial income to effectively manage the emerging issues. To deal with 
the urban/suburban problems, the federal government saw that it had no choice, but 
to strengthen direct financial assistance to the cities. According to some estimates, 
direct federal aid rose from 1% to about 47.5% of income for the administration of 
several large cities.136 Further, in order to address the problem of urban decline and 
unemployment, some older policies were re-adopted, 
 
The ﬁrst was public–private partnerships, in which cities allied with private 
developers with major injections of federal and state money in the form of grants for 
public works, subsidies linked to private leverage, and tax exemptions including the 
designation of enterprise zones, as well as new institutional forms such as 
development corporations to regenerate a major part of their decayed inner-city 
area, often an old port area or an abandoned railroad freight yard, via a major 
construction-plus-rehabilitation project.137 
 
In general, regional policies during this period also continued to apply previous 
regional strategies. There were a few minor changes: regional development 
objectives were more focused on the problem of unemployment; the central or 
federal government still played a leading role, but the roles of the local government, 
enterprises and other macro-organizations had more attention paid to them; regional 
development and coordination agencies maintained with the previous settings, while 
a few functions were adjusted to adapt to the new regional plans. 
 
2.1.3 The stage of promoting regional competitiveness based on regional 
governance 
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The regional development model at this stage was different from those of previous 
periods. There had previously been deeply held doubts about the role of the market; 
the policy makers and scholars thought that regional disparities could not be 
corrected by using market mechanisms. Furthermore, the polarization effects of the 
free market were stronger than the diffusion effects. It was considered that, if the 
government did not lead the control of flow of production-related factors, then 
regional inequalities would unceasingly expand.138 Based on this above judgment, 
the mainstream flow of regional policies in OECD countries consisted in public 
investment and financial aid by the central or federal government, which was targeted 
to distribute and redistribute resources to backward regions up until the 1980s. 
However, the degree of regional disparities did reflect clear trends of a narrowing of 
the gaps in most OECD countries during this period.139 The reasons for regional 
policy failures are: firstly, the ambitious regional programs did not have sufficient 
and sustained financial and other support mechanisms, because of economic 
slowdown and financial austerity; secondly, the top-down regional intervention 
model was not able to cope with the variety of complex regional issues; thirdly, the 
goals of regional policy were too wide in relation to the centralized resources.  
From the late 1970s, Conservatism began to sweep the western world; reducing 
government intervention and returning to the market economy which became the 
panacea intended to cure all forms of government failure, including regional policies. 
During this period, many governments began to cut the programs and budgets related 
to regional issues. In the UK, the population affected by regional policies reduced 
from 43% to 25%. In the U.S., regional policies were redesigned mainly to manage 
the suburb/urban issues. However, regional inequality was not relieved by these neo-
liberal policies. In most OECD countries, regional inequalities displayed a widening 
trend. In the plight caused by the double failure of government and market, some 
countries and scholars began to explore new models to pragmatically deal with 
complex regional issues.  
Regional development goals were altered from focussing in on regional income or 
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employment equality to those related to enhancing regional competitiveness. 140The 
related policies not only covered the backward regions, but also the rich regions 
where their regional competitiveness also had to be refreshed in the era of 
globalization. Regional development standards changed from one-size-fit-all to 
being flexible, responding to local conditions. The most important change was due 
to the failure of the top-down government intervention model, which was then 
replaced by the regional endogenous growth and regional innovation model with the 
core strategy of effecting a gradual decentralization.141 Regional governance, based 
on decentralization, became a widely accepted idea, not only by western developed 
countries, but also in many developing countries, such as India, Brazil and China.142 
New Regionalism and Multilevel Governance were considered as two successful 
regional governance models.  
Though the nature and sources of the models of regional governance vary 
signiﬁcantly between societies and nations, they each share the common belief that 
the regional scale is the ideal space for the formulation and implementation of 
economic policies. The regions more easily can recognize their advantages and 
disadvantages, can better sense the changing industry trends both domestically and 
internationally with greater sensitivity, and can maintain relatively stable coalitions 
across class and by a locally-based alliance of social and political actors.143 Further, 
the coalition and cooperation of different members - such as of the central 
government, local governments, enterprises, NGOs and citizens - can enhance the 
suitability and efficiency of regional policies, and also ensure its legitimacy.144 
 
Table 2-1 Traditional top-down and new model bottom-up policies and institutions 
Characteristics Traditional top-down New model bottom-up 
Organization National  
Government department 
  
Regional 
Semi-autonomous body  
(agency, partnership) 
                                                   
140 Boudreau, J. A. (2003). The politics of territorialization: regionalism, localism and other isms… The case of 
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Bureaucracy  
Generalist qualiﬁcations  
Administrative hierarchy 
and infrastructure 
Business-led 
Speciﬁc expertise 
Task-led projects and teams 
Political control Directly through 
government department and 
ministerial 
responsibility 
Indirectly through sponsor 
government departments and weak 
accountability structures 
Operational freedom Limited Arm’s length earned autonomy and 
target-based ﬂexibility 
Economic objectives Inter-regional equality 
  
Growth of national economy 
Redistributed growth 
Inter-regional competitiveness and 
raising economic performance 
Growth of regional economy 
Indigenous/imported growth 
Mode of operation Non-selective   
Automatic/discretionary  
Reactive 
Selective 
Discretionary 
Proactive 
Policy instruments Bureaucratic regulation 
Financial inducements 
Advisory services 
Public provision 
Financial inducements 
Advisory services 
Public provision 
Source: Pike, A., Pose, A. & Tomaney, J. (2006). Local and regional development. Routledge, p134. 
 
During this period, the central government was no longer the only and leading 
policy maker, but RDAs (regional development agency) assumed an important role 
in regional development. For example, in Bologna, Italy, ERVET145, which was 
established by the regional government of Emilia Romagna in 1973, is thought of as 
the key factor behind the rapid economic growth of this area.146 The secret of 
ERVET’s success belonged to the social networks which linked the unions, the 
cooperative movement, artisan associations and employers, in order to coordinate 
and encourage them toward a common goal.147 The relationship between regional 
government and ERVET is both close and different. The macro decision-making 
responsibility was assumed by the regional government, and the micro policy-
implementation responsibility was assumed by ERVET, which constituted experts 
and representatives from all walks of life. In this model, the advantages of the 
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different bodies were given full play.  
 
RDAs have also been established in many other countries, such as in the North-
East of England, the Ontario Province of Canada, Silicon Valley in the U.S., etc. 
Moreover, the effective coverage of RDAs has begun to go beyond national 
boundaries. An example is the establishment of the cross-border Oresund region, 
which combines the regions of Skåne of Sweden, and Zealand of Denmark linked by 
the Oresund Bridge. In addition to the spatial connection, a new Oresund Committee 
was established to manage the economic and social affairs of this cross-national 
region. According to the review by OECD, “The committee is composed of local and 
regional political bodies from both sides of the sound and – which is quite exceptional 
for transnational regionalism – by the two national ministries . . . The process of 
integration in Øresund is therefore achieved not through the setting up of an 
additional government layer but through the voluntary coordination of the policies 
Figure 2-2 The relationship between the regional government and ERVET 
Source: Pike, A., Pose, A. R., & Tomaney, J. (2006). Local and regional development. Routledge, p138. 
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of its members.”148 Though the governments still play an important role in this region, 
the complex and sophisticated regional social networks, including universities, 
research institutions and industrial organization have become the main driving force 
of the regional innovation systems (RIS) of this region.149 
There is yet no consensuses about the effects of regional governance with respect 
to the character of decentralization. Some scholars argue that regional governance is 
basically the continuation of neo-liberal policies, which attempt to evade the 
responsibilities of the regional redistribution of government.150 However, generally 
speaking, there are success stories across the world, which instill confidence in the 
scholars and policy makers regarding regional governance as being within the core 
of decentralization. 
 
2.2 Decentralization and Regional Inequality ： Literature 
review 
 
The relationship between decentralization and inequality is a relatively new topic 
of discussion in recent years. Theoretically, the discussions of decentralization and 
regional disparities originated from fiscal federalism. The representatives of 
federalism, Wallace E. Oates151 and Charles Tiebout152 argue that contrary to the 
central government, local governments can obtain more information about the 
diverse local public needs and enhance the efficiency of the supply of public goods; 
citizens can self-supervise and motivate behaviors, and decision-making is more 
conveniently located with local officials than with centrally-located officials. The 
accountability and responsiveness of the local government’s behavior can be 
enhanced in a decentralized system; citizens can vote with their feet and select 
different public services in different regions, which can maximize the allocation of 
public goods and social welfare. In short, the aim is for regional disparities to be 
                                                   
148 OECD (2003), OECD Territorial Reviews: Oresund, Denmark/Sweden 2003, OECD Publishing, p160. 
149 Hansen, T. (2013). Bridging regional innovation: cross-border collaboration in the Øresund Region. Geografisk 
Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography, 113(1), 25-38. 
150 Lovering, J. (1999). Theory led by policy: the inadequacies of the ‘new regionalism’ (illustrated from the case of 
Wales). International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(2), 379-395. 
151 Oates, W. E. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism. Journal of Economic Literature, 37(3), 1120-1149. 
152 Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416-424. 
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erased through decentralized systems, by market mechanisms and local competitions. 
However, some scholars argue that the fiscal federalism theory is too idealistic. In 
practice, there is a foundation of demanding assumptions, such as adequate market 
information, fully rational citizens, free migration, and regional public goods without 
spillovers which are difficult either to achieve or to sustain.153 
Moreover, some scholars argue that a decentralized system may drive the 
inequality between regions. In a decentralized country, rich regions can provide high 
quality public services with a lower tax rate, because of larger tax bases. In this 
context, rich regions will attract more investment and other resources into the future, 
which allow these regions to continue to become more affluent, while the central 
government lacks sufficient redistributive powers in order to coordinate the lessening 
of inequalities between regions.154 On the contrary, the centralized system may 
possess more inspiration and better resources to manage and control the difficulties 
caused by regional disparities. However, other scholars, such as Qian and 
Weingast155 argue that the territorial competition in the decentralized system would 
stimulate less developed regions to offer more favorable conditions to attract more 
investment and other resources, such as lower tax rates, less welfare burdens, land 
use facilities, etc. The pressure of competition then will encourage the poor regions 
to catch up with rich ones, without the need for mandated coordinating programs.  
Apart from these theoretical disputes, some case studies were investigated and 
reported on the relationship between decentralization and regional inequality. In a 
case in the U.S., Akai and Sakata showed that decentralization could be advantageous 
for economic growth and regional equality.156 In another case regarding China, Fan, 
anbur and Zhang proposed that the fiscal decentralized process, together with reform 
and opening up, may be one of the important reasons of the enlarged regional 
disparities.157 In a case on Italy, Calamai identified a clear link between the process 
                                                   
153 Prud'Homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer, 10(2), 201-220. 
154 Sewell, D. O. (1996). “The Dangers of Decentralization" According to Prud'homme: Some Further Aspects. The 
World Bank Research Observer, 143-150. 
155 Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1997). Federalism as a commitment to preserving market incentives. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 83-92. 
156 Akai, N., & Sakata, M. (2002). Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth: evidence from state-level 
cross-section data for the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 52(1), 93-108. 
157 Fan, S., Kanbur, R., & Zhang, X. (2011). China's regional disparities: Experience and policy. Review of 
Development Finance, 1(1), 47-56. 
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of devolution and the reduction of spatial inequalities.158 Finally, regarding a case of 
the EU, the centralized trend was seen to have fostered the catching-up of lagging 
countries and the reduction of the overall disparities.159 There are several other case 
studies, which can be divided into two groups: the first concluded that 
decentralization would enlarge regional disparities (such as Bonet for Colombia,160 
Chakravorty for India,161 Hill for Indonesia and the Philippines162), the second group 
argued that decentralization is related to the decrease of regional disparities (such as 
Costa-Font for Spain,163 and Albrechts for Belgium.164) Taken as a whole, these case 
studies depict a confusing picture about the relationship between decentralization and 
regional disparities.  
By overcoming the defects and limitations of using single case studies, other 
researchers have attempted to develop a comparative research model by applying 
cross-country data sets. By utilizing data collected from 14 developing and 
developed countries, Shankar and Shah165 propose that decentralized countries have 
performed better in restraining regional disparities, because of the greater political 
risk that these disparities have posed for such countries. One of the defects of this 
research was that decentralization, which was measured by the dummy variable of 
federalism, was too simplistic to effectively evaluate the actual conditions of 
decentralization. Moreover, the number of samples in the study was also too small to 
reach a clear conclusion. Canaleta, Arzoz and Garate166, by using a sample of 17 
OECD countries, state that they had found a positive influence from decentralization; 
particularly that of fiscal decentralization on regional convergence. The concept of 
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decentralization in this study was divided into a political dimension and a fiscal 
dimension, which then were evaluated by various indicators. However, the 
correlations between the different indicators were not then tested and the use of 
control variables also were not considered in the study. In a series of cross-country 
analyses performed by Rodríguez and Ezcurra167 the panel data from 26 developing 
and developed countries were used to overcome the shortcoming of the sectoral study, 
which could not be analyzed through the lack of sufficient control variables. 
However, the measurement of fiscal decentralization was simplistic, reached only by 
applying subnational governmental expenditure as a percentage of the overall 
governmental expenditure. A recent study, by Lessmann168, utilized cross-section and 
panel data for 23 OECD countries from 1982 to 2000 and concluded that 
decentralization can decrease the degree of regional disparities. The study overcomes 
drawbacks of previous studies; however, it was flawed in that the different effects of 
decentralization on developing and developed countries had not been considered in 
the study. 
 
2.3 Measurement of Decentralization and Regional Inequality 
 
Based on the experience of and defects in previous studies regarding this topic, 
this study endeavored to revisit the linkage between decentralization and regional 
disparities, based on the panel data collected from a sample of 26 OECD countries.169 
Attentions was also paid to a careful examination of the different effects of 
decentralization on relatively rich and poor countries.170 
 
                                                   
167 Ezcurra, R., Gil, C., & Pascual, P. (2005). Regional welfare disparities: the case of the European Union. Applied 
Economics, 37(12), 1423-1437. Ezcurra, R., & Pascual, P. (2008). Fiscal decentralization and regional disparities: 
evidence from several European Union countries. Environment and Planning A, 40(5), 1185. Rodríguez-Pose, A., & 
Ezcurra, R. (2009). Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A cross-country analysis. Journal of 
Economic Geography, lbp049. 
168 Lessmann, C. (2009). Fiscal decentralization and regional disparity: evidence from cross-section and panel data. 
Environment and Planning A, 41, 2455-2473. 
169 Notes: The data of GDP per capita, revenue, expenditure are all collected form the OECD Statistics, 
http://stats.oecd.org/. It should be noted that the reliability of OECD is widely recognized by academia. This is one of 
the reason that this research take OECD countries as the studying object. In addition, most of the data are mutual 
confirmed with the data form IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
170 Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Ezcurra, R. (2009). Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A cross-country 
analysis. Journal of Economic Geography, lbp049. 
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2.3.1 Measurement of Regional Disparities  
As mentioned above (in the discussion of the introductory section) there are several 
different definitions of regional disparities, and also several indexes used to evaluate 
regional disparities. In this section, the GDP per capita was used to define regional 
disparities, as is common in the literature. The Gini coefficient, Theil index, the 
Atkinson family of indices and Coefficient of Variation were all employed to 
estimate the level of regional disparities. That is because each of them has both 
distinct advantages and disadvantages.  
 
Table 2-2 Different measurement of regional inequalities of OECD countries: 1996-2000 
Countries GINI R CV R GE1 R GE2 R A0.5 R A1 R A2 R 
Austria 0.12  11 0.23  12 0.03  12 0.03  12 0.01  12 0.02  13 0.05  13 
Australia 0.04  25 0.07  25 0.00  25 0.00  25 0.00  25 0.00  25 0.00  25 
Belgium 0.17  7 0.37  6 0.06  6 0.07  6 0.03  6 0.05  7 0.09  8 
Canada 0.08  20 0.14  21 0.01  21 0.01  21 0.01  21 0.01  20 0.02  20 
Chile 0.19  4 0.37  5 0.06  5 0.07  5 0.03  5 0.06  5 0.12  4 
Czech 
Republic 
0.11  14 0.31  8 0.04  9 0.05  8 0.02  9 0.03  9 0.06  9 
Denmark 0.09  19 0.17  19 0.01  19 0.01  19 0.01  19 0.01  19 0.03  19 
Finland 0.09  17 0.18  18 0.02  18 0.02  18 0.01  18 0.02  18 0.03  17 
France 0.12  10 0.26  10 0.03  10 0.03  10 0.01  10 0.03  10 0.05  10 
Germany 0.10  15 0.20  17 0.02  16 0.02  17 0.01  16 0.02  16 0.04  15 
Greece 0.07  24 0.14  22 0.01  22 0.01  22 0.00  22 0.01  22 0.02  22 
Hungary 0.18  6 0.34  7 0.05  7 0.06  7 0.03  7 0.05  6 0.10  6 
Ireland 0.22  3 0.42  4 0.08  3 0.09  4 0.04  3 0.07  3 0.13  3 
Italy 0.16  8 0.28  9 0.04  8 0.04  9 0.02  8 0.04  8 0.09  7 
Japan 0.08  21 0.13  23 0.01  23 0.01  23 0.00  23 0.01  23 0.02  23 
Korea 0.03  26 0.06  26 0.00  26 0.00  26 0.00  26 0.00  26 0.00  26 
Mexico 0.29  2 0.57  2 0.14  2 0.17  2 0.07  2 0.12  2 0.21  2 
Netherlands 0.07  23 0.13  24 0.01  24 0.01  24 0.00  24 0.01  24 0.02  24 
Poland 0.12  13 0.22  15 0.02  15 0.02  15 0.01  15 0.02  14 0.04  14 
Portugal 0.12  12 0.25  11 0.03  11 0.03  11 0.01  11 0.03  11 0.05  12 
Slovakia 0.18  5 0.43  3 0.07  4 0.09  3 0.03  4 0.06  4 0.11  5 
Slovenia 0.46  1 0.98  1 0.42  1 0.48  1 0.21  1 0.44  1 0.75  1 
Spain 0.13  9 0.22  14 0.03  13 0.03  14 0.01  13 0.03  12 0.05  11 
Sweden 0.09  18 0.20  16 0.02  17 0.02  16 0.01  17 0.02  17 0.03  18 
UK 0.10  16 0.23  13 0.02  14 0.03  13 0.01  14 0.02  15 0.04  16 
USA 0.07  22 0.16  20 0.01  20 0.01  20 0.01  20 0.01  21 0.02  21 
Note: R means Rank. Source: Calculated by author.  
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Table 2-2 displays the different indices of inequality for the GDP per capita of 26 
OECD countries, and a five year average was used to compensate for the influence 
of the economic cycle. Because of the different characteristics of the indices, the rank 
of a specific country may vary, such as Chile, Austria, Slovakia and the UK. Overall, 
the countries that display the largest regional inequality are Slovenia, Mexico, Ireland, 
and Chile. The countries that show the least regional inequality are South Korea, 
Australia, the Netherlands, Japan and the U.S.A. Given the above description, it was 
concluded that the regional inequality in relatively developing countries is more 
severe than that in relatively developed countries.  
Further, the researcher should be careful about what precisely is to be measured in 
a research study. Specifically for this study, there were two different concepts of 
regional inequality under research. 171  The first concept of regional inequality 
measured inequalities in the mean GDP between regions. Each region was treated 
equally and no weighting was involved. The formula for obtaining the mean GDP 
was for the regional GDP to be divided by the population of the region. Concept 1 
was the most intuitional index of the regional developmental condition. Based on this 
concept, some coefficients were invented to calculate regional inequality, such as the 
coefficient of variation (CV). Where this is the country's average GDPpc, yi is the 
GDPpc of region i, and n is the number of sub-national units. 
 
CV =
1
?̅?
√
1
𝑛
∑ (?̅? − 𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1                                     (2.1)                                                                          
CVp =
1
?̅?
√∑ 𝑝𝑖(?̅? − 𝑦𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1                                   (2.2)                                                                        
 
The second conception of regional inequality was also based on the regional mean 
GPD, weighted by the region’s population. So, in Concept 1, all regions were given 
the same importance, but in Concept 2, regions with a higher population were given 
greater importance. Concept 2 may reflect the feeling of inequality within a nation 
better than Concept 1. The population-weighted inequality was useful in exploring 
                                                   
171 Milanovic, B. (2005). Half a world: Regional inequality in five great federations. Journal of the Asia Pacific 
Economy, 10(4), 408-445. 
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the relationship between regional inequality and population or the population growth 
rate. One coefficient based on Concept 2 was the population-weighted coefficient of 
variation, or CVp. By comparing formula (2.1) and formula (2.2), the difference 
between the two concepts was evident: in Concept 1, all the regions were equally 
treated as 1/n, regardless of the size of the population; in Concept 2, pi was the share 
of the country's total population in region i. 
 
Table 2-3 Regional inequalities of 26 OECD countries measured by population weighted CV 
and CV: 1996-2009 
Countries CVp Rank CV Rank Countries CVp Rank CV Rank 
Australia 0.0778 25 0.1411 24 Italy 0.2754 9 0.2664 11 
Austria 0.2131 14 0.2053 16 Japan 0.1315 24 0.1150 25 
Belgium 0.3590 6 0.3709 6 Korea 0.0555 26 0.0933 26 
Canada 0.1663 20 0.2512 12 Mexico 0.6213 1 0.7825 1 
Chile 0.3575 7 0.4871 3 Netherlands 0.1345 23 0.1655 21 
Czech 
0.3739 5 0.3829 5 Poland 0.2473 13 0.2172 15 
Republic 
Denmark 0.1674 18 0.1626 22 Portugal 0.2529 11 0.1970 17 
Finland 0.1670 19 0.2190 14 Slovakia 0.4713 3 0.4729 4 
France 0.2704 10 0.1763 19 Slovenia 0.6102 2 0.5448 2 
Germany 0.1926 17 0.2776 10 Spain 0.2120 15 0.1905 18 
Greece 0.1437 22 0.1487 23 Sweden 0.1990 16 0.1712 20 
Hungary 0.3932 4 0.3519 8 UK 0.2508 12 0.2353 13 
Ireland 0.3320 8 0.3103 9 USA 0.1643 21 0.3525 7 
Source: OECD statistic, calculated by author. 
 
Table 2-3 illustrates that the condition of regional inequality of a specific country 
may be measured by CVp or CV. For example, the CVp of the U.S.A. was 
approximately 0.15, which ranked the country at 21st in relation to the other countries; 
however, the CV was approximately 0.352 which produced a relative rank of 7th. The 
phenomenon demonstrated that a larger number of the population lived in rich 
regions and the developmental gap between the rich and poor regions was relatively 
large. Another notable case was France, in which the value of CVp was much higher 
than the CV value. This revealed that the developmental levels between the regions 
were relative small, but also that fewer people resided in the affluent regions and 
most of the people lived in relatively poor regions.  
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Another important issue that should be noted is that of the correlations between 
various indices. From table 2-4, nearly all the indices were highly correlated (the 
coefficient of correlation was greater than 0.8) except for the CVp and GE0.1 values. 
Because of the high correlations, for the convenience of the research and comparable 
to most of the related researches, the CVp was utilized as the primary index to 
evaluate the degree of regional inequality. Other indices were evaluated for 
robustness.  
  
Table 2-4 Correlations between different measures of inequality 
 GINI CVp GE0.1 GE0 GE1 GE2 A0.5 A1 A2 
GINI 1.0000         
CVp 0.9759 1.0000        
GE0.1 0.9759 0.6879 1.0000       
GE0 0.9759 0.8448 0.9660 1.0000      
GE1 0.9759 0.9342 0.8915 0.9760 1.0000     
GE2 0.9759 0.9414 0.8396 0.9356 0.9832 1.0000    
A0.5 0.9759 0.9095 0.9202 0.9898 0.9964 0.9675 1.0000   
A1 0.9759 0.8836 0.9381 0.9955 0.9874 0.9488 0.9972 1.0000  
A2 0.9759 0.8585 0.9282 0.9846 0.9661 0.9154 0.9823 0.9922 1.0000  
Source: OECD statistic, calculated by author. 
 
2.3.2 Measurement of Decentralization 
As stated at the outset (see introduction), decentralization is a highly complicated 
and controversial concept. As Aaron Schneider states, 
 
The proliferation of meanings and measures erodes precision and impedes our 
ability to assess types of decentralization. The problem is worsened by the evaluative 
nature of the decentralization concept, which leads researchers to conflate 
decentralization with other concepts, especially those that are also imbued with 
positive value, such as democracy or market reforms. The result is that there is little 
agreement about what constitutes an example of decentralization, what causes 
decentralization, or what effects it is likely to have.172 
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Development, 38(3), 32-56. 
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To overcome the confusion between related research studies, some scholars argue 
that the conception of decentralization should be quantified. Because of the 
complexity of decentralization, Sharma suggests that, “... in fact, a true assessment 
of the degree of decentralization in a country can be made only if a comprehensive 
approach is adopted and rather than trying to simplify the syndrome of characteristics 
into the single dimension of autonomy, interrelationships of various dimensions of 
decentralization are taken into account.”173 Based on the indexes adopted by the 
majority of scholars, three dimensions of decentralization were evaluated: Fiscal 
decentralization, administrative decentralization and welfare decentralization (See 
table 1-1). Moreover, six indexes were utilized in order to quantify these three 
dimensions.  
It should also be noted that the six indexes used for measuring decentralization 
may have had correlations which would cause the issue of multicollinearity and so 
distort the result of the regression, or enlarge the standard error. There are two 
techniques which can be used to manage the problem: increasing the sample size, or 
deleting one of the two collinear variables (where the coefficient of correlation> |0.8|). 
When limited by the data capture resources, it is difficult to increase the sample size; 
thus, the unnecessary variable should be located and deleted. From table 2-5, it can 
be seen that expenditure decentralization was highly correlated with revenue 
decentralization (coefficient of correlation=0.9922), which means that the 
subnational revenues and expenditures in all OECD countries were at a state of 
balance. One of the two should be excluded from the analyses, and in order to 
conform to other researches, it was decided that the expenditure decentralization 
index should be adopted. Furthermore, tax decentralization and transfer payment 
decentralization were highly correlated negatively (coefficient of correlation=-0.854). 
The result was consistent with the above hypothesis that tax decentralization can 
prompt the autonomy of a subnational government, and grant decentralization can 
strengthen the control of the central government. Based on the analysis above, four 
of the six variables were adopted for use in this research project: expedec, taxdec, 
empldec and welfdec.  
                                                   
173 Sharma, C. K. (2006). Decentralization dilemma: measuring the degree and evaluating the outcomes. The Indian 
Journal of Political Science, 49-64. 
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Table 2-5 Correlation of decentralization measures based on OECD countries 
 empldec expedec revedec taxdec trandec welfdec 
empldec 1.0000       
expedec -0.1426  1.0000      
revedec -0.1539  0.9922  1.0000     
taxdec -0.2356  0.6364  0.6395  1.0000    
trandec 0.3117  -0.3286  -0.3249  -0.8584  1.0000   
welfdec -0.1440  0.7503  0.7647  0.3675  -0.0338  1.0000  
Source: OECD statistic, calculated by author. 
 
2.3.3 Control Variables  
In order to accurately determine the real effect of decentralization on regional 
inequality, it was decided that some related variables should be controlled in the 
regression model. In searching the literature, these were:174 the control variables in 
the research include country wealth, which is measured by the GDP per capita; 
country size which is evaluated by population; the degree of openness which is 
estimated by trade as a percentage of the GDP and FDI; the development speed which 
is calculated by the grow rate of the GDP; urbanization which is tested by the urban 
population as a percentage of the total population; unemployment which is reflected 
by the unemployment rate; the agglomeration which is reflected by the population of 
the metropolitan areas (more than 1 million) as a percentage of the total population; 
the size of the government which is imitated by the governmental expenses as a 
percentage of the GDP, and the degree of the welfare country which is reported by 
the expenses of health and education as a percentage of the GDP.  
 
2.4 Regression Model 
 
In order to make the result more convincing, both the sectorial regression and 
panel regression were paired to allow inspection of the links between decentralization 
and regional disparities.  
 
                                                   
174 Note: The data of FDI and Urban population are collected from Word Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/.  
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2.4.1 Sectorial Regression 
To examine whether the results of this research would be consistent with other 
scholars’ research, such as Shankar and Shah,175 and Lessman,176 the correlation 
coefficient between regional fiscal decentralization (expedec) and inequality (CVp) 
was computed, which was -0.4881 and is statistically significant. This means that 
fiscal decentralization has a negative effect on regional inequality. However, the 
result may be distorted by the simple definition of decentralization and omission of 
certain control variables; therefore, the following model was adopted:  
 
𝑅𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                 (2.3)                                                                   
 
Where RIi denotes the regional inequality in country i, DEC represents the 
condition of the different dimensions of decentralization, Ci contains the control 
variables and ε is the error term. Because of the limited sample, it was not possible 
to contain all the variables in the model; thus, some variables with a high correlation 
with regional disparity were selected as control variables, including gdppc, 
population and trade. In order to lower the effect of reverse causality, an average of 
10 years (1996-2005) was taken; independent variables were employed. Furthermore, 
considering the lag effect of decentralization on regional disparity, the average 
disparity from 2006 to 2009 was adopted to create a lag structure. 
 
Table 2-6 The impact of decentralization on regional inequality: cross-section regression 
Variables Coef. Std. Err. t-value 
empldec -0.018 0.178  -0.100  
expedec -0.311* 0.179  -1.740  
taxdec 0.211* 0.116  1.820  
welfdec 0.039 0.083  0.470  
gdppc -4.670E-06** 1.830E-06 -2.560  
population 6.150E-10** 2.830E-10 2.170  
trade 0.004*** 0.001  4.150  
constant 0.197  0.093  2.120  
Adjust R2 0.6312 Observations 22 
                                                   
175 Shankar, R., & Shah, A. (2003). Bridging the economic divide within countries: A scorecard on the performance of 
regional policies in reducing regional income disparities. World Development, 31(8), 1421-1441. 
176 Lessmann, C. (2009). Fiscal decentralization and regional disparity: evidence from cross-section and panel data. 
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F(7, 14) 6.13 Prob > F 0.0020 
Notes: the dependent variable is the CVp, the population-weighted coefficient of the variation of the regional GDP per capita. 
*Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: OECD statistic, calculated by author. 
 
As presented in table 2-6, the expenditure decentralization had a negative effect on 
regional inequality and was significant at a 10% level; tax decentralization had a 
positive effect on regional inequality and was significant at a 10% level; the effect of 
employment decentralization and welfare decentralization were not significant. The 
results indicated that regional inequality was smaller in the country with a higher 
percentage of subnational expenditures; that regional inequality was larger in the 
country transferring more taxing power to the subnational government. Furthermore, 
the effects of each of the control variables were all significant; however, the effect 
was not large. The results demonstrated that big countries had a larger regional 
inequality; rich countries had smaller regional inequality; trade or openness may have 
increased the degree of regional inequality of a specific country. The findings of the 
research generally conform to that reported in other scholars’ studies. 
 
2.4.2 Panel Regression 
Compared to cross-sector data, panel data not only provides a large number of 
observations which can include more variables in the regression model, but also 
allow researchers to inspect internal country effects and capture the unobserved time-
invariant factors.177 Therefore, in this section, the panel regression was used to test 
the preliminary results obtained from cross-sector regression. There are three basic 
stationary panel regression models: pooled regression, which treat the case i 
measuring in different times as a new case and neglects the specific relationships of 
the same cases; fix-effect model, which treats the individual effects as fixed factors; 
and, the random-effect model, which treats the individual effects as random factors. 
Many methods have been devised to help the researcher make a selection between 
the fixed effect and random effect model, and the most commonly used method is 
the Hausman test. For this research project, the Hausman test supported the fix-effect 
model, which was also used in other related research studies. Therefore, the pooled 
                                                   
177 Xie, Y., & Hannum, E. (1996). Regional variation in earnings inequality in reform-era urban China. American 
Journal of Sociology, 950-992. 
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regression model and fix-effect model were adopted for the research in order to 
inspect the relationship between decentralization and regional inequality.178 
In this section, the panel data of 26 OECD countries from 1996-2009 were used. 
Following the approach of Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurr,179 the different effects of 
decentralization on regional inequality between rich and poor countries were to be 
tested. Due to the limited sample size and also the average high economic level of 
OECD countries, the standard used by the World Bank to divide rich and poor 
countries were not appropriate for this research. Therefore, the countries’ average 
GDP per capita for 14 years was divided by 20 000 dollars (the value of 2005). 
Countries above the standard were treated as ‘rich’, and vice versa. Specifically, the 
relatively poor countries included Chile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
South Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also, on consideration of the 
lag effect of decentralization on regional disparity, the one year lagged CVp was 
defined. 
 
Table 2-7 The impact of decentralization on regional inequality: panel regression 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
empldec 
0.083 
(0.059) 
0.434*** 
(0.104) 
0.184*** 
(0.063) 
0.292*** 
(0.074) 
0.648*** 
(0.097) 
-0.093 
(0.093) 
expedec 
-0.304*** 
(0.075) 
-0.363** 
(0.169) 
0.055 
(0.115) 
-0.007 
(0.095) 
0.308** 
(0.122) 
0.069 
(0.123) 
taxdec 
0.254*** 
(0.043) 
0.506*** 
(0.108) 
0.242*** 
(0.047) 
-0.030 
(0.052) 
0.102* 
(0.057) 
-0.025 
(0.076) 
weldec 
-0.012 
(0.024) 
0.101 
(0.144) 
0.014 
(0.024) 
0.107*** 
(0.039) 
0.179** 
(0.079) 
0.096** 
(0.041) 
gdpgrow 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-2.0E-04 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
gdppc 
-4.3E-07 
(4.8E-07) 
8.1E-07 
(1.7E-06) 
8.8E-07 
(5.7E-07) 
-4.9E-07 
(3.4E-07) 
-1.1E-07 
(1.1E-06) 
-1.0E-06*** 
(3.7E-07) 
governexpen 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
popinmetro 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
-0.033*** 
(0.012) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
                                                   
178 Lessmann, C. (2012). Regional inequality and decentralization: an empirical analysis. Environment and Planning 
A, 44, 1363-1388. 
179 Rodríguez-Pose, A., & Ezcurra, R. (2009). Does decentralization matter for regional disparities? A cross-country 
analysis. Journal of Economic Geography, lbp049. 
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population 
4.3E-
10*** 
(1.4E-10) 
-4.7E-09* 
(2.4E-09) 
1.1E-09*** 
(2.0E-10) 
-8.2E-10 
(1.3E-09) 
-5.4E-
08*** 
(7.4E-09) 
9.1E-10 
(1.4E-09) 
eduexpen 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.048*** 
(0.018) 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.010) 
healthexpen 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.029*** 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
trade 
0.003*** 
(3.4E-04) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.000) 
0.001** 
(4.3E-04) 
0.001*** 
(4.5E-04) 
-2.8E-05 
(0.001) 
unemploy 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
-1.8E-04 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
urban 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.004) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
cons 
0.083 
(0.066) 
-0.510** 
(0.200) 
-0.195** 
(0.089) 
-0.279 
(0.214) 
1.331*** 
(0.374) 
-0.644*** 
(0.235) 
Adjusted R2 0.546 0.911 0.597 0.2340 0.6379 0.0990 
Obs/Group 228 67 161 228/13 67/9 161/20 
Sample all poor rich all poor rich 
Notes: *Significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Source: OECD statistic, calculated by author. 
 
In table 2-7, column (1), (2) and (3) were the results of pooled regression, and 
column (4), (5) and (5) were the results of Fixed-effects (within) regression. The 
result of pooled regression of all countries was approximately the same, as the result 
of cross-sector regression (Table 2-6); expenditure decentralization had a negative 
effect and tax decentralization had a positive effect on regional inequality. Regarding 
rich and poor countries, employment and tax decentralization both had positive 
effects on regional inequality; however, the negative effect of expenditure 
decentralization on poor countries was not significant relative to the case of the rich 
ones. Welfare decentralization was not significant in the pooled regression. Some 
interesting outcomes can be seen in the controlled variables. Population gathering in 
the metropolitan may have decreased the regional inequality of poor countries, but 
may have increased it in the rich countries; these opposite directional affections also 
existed in education expenditure, population, and urbanization. Otherwise, the trade 
and unemployment rate may have fostered a regional inequality of rich countries, 
and health expenditure restrained it, while these variables did not display a significant 
effect in relatively poor countries.  
The results of fixed-effects (within) regression presented a different picture. For 
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every countries, the affection of employment decentralization and welfare 
decentralization were positively significant, while the affection of expenditure and 
welfare decentralization, which were significant in pooled regression, were not 
significant. Also, fixed-effects (within) regression primarily were evident on the 
within-group variation in different times and neglected the between-group variation. 
Thus, the results reflected the diachronic effects during the 14 years. For relatively 
poor countries, all dimensions of decentralization had a positive effect on regional 
inequality. Government expenditure, trade and urbanization may also have 
contributed to regional inequality.  
Contrariwise, the growth of GDP and population in the metropolitan areas may 
have helped correct regional disparity. For relatively rich countries, only welfare 
decentralization had a significant effect on regional inequality, whereas the effects 
of other dimensions were not significant. In contrast to relatively poor countries, a 
higher GDP growth rate and more population in the metropolitan areas may have led 
to the growth of regional inequality. Government expenditure and urbanization were 
also seen to be reasons for regional inequality.  
As a next step to extract more information from the data, the researcher devised a 
quadratic equation, which could be used in order to determine whether there was an 
impact caused by decentralization upon regional development. According to the 
calculation, local government welfare spending accounted for 51.81% of the total 
local expenditure, which was an important indicator where regional disparities 
reached their maximum. Typical examples were Mexico (53.1%) and Belgium 
(52.8%). In OECD countries, when the expenses of government employment 
accounted for 35.55% total financial expenses, the degree of regional disparities may 
have reached the lowest values. The countries with relatively small regional 
inequalities had maintained the level of government expenses, such as in South Korea, 
Japan, the U.S., Greece and Canada. A ratio either too large or too small may have 
led to the exacerbation of regional disparities. Another indicator was that the local 
tax revenue accounted for 47.69% of the total revenue. At this point, the country’s 
regional disparity may have reached a low level. Typical countries are Japan (46.2%) 
and Denmark (47.5%).  
 
66 
2.5 Results and Advice 
 
Decentralization has become an important agenda for many developing and 
developed countries. Scholars and policy makers not only discuss the benefits of 
decentralization to economic development, social justice and democratization, but 
also the attempts to take advantage of decentralization to control the long lasting 
regional inequalities; particularly in OECD countries.180 During an extended period, 
most OECD countries have adopted top-down regional intervention policies in order 
to correct regional disparities; however, the effects of these regional policies, when 
led by the central government were not ideal. In many countries, the degrees of 
regional disparities did not only decrease, but they have also enlarged sharply against 
the background of the economic slowdown and financial austerity. The laissez-faire 
policies guided by neo-liberalism also did not demonstrate the ability to cure uneven 
regional development.  
Faced with the dilemma, many countries began to decentralize developmental 
power to local and regional governments. The measures have included dividing the 
taxing and expenditure responsibilities between the central and subnational 
government, transferring welfare responsibilities to the subnational government, 
establishing a regional government, electing local officials, constricting “soft” co-
operation mechanisms between subnational governments, etc. Countries have 
endeavored to utilize these measures in order to exploit the potential of endogenous 
assets and local networks and to promote entrepreneurship, local innovation, and 
sustainable development, and finally to narrow the spatial developmental inequality.  
However, an agreement between scholars and officials, regarding the actual 
effects of decentralization on regional disparity, has not been reached. Coming from 
a base of reports in the related literature, this research used panel data of OECD 
countries from 1996-2009 to test the relationships between decentralization and 
regional disparities. In addition, the study presents two further innovations: First, 
decentralization which was interpreted from multiple dimensions, including fiscal 
decentralization, administrative decentralization and welfare decentralization; 
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second, the different effects of decentralization on relatively rich and poor countries 
were considered and presented. However, this research project does not reach the 
conclusion that there is evidence of a clear and uniform conclusion to be drawn on 
the link between decentralization and regional inequality.  This is in concord with 
other related studies.  
HOWEVER, Based on the policy analysis and regression model above, some 
preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, for relatively backward countries, the 
decentralization of financial expenses and tax authority should be treated with 
caution, so as to prevent the unintended effect of a rapid expansion of regional 
disparities. Second, the concentration of welfare authority can be used in order to 
help reduce regional disparities. Third, since an overbearing proportion of the local 
government’s employment expenses might enlarge regional disparities, if national 
transfer payment could not balance regional financial capacity completely, 
appropriate restrictions on the number of local civil servants might be seen as a 
suitable method to be used to coordinate regional development. Otherwise, and 
perhaps contrary to common sense, repaid economic development and a moderate 
concentration of population is conducive to alleviating regional disparities. Therefore, 
for relative backward countries and for developing countries, promoting economic 
development and urbanization is an important method to be used in order to achieve 
a balanced regional development.  
Note also that the conclusions given above are based on the limited dataset from 
OECD countries; data which are not available for every country. However, given this, 
there remain useful inferences which can be drawn. First, even though 
decentralization is a worldwide trend, which is considered to contribute to a regional 
balanced development, this judgment - that decentralization leads to regional 
balanced development - has not been confirmed, whether through case studies or 
cross-national data analyses. Even in the case of developed and federal countries, 
policy makers have not given up the use of regional intervention measures by central 
government. Second, decentralization is a highly complex and controversial concept 
which includes many dimensions, such as political decentralization, fiscal 
decentralization, administrative decentralization, welfare decentralization, etc. 
Different aspects of decentralization have different effects on regional development. 
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Third, for relatively backward countries, the process of decentralization should 
proceed with caution. The case studies reported of Mexico, Chile, Peru, the 
Philippines and India all demonstrated that decentralization may not only be unable 
to reduce regional disparities, but may also lead to several other problems, such as 
regional conflicts, social unrest, etc. 181  In summary, the distribution of power 
between the central and local government is a long running and continual process for 
every country with its different conditions and targets. There remains no universal or 
perfect model. Suspicions relating to centralization and decentralization are not 
conducive to the coordinated development of the regions; therefore, the policy 
makers should conduct the decentralization process through trial and, inevitably, 
error. 
Specific considering China, regional disparity is a major challenge for policy 
makers. After 1949, China experienced several rounds of powers redistribution 
between the central and local governments, yet regional disparities have not been 
limited during this period. Since 1994, the central government began again to 
centralize the power and to attempt to implement a regional redistribution program, 
such as the grand western development program. Up until 2010, though the regional 
growing gap remained under control, regional disparities still showed no significant 
convergence. The question remains as to whether China should adopt the 
decentralization model, as OECD countries have done, in order to promote a regional 
coordinated development. Following on from the analysis presented above, the 
relationship between decentralization and regional disparities of China will be 
discussed in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 3 Fiscal Decentralization and Regional 
Disparities: an Exploration of China 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional unbalanced 
development is one of the focuses of regional problem research. Scholars 
adhering to a new liberalism hold that fiscal decentralization is in favor of 
narrowing regional disparity. For this reason, without the support from the 
central government’s subsidy or coordination in the system of power 
decentralization, the pressure of competition forces less developed regions to 
spontaneously chase after more developed regions. The governments of less 
developed regions always provide a variety of favorable conditions, such as 
issuing preferential tax policies, cutting down enterprises’ welfare burdens and 
offering cheap land, so as to attract more capital and external resources to 
achieve transcendental economic growth. In the circumstance of local 
competition, the free flow of production factors; especially the reverse flow of 
capital and human resources contributes to realizing the nation’s overall 
balanced development.182  
However, scholars upholding Keynesianism, point out that the institutional 
arrangement of fiscal decentralization may aggravate the regional development 
disparity. 183  Regarding the reason, in a competitive fiscal decentralization 
system, developed regions with a large tax base can provide high-quality public 
services at a relatively lower tax rate; thus, they can effectively attract the inflow 
of external capital, labor and other resources. Within this process, affluent 
regions become more affluent, while, instead of making a profit, poverty-
stricken regions become places supplying the production of raw materials, 
human capital and other resources to the more developed regions, namely, the 
phenomenon that less developed regions provide “reverse subsidy” for 
developed regions, which further solidifies and widens regional development 
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disparity. 
When it comes to China’s specific situation, issues about the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and regional balanced development have not yet 
been concluded. Generally speaking, most Chinese studies are focused on the 
importance of the central government’s financial centralization. For instance, 
studies of scholars like Fan Shenggen have revealed that trade openness and 
financial decentralization are significant reasons for the widening of regional 
disparity in China. 184  Studies of scholars like Wang Shaoguang have also 
determined 185 that China’s regional unbalanced development degree and the 
central government’s financial absorbing ability are negatively correlated, i.e. 
when the central government’s financial absorbing ability lowers, the disparity 
of regional development widens, and vice versa. Based on introspecting the 
restriction of the system – “serving meals to different diners from different pots” 
over the central government’s financial capacity, they proposed that “the central 
government should bear the principal responsibility for narrowing regional 
disparity it must intensively and uniformly arrange the distribution of transfer 
payment in every province”.186  
Scholars like Zheng Yongnian, neither advocate applying the traditional 
means of financial centralization to achieve a regional balanced development, 
nor agree to completely rely on a spontaneous effect to solve the development 
disparity among regions, but attempt to explore an eclectic or new regional 
coordination mode, i.e. “they emphasize that the central government should 
comply with the market rules to give play to the central coordinator’s particular 
effect, so as to strengthen its roles in economic balanced development and 
national integration”.187 In other words, these scholars stress that the exchange 
and cooperation between the central government and local government; as well 
as exchanges among local governments should be achieved by the central 
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government’s policy guidance and platform construction. Besides, there are 
some scholars that uphold and support “asymmetry financial decentralization”. 
For instance, scholars like Shen Kunrong have argued that “financial 
decentralization can promote economic growth… it is essential to constantly 
improve the system of financial decentralization especially the level of financial 
decentralization to less developed areas, so as to further enhance the overall 
efficiency of investment in public goods”, for the specific purpose of narrowing 
the development disparity among regions.188 
It can further be determined from the simple summarization above that the 
research regarding the relationship between fiscal decentralization and regional 
balanced development is still in the debating stages, and scholars have reached 
different conclusions, according to different case studies and different time 
intervals. Based on the study above, this paper attempts to analyze China’s fiscal 
decentralization course and its changing trend of regional disparity, as well as 
further exploring their relationship.  
 
3.1 Fiscal Decentralization under the Strategy of Regional 
Balanced Development 
To narrow the regional development disparity and achieve a national balanced 
development, coordinated development has been an important subject and 
challenge since the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and it not only 
relates to the nation’s economic development and social stability, but also affects 
national unity and national defense security. Hence, at the beginning of the 
founding of the People’s Republic of China, the new China utilized the strategy 
of a regional balanced development and continued it until the reform and 
opening-up.  
According to the effect, China’s interprovincial development disparity began 
to decrease from 1953 and reached a relatively low point in 1955, but it then 
began to ascend and reached the highest point in 1960; then, it started to 
decrease again and reached a relatively low point in 1967. After that, China’s 
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regional development disparity basically exhibited an ascending trend, and large 
development disparity appeared after the Cultural Revolution ended (see Figure 
3-1). In other words, the strategy of a regional balanced development, at that 
time, did not reach the purposed goal of effectively narrowing the regional 
development disparity as expected by the decision makers at that time. Some 
complex reasons, such as the strategy of developing heavy industry,189 mistaken 
leftist ideals, a planned economic system, frequent political movement, and a 
complex international environment lead to dissatisfactory results of relevant 
strategies and policies.  
 
Figure 3-1 Regional disparities and decentralization (shadow) of china, 1952-2008  
Notes: GINI means GINI coefficient; CV means the coefficient of variation; GE (1) means Theil index. Source: 
Calculated by author.  
 
In the planned economic system, the nation had limited means to coordinate 
regional development, which was mainly reflected in the distribution of national 
industrial investment and resources – the core was the distribution of financial 
resources. In the system with highly centralized political power, although the 
central government controlled and distributed most financial resources, it did 
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not mean that the nation’s industry development plan and finance distribution 
plan could be perfectly implemented, while totally being in line with the central 
government’s design. As direct absorbers of financial resources, local 
governments always minimized fees and taxes paid to the central government, 
so as to protect local interests. The central government’s development plan not 
only needed to be implemented by local governments, but also required the 
financial support paid by local governments; thus, it must allow financial 
autonomy to local governments within a certain range, creating room for 
competition between local governments and the central government. Therefore, 
during the period of the planned economic system, the central government’s 
ability regarding regional coordination depended on its ability of effectively 
absorbing and allocating financial resources, while they both relied on the 
degree to which local governments were controlled by the central government. 
In the face of China’s vast territory and unique national condition, the 
decision makers then did not advocate the complete copying of the Soviet-style 
central planning system, which featured a highly centralized power and vertical 
bureaucratic control system, but focused on granting some limited autonomy to 
the local governments, on the basis of the central government’s unified plan; 
thus, arousing both the central government and local governments’ enthusiasm. 
The relationship between the central government and local governments is a 
contradiction. To solve this contradiction, it is essential to expand the local 
governments’ power base and allow more independence to local governments, 
on the premise of consolidating the central government’s unified leadership, 
which is in favor of constructing a powerful socialist country. As a result of 
China’s large national geographic area, huge population, and complex national 
condition, both the central government and local governments’ shared 
enthusiasm is certainly superior to that of a one sided enthusiasm.190  
However, due to the lack of experience in fiscal decentralization, as well as 
the fundamental contradiction between a planned economic system and 
decentralization system, fiscal decentralizing to local governments may directly 
cause the nation’s overall development plan to fail in receiving sufficient 
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financial support and be actively implemented by the local governments, and of 
course, it may also directly affect the achievement of the nation’s strategic 
planning goal of a regional balanced development. Based on the above 
considerations, this paper attempts to explore and analyze the influence of fiscal 
decentralization on regional development disparity during the period of planned 
economy. 
It’s noteworthy that China has experienced two large-scale fiscal 
decentralizations before the reform and opening-up: one was revenue and 
expenditure power decentralization, focusing on “revenue and expenditure 
decentralization, planned contract responsibility system, regional regulation and 
sharing in the total revenue” during the period of the Great Leap Forward, while 
the other was revenue and expenditure power decentralization, focusing on 
“fixed revenue and expenditure, contract responsibility system for revenue and 
expenditure, ensured turning over (or deficiency payment), surplus retention and 
yearly setting” since 1971. The fiscal decentralization in 1971 greatly expanded 
the scope of local financial revenue and expenditure. Except for the tariff 
revenue of enterprises directly under the central government, as well as 
expenditures of capital construction, national defense, external assistance and 
reserve directly under the central government, all the remaining revenue and 
expenditures were covered by the local governments. 
 
3.1.1 The First Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparity 
According to the trend of regional development in the early years of the new 
nation, China was faced with an overall backward economy and extremely 
unreasonable distribution of regional economy. At that time, the gross industrial 
output value was only about 14 billion yuan.191 The low industrial production 
capacity was inferior to not only developed capitalist countries, but also 
developing countries that had just become independent, such as India. In the 
corresponding period, most of the Chinese industries were distributed in the 
eastern coastal region of China. For example, in 1952, “inland GDP covering 
88.7% of national territorial area accounted for only 54.6% of national GDP, 
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and coastland covering 11.3% of national territorial area accounted for 45.4% 
of national GDP”.192 This extremely uneven distribution of productivity not 
only resulted in the separation of production in the eastern region from raw 
materials and markets in the central and western areas, but was also counter-
productive to the development and stability in the central and western regions. 
From the perspective of the international environment, the Soviet-pattern’s 
radiation, constantly worsened the international situation and the pressure of 
national security issues were important external factors influencing China’s 
regional development strategy.  
Facing this situation, China’s strategic idea of giving priority to develop 
heavy industry, which was introduced around 1953, was not only incorporated 
into the general strategy during the CPC’s transition period, but was also 
accepted by the first meeting of the First National People’s Congress. Zhou 
Enlai clearly pointed out, in his government work report, “To achieve 
industrialization, China must rely on the construction of new industries 
especially heavy industry.” 193  Combining the strategy of developing heavy 
industry and the idea of balancing regional productivity, China entered the 
period of balanced regional economic development under the specific guidance 
of a heavy industry development strategy. 
 
(1) Regional Strategic Background for the First Fiscal Decentralization 
The “1st Five-Year Plan” explicitly stipulated that “the nation should properly 
distribute industrial productivity throughout the country so that the industry is 
close to production/consumption area and satisfy the condition of consolidating 
national defense for the purpose of primarily improving the unreasonable state 
and enhancing economic level in less developed areas”. Based on “156” projects 
(actually 150 projects were launched), which were constructed with the Soviet 
Union’s aid, and 694 projects with an investment of more than 10 million yuan; 
China began re-allocating its productivity. Regarding the regional distribution 
                                                   
192 Xiaobin, S. Z. (1996). Spatial Disparities and Economic Development in China, 1953‐92: A Comparative Study. 
Development and Change, 27(1), 131-164. 
193 Zhou, E. (1984). Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (Vol. 2). People’s Publishing House, p135. (In Chinese) 
76 
of investment, inland and along the coastal regions; the investment accounted 
for 46.8% and 36.9% respectively during the “1st Five-Year Plan”; regarding the 
number of investment projects, 472 projects with an investment of more than 10 
million yuan were distributed within China’s inland area, accounting for 68% of 
the all the projects. Moreover, as regarding the growth ratio, China experienced 
an average industrial growth rate of 15.5% from 1952 to 1957; 17.8% in the 
inland regions and 14.4% in the coastal regions. In summary, the disparity 
between the central, western regions and the eastern regions was obviously 
narrowed, with regional disparity reaching its lowest point in around 1956 
(figure 3-1).  
It is noteworthy that the basic premise for effective implementation of the 
industrial layout strategy during that period was the nation’s highly centralized 
fiscal distribution. Under the financial system of “unified leadership and graded 
responsibility” established in 1951, the central government controlled most 
financial resources. Throughout the entire period of the “1st Five-Year Plan”, the 
central government’s financial revenue accounted for about 80% of the total 
budget revenue, while provincial and county-level governments’ revenue 
accounted for about 20%; 194 thus, the central government’s financial 
expenditures (including direct expenditure and expenditure turned over by local 
organizations) accounted for 74.1% of the total expenditures, while local 
financial expenditure accounted for only 25.9%.195 The central government’s 
powerful financial resource absorbing ability and distribution ability enabled the 
central government to intensively utilize resources in the areas which were in 
the greatest need of development, according to the national strategic plan, so as 
to effectively narrow regional development disparity and balance the 
distribution of productivity more evenly. 
 
(2) Regional Development Trend during the Period of the First Fiscal 
Decentralization 
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In view of the sound momentum of regional coordinated development during 
the “1st Five-Year Plan”, and the “2nd Five-Year Plan”, reviewed and adopted by 
the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, in line with Mao Zedong’s spirit in 
On the Ten Major Relationships, not only focused on continuing to strengthen 
the construction of a new inland industrial base, but also explicitly pointed out, 
“China must actively, fully utilize and properly develop original industries in 
the coastal region, which will not only meet the nation and people’s increasing 
demand but also contribute to supporting inland construction.”196  
Meanwhile, according to domestic and foreign experience in construction, 
central leaders put forward the conception of constructing a basically 
independent and complete industrial system; however, “basically complete 
system does not mean total self-sufficiency… something also cannot be found 
in America or the Soviet Union”. 197  To cooperate with the concept of 
constructing an independent and complete industrial system, the central 
government proposed several concrete strategies. One strategy was to establish 
an economic zone with a relatively complete industrial system and strengthen 
inter-provincial/inter-municipal “information exchange, experience exchange, 
mutual cooperation, mutual support, contradiction adjustment and detailed 
appraisal through comparison”.198 In February of 1958, the central government 
issued Provisions on Holding Regional Collaboration Meeting, and pointed out 
that “for more, faster, better and economical construction of socialism and 
implementation of national economic plan, the whole country needs to be 
divided into 7 collaborative regions”, 199  namely, northeast China, northern 
China, eastern China, southern China, central China, southwest China and 
northwest China.  
The other strategy was to “walk on two legs”, i.e. the central industry and 
local industry should be combined and “local governments should find a way to 
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establish independent industrial system”.200 However, with “the Great Leap 
Forward” (大躍進 ) the developing local governments began to blindly and 
impatiently strive for the speed of economic construction; thus, leading to a 
deviation in the central government’s exploration toward establishing a 
complete industrial system. All regions, provinces, cities and counties devoted 
themselves to the construction of large-size and small-size self-system industrial 
structures, regardless of the local economic foundation and industrial efficacy.  
The construction of local industrial systems evolved into a “commune 
industrialization” movement, causing star-studded small-size iron & steel 
industries, small-size chemical fertilizer industries, small-size machine 
industries and small-size cement industries, which helped to create a nationwide 
industrial investment policy which was out of control. As a result, “the 
investment in national infrastructure was about 99.6 billion yuan during 1958-
1960, 1.8 times that during the ‘1st Five-Year Plan”.201 
What followed after the Great Leap Forward was the decentralization of the 
fiscal distribution from the central government to the regional. The central 
government intensively controlled all special appropriations from the central 
government’s provision; however, the financial management system for 
infrastructure investment did not entirely adapt to the comprehensive leap 
forward of production construction and decentralization of most industrial and 
commercial enterprises, economy, culture and educational undertakings 
attached to the central government. The State Council issued Provisions on 
Further Improving Financial Management System and Correspondingly 
Improving Bank Credit Management System, which stipulated that, “regarding 
revenue, except for central enterprises’ revenue and national revenue (such as 
railway, posts and telecommunications, foreign trade and customs), all other tax 
revenue and corporate revenue should be categorized into local revenue; 
regarding expenditure, except for the central administration, economy, 
diplomacy and military technology expenditures, all other expenditures should 
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be categorized into local financial expenditures”.  
In this system, the national economic development plan and key construction 
projects were still determined by the central government. Furthermore, on the 
principle of “one change a year”, the central government could determine the 
financial revenue and expenditure indicators, by sharing ratio and subsidy 
figures every year and in every area. However, since most power of investment 
in capital construction had been decentralized to the local governments, and 
concrete institutional constraint and political pressure were lacking; once the 
local governments controlled the fiscal resources, they blindly enlarged the scale 
of infrastructure, for the sake of their own benefit by ignoring cost; causing the 
national finance to fail in balancing their fiscal budget from 1958 to 1961, with 
the total financial deficits reaching 14.8 billion yuan. 
 
Table 3-1 Financial conditions of national and central government during the first fiscal 
decentralization (Billion Yuan) 
Year Central 
Revenue 
Central 
Expenditure 
Central/National 
Revenue 
Surplus of central 
Government  
Central Self-
sufficiency Rate 
1953 177.02 162.05 83.01% 14.97 109.24% 
1954 187.72 183.7 76.57% 4.02 102.19% 
1955 193.44 201.05 77.60% -7.61 96.21% 
1956 222.1 210.02 79.27% 12.08 105.75% 
1957 222.94 210.03 73.53% 12.91 106.15% 
1958 305.26 177.22 80.41% 128.04 172.25% 
1959 118.78 249.34 24.38% -130.56 47.64% 
1960 142.8 278.63 24.95% -135.83 51.25% 
1961 76.65 160.32 21.53% -83.67 47.81% 
1962 93.07 181.64 29.68% -88.57 51.24% 
1963 78.92 192.31 23.06% -113.39 41.04% 
1964 100.81 224.86 25.23% -124.05 44.83% 
1965 156.07 284.17 32.97% -128.1 54.92% 
1966 196.49 339.11 35.17% -142.62 57.94% 
1967 132.44 269.94 31.58% -137.5 49.06% 
1968 107.11 219.49 29.65% -112.38 48.80% 
1969 171.1 319.16 32.48% -148.06 53.61% 
1970 182.95 382.37 27.60% -199.42 47.85% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
During that period, the central government’s macroeconomic control ability 
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was substantially weakened. It can be determined from Table 3-1 that since the 
decentralization of revenue and expenditure power, central financial revenue 
was sharply reduced from 30.526 billion yuan in 1958 to 11.878 billion yuan in 
1959, and it was as low as 7.665 billion yuan in 1961. The ratio of central 
financial revenue to national financial revenue also fell from 70% to 20%. At 
the same time, central financial expenditure did not reduce correspondingly; 
thus, directly resulting in the expansion of the deficit in the central budget. Not 
only could the central government not control the developmental pattern of the 
macro economy, but also failed to control the implementation of relevant 
policies, which relied heavily on local governments. According to the 
investment in infrastructure, the ratio of investment in the coastal and inland 
infrastructure was 42.3% and 53.9% respectively. 202 The ratio of the inland 
industrial output value to the national industrial output value increased from 
33.5% to 35.5%; however, the increased amount of investment did not translate 
into the enhancement of the developmental level. Large-size and small-size 
factories, as well as complete industrial structures resulted in regional self-
closing and industrial structure convergence; thus, causing a tremendous waste 
of capital and resources. 
Additionally, as a result of an absent rigorous argument and scientific 
management, as well as local government’s excessively pursuing quantity, but 
overlooking quality; even heavy investment did not generate the increase in 
enterprise revenue. This phenomenon was particularly obvious in the central and 
western regions; like Henan Province, Anhui Province, Jiangxi Province, 
Guangxi Province, Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province and Gansu Province. 
Take Henan Province for example (see Table 3-2).  
In 1957, there were 4,561 industrial enterprises; with the decentralization of 
fiscal and investment power, the number of industrial enterprises increased 
sharply by nearly 5 times, to 22,442 in 1958, but the total industrial output value 
merely increased from 1.663 billion yuan to 3.317 billion yuan, an increase that 
only doubled the previous value. However, instead of sharply increasing, the 
number of industrial enterprises might decrease in some eastern provinces, but 
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due to a series of advantages within the industrial foundation, such as 
technological accumulation and industrial location, enterprise benefit increased 
rapidly. For another example, the number of industrial enterprises in Beijing 
reduced from 4,234 in 1957 to 2,084 in 1958, but enterprise benefits increased 
from 2.2 billion yuan to 4.28 billion yuan. To summarize, in this process of 
power decentralization, the increase in the amount, ratio of investment, as well 
as the number of industrial enterprises in the central and western regions, did 
not convert into a direct economic benefit. Therefore, as a matter of fact, the 
disparity between the eastern region and the western region was not narrowed, 
but was further expanded. 
 
Table 3-2 Amount of industrial enterprises and industrial output (100 million Yuan) of 
provinces, 1957-1959 
  Province 1957 1958 1959 Province 1957 1958 1959 
Amount Beijing 4234 2084 2890 Zhejiang 12558 - - 
Output Beijing 22 42.8 63.3 Zhejiang 20.88 - - 
Amount Tianjin 2507 2376 2169 Anhui 1596 8652 15103 
Output Tianjin 40.44 61.94 85.15 Anhui 15.4 31.8 49.33 
Amount Hebei 1076 3708 7605 Fujian 6127 - 7561 
Output Hebei 25.86 39.63 63.84 Fujian 8.57 12.94 19.56 
Amount Shanxi 4509 5016 7388 Jiangxi 5853 10753 11733 
Output Shanxi 14.84 23.95 38.77 Jiangxi 11.7 18.96 24.84 
Amount 
Inner 
Mongolia 
2110 - - Shandong - - - 
Output 
Inner 
Mongolia 
6.33 - - Shandong 43.31 69.57 92.98 
Amount Liaoning 5629 42928 6992 Henan 4561 22442 15429 
Output Liaoning 94.4 138.9 198.6 Henan 16.63 33.17 50.16 
Amount Jilin 3093 4281 5470 Hubei 8424 - - 
Output Jilin 20.8 30.88 41.84 Hubei 24.31 34.93 49.57 
Amount Heilongjiang 4256 3865 9416 Hunan 8107 12971 12216 
Output Heilongjiang 35.03 61.81 89.68 Hunan 16.99 32.41 42.63 
Amount Shanghai 16316 14240 12205 Guangdong 25510 - - 
Output Shanghai 118.82 176.44 254.68 Guangdong 37.92 - - 
Amount Jiangsu 2322 5868 4809 Guangxi 13610 46348 9719 
Output Jiangsu 41.01 75.22 96 Guangxi 9.2 12.15 17.43 
Amount Chongqing 2879 - - Shaanxi 5458 3656 4964 
Output Chongqing 31.08 44.64 61.96 Shaanxi 11.34 19.9 29.49 
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Amount Sichuan - - - Gansu 1724 17895 9807 
Output Sichuan 21.29 - - Gansu 6.35 9.22 15.6 
Amount Guizhou 3683 68333 14963 Qinghai 356 677 929 
Output Guizhou 6.05 9.42 13.42 Qinghai 1.04 1.79 4.96 
Amount Yunnan 3866 23110 7281 Ningxia 310 1755 830 
Output Yunnan 11.19 17.64 24.45 Ningxia 0.46 0.92 1.79 
Amount Tibet - - -- Xinjiang 1396 2669 3056 
Output Tibet 0.04 0.45 0.43 Xinjiang 4.75 7.1 15.99 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
After realizing the explicit dangers of excessive fiscal decentralization, the 
central government set about centralizing fiscal management. In 1961, it decided 
to centralize fiscal management at three levels; including the central government, 
grand regions and provinces, and properly maintain tighter control of special 
administrative regions, counties (cities) and communes’ fiscal authority; thus, 
the state carried out “one account from top to bottom” and “one board of chess 
throughout the nation” in terms of finance, i.e. it strictly required a balanced 
revenue and expenditure and forbade deficit budgets in every region. With the 
economic adjustment, the central government then effectively controlled the 
investments in infrastructure, adjusted the ratio of the national economic 
construction, constrained extra-budgetary funds and achieved a basic financial 
balance; however, what followed was the shrinkage of numerous businesses and 
the failure of a large number of enterprises, which were managed by the 
commune and brigade. As a consequence, the scale of commune-run industry 
was severely reduced from 6 billion yuan in 1958, to 420 million yuan in 
1963.203 The shrinking of industry managed by the communes and brigades 
directly impacted agricultural production. Moreover, together with natural 
disasters in 1962, every region’s per capita GDP generally lowered, and 
basically recovered to its previous level of 1956. A nationwide low-level 
development also led to a low-level balance of development among regions. 
During 1961-1967, China’s interprovincial regional development disparity 
reflected an obvious declining and leveling-off tendency. 
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3.1.2 The Second Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Balanced 
Development 
     
(1) Regional Strategic Background for the Second Fiscal Decentralization 
Generally speaking, the second fiscal decentralization was closely related to 
“the third-line construction”. National defense security had always been an 
important principle for the new China’s industrial layout. Mao Zedong explicitly 
proposed an important principle of “favor of preparing for the war” for the 
industrial layout in On the Ten Major Relationships. In the 1960s, as the 
international situation and the peripheral environment of China deteriorated, 
China changed its industrial development strategy from “favoring of preparing 
for the war” to “focusing on preparing for the war” for the sake of national 
security. In September of 1965, the Outline of Report on Arrangement for the 
3rd Five-Year Plan (Draft) explicitly proposed that “the 3rd Five-Year Plan must 
base on war by preparing for a big fight and actively preparing for the war, put 
national defense construction first, accelerate the third-line construction and 
gradually change industrial layout.”204  
Apart from “preparing for the war”, the central government also took the 
third-line construction as an important part of the long-term national economic 
development and an important link in the process of constructing an independent 
industrial and national economic system, as well as achieving an equitable and 
balanced distribution of productivity. Zhou Enlai very clearly pointed out that 
the government initiated its target from the 3rd Five-Year Plan with the aim of 
constructing an independent and complete industrial system, as well as a viable 
national economic system throughout China, via the three Five-Year Plans.205 
From the perspective of arousing the central and local governments’ enthusiasm, 
as well as the idea of a people’s war; the first-line and second-line regions had 
to focus on rear construction and intensify the “small third-line” construction, 
in addition to strengthening the “large third-line” construction. Thus, during the 
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3rd and 4th Five-Year Plans, the small third-line construction became the focus 
of investment in each province and city. 
 
(2) Regional Development Trend during the Period of the Second Fiscal 
Decentralization 
After experiencing the turmoil at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, 
China’s economic situation tended to be stable during the early 1970s. However, 
affected by the strategic background of “concentrating on large third-line 
construction” and Mao Zedong’s criticism on “vertical departments’ 
dictatorship”, China started a new round of fiscal decentralization. In March of 
1971, the Ministry of Finance issued a Notice on the Implementation of Contract 
System on Revenue and Expenditure with the attachment, Trial Scheme of 
Contract System on Revenue and Expenditure, which stipulated that “fixed 
revenue and expenditure, contract responsibility system for revenue and 
expenditure, ensured turning over (or deficiency payment), surplus retention and 
yearly setting” should be implemented in every provincial administrative region: 
thus, the scope of local financial revenue and expenditure was expanded, and 
except for tariff revenues of enterprises directly under the central government, 
as well as expenditures of capital construction, national defense, external 
assistance and reserves directly under the central government, all the remaining 
revenues and expenditures were covered by the local governments. The degree 
of this fiscal decentralization even surpassed that of 1958, that is to say, “during 
this power decentralization, the central government indiscriminately and 
hurriedly decentralizes most central enterprises including large-scale backbone 
enterprises like Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation, Daqing Oil Field, 
Changchun Automobile Manufacturer and Kailuan Coal Mine relating to 
national welfare and the people’s livelihood to local governments”.206 
 
Table 3-3 Financial conditions of the national and central government, during the first 
fiscal decentralization (Unit: Billion Yuan) 
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Years 
Central 
Revenue 
Central 
Expenditure 
Central/National 
Revenue 
Surplus of Central 
Government  
Extra-budgetary 
Revenue 
1966 19.649 33.911 35.17% -142.62 8.113 
1967 13.244 26.994 31.58% -137.5 8.361 
1968 10.711 21.949 29.65% -112.38 7.744 
1969 17.11 31.916 32.48% -148.06 8.742 
1970 18.295 38.237 27.60% -199.42 10.094 
1971 11.936 43.567 16.03% -316.31 11.856 
1972 10.581 43.14 13.80% -325.59 13.424 
1973 11.986 44.933 14.80% -329.47 19.129 
1974 13.477 39.784 17.21% -263.07 21.972 
1975 9.663 40.94 11.85% -312.77 25.148 
1976 9.891 37.763 12.74% -278.72 27.532 
1977 11.385 39.37 13.02% -279.85 31.131 
1978 17.577 53.212 15.52% -356.35 34.711 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
The most direct influence of that fiscal decentralization was to reduce central 
financial revenue and add the burden to central finance. According to Table 3-3, 
central financial revenue lowered from 18.295 billion yuan in 1970 to 11.936 
billion yuan in 1971; even reducing to 9.663 billion yuan in 1975; the ratio of 
the central financial revenue to national financial revenue also sharply reduced 
from 27.60% in 1970 to 11.85% in 1975; correspondingly, the central financial 
deficit increased and remained around 30 billion yuan during the period of 1971-
1975. Besides, extra-budgetary revenue also started to inflate during this period.  
From 1970 to 1976, the national budgetary financial revenue increased only 
by 17.1%, but during that same period extra-budgetary financial revenue 
increased from 10.1 billion yuan to 25.1 billion yuan, a margin of 173%. The 
ratio of the extra-budgetary fund to the budgetary fund increased from 15% in 
1970, to 35% in 1976. As the central financial resource’s absorbing ability 
decreased and the extra-budgetary fund inflated, the central government’s 
ability of controlling the overall economy was furthered weakened. Local 
governments’ pursuit of narrow interest began to be stronger than their 
implementation and compliance of the central government’s strategic plan and 
indicator adjustments.  
From the perspective of national investment, China focused on the 
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construction of the national defense industry and intensively utilized more 
capital to construct the third-line projects in the southwest and northwest regions 
during the “3rd Five-Year Plan”. During that period, the investment targeted for 
inland construction reached 63.121 billion yuan; accounting for 64.7% of the 
investment in national infrastructure, and the investment in the third-line regions 
reached 48.243 billion yuan, which accounted for 52.7% of the overall 
investment in infrastructure.207 At that time, a total population of 145,000 and 
38,000 production devices relocated from the coastal region to the third-line 
region,208 constructing important railways like the Chongqing-Guiyang railway, 
Hunan-Guizhou railway, Guiyang-Kunming railway and the Chengdu-Kunming 
railway, as well as important industrial bases in Panzhihua and Jiuquan; during 
the “4th Five-Year Plan”, apart from continuing to strengthen the construction of 
the national defense industry, China began to actively promote the overall 
development of basic industry, turned the focus of the third-line construction to 
“three western regions” (western Henan, western Hubei and western Hunan), 
and expanded the scope of investment to the basic industry and civil industry.  
Throughout that period, the total investment in the third-line region reached 
69.098 billion yuan, accounting for 41.1% of total investment in national 
infrastructure and a reduction of 11.6% compared with that in the “3rd Five-Year 
Plan”. In the late “4th Five-Year Plan” and early “5th Five-Year Plan”, China 
began to adjust its national investment structure, along with a change in the 
international situation. In addition to attaching more importance on the 
investment in the construction of civil industry and the agricultural industry, the 
state gradually transferred the focus of investment toward the eastern coastal 
region, and, at that time, “most imported devices are used in the coastal 
region”.209 
It is undeniable that the third-line construction was a process of 
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“unprecedented large-scale inland economic development and construction”.210 
The state compulsorily adjusted the regional economic layout, through 
investment and administrative means, which had an important influence on 
China’s regional economic development. After intensive construction of the 
three “Five-Year Plans”, the central and western regions constructed a heavy 
industry system, and a series of emerging industrial centers that were complete 
in range and large in size, which not only laid the foundation of infrastructure, 
talent, technology and resources for further development of the inland economy, 
but also controlled or contained the expansion of regional disparity to some 
extent. It can be seen from Table 3-4 that the number and industrial output value 
of industrial enterprises in every province and region increased to some degree. 
According to the division of the three regions, the industrial output value in the 
eastern region increased by 52%, from 1970 to 1976, that of the central region 
increased by 45% and that of the western region increased by 53%.  
It is noteworthy, that an important reason why regional development disparity 
could be controlled and key projects of third-line construction could be 
successfully implemented, was directly related to the central government’s 
control over the power of financial expenditure. Thus, being different from the 
first fiscal decentralization process, in which financial revenue and financial 
expenditure decreased in large scale at the same time, this reform resulted in the 
central financial revenue decreasing to less than 20%, lower than that during the 
Great Leap Forward period, but the central financial expenditure was basically 
controlled at over 55%; thus, enabling the central government’s relevant 
strategic plan to gain basic financial support. 
 
Table 3-4 Amount of industrial enterprises (shadow) and industrial output (100 million 
Yuan) of provinces, 1970-1976 
East Central West 
Province 1976 Grow Province 1976 Grow Province 1976 Grow 
Beijing 3877 113.14% Shanxi 8429 72.73% 
Inner 
Mongolia 
 - 
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Beijing 141.2 45.42% Shanxi 66.2 15.75% 
Inner 
Mongolia 
 - 
Tianjin 3718 32.50% Jilin 7324 38.11% Guangxi 9148 49.04% 
Tianjin 135.6 31.95% Jilin 103.4 62.90% Guangxi 56.7 106.90% 
Hebei 12246 53.13% Heilongjiang 12031 34.97% Chongqing 8489 67.21% 
Hebei 157.3 75.76% Heilongjiang 186.6 36.36% Chongqing 65.3 23.01% 
Liaoning 12740 62.21% Anhui 11201 49.83% Sichuan 33201 0.02% 
Liaoning 341.2 50.71% Anhui 90.5 99.16% Sichuan - - 
Shanghai 8798 -10.53% Jiangxi 9215 44.35% Guizhou 6798 72.85% 
Shanghai 423.5 35.64% Jiangxi 48.1 15.62% Guizhou 23.1 11.22% 
Jiangsu 22105 199.12% Henan 12668 67.21% Yunnan 6499 -4.68% 
Jiangsu 247.6 82.76% Henan 108 46.57% Yunnan 32.6 5.78% 
Zhejiang 17556 44.17% Hubei 14511 32.04% Tibet - - 
Zhejiang 82.1 23.12% Hubei 114.8 33.12% Tibet 1.1 205.25% 
Fujian 7357 61.59% Hunan 18438 82.45% Shaanxi 8951 75.75% 
Fujian 43.6 78.41% Hunan 104.5 51.61% Shaanxi 71.5 38.47% 
Shandong - - - - - Gansu 4701 67.35% 
Shandong 220 55.79% - - - Gansu 68.2 61.42% 
Guangdong - - -    Qinghai 1158 89.84% 
Guangdong - - - - - Qinghai 10.3 86.57% 
        Ningxia 918 53.77% 
        Ningxia 10.4 108.76% 
        Xinjiang 3238 42.27% 
            Xinjiang 24.1 33.04% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
However, it cannot be denied that, although regional disparity was controlled, 
it did not reflect a declining trend. In some cases, the regional disparity, after 
1970, was even larger than that during the Great Leap Forward period. In other 
words, the central government’s strategic target of regional balanced 
development failed to be completely achieved, and the investment in the central 
and western regions did not generate proportional returns of investment. After 
being affected by the complex international situation and “leftist” thought; the 
third-line construction was implemented at an excessively high cost and many 
problems were left unresolved. The most important problems, included 
excessive emphasis on “relying on mountains, scattering and entering caves”, 
the absence of scientific, reasonable and logical input for a large number of 
problems, and relatively low input-output from the third-line construction. It can 
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be determined from Table 3-5 that the third-line region’s capital profit rate and 
accumulation rate were far lower than those in the eastern coastal region, but 
their production cost and occupied current capital were far higher than those of 
the eastern coastal region. Thus, it can be seen that, although more resources 
were invested in the central and western regions than the eastern region, it could 
only minimally prevent the developmental disparity among other regions from 
further expansion. 
 
Table 3-5 Comparison of state-owned industrial enterprises between the coastal regions 
and third-line regions in 1978 (Unit: Yuan) 
 Nation 
wide 
Coastal 
regions 
Third-line 
regions 
Output value per 100 yuan 102.6 141.4 70.4 
Occupying liquidity per 100 yuan output value 32.0 24.6 40.7 
Cost per100 yuan output value 67.4 64.8 77.4 
Profit rate 15.5% 23.4% 9.2% 
Accumulation rate 24.2% 35.4% 14.1% 
Source: Liu, Z (1995). The study on productivity distribution of China. China Commodity price 
Publishing House, p19.    
  
3.1.3 Historical Experience in Fiscal Decentralization and Regional 
Development 
In general, the fiscal decentralization system before the reform and opening-
up failed to cooperate effectively with the strategy of a regional balanced 
development, causing regional disparity to constantly expand during that period. 
Lessons can be learned from these experiences as follows: 
In the first place, it is difficult for the planned economic system with an 
excessively decentralized power to effectively control the unbalanced 
development among regions. Regional development is not just a simple issue of 
productivity space layout, but a complex issue involving geographical location, 
production level, human resources, industrial structure, historical culture and 
governmental capacity. Due to the contradiction between the central 
government’s limited capacity and complex regional conditions, compulsively 
changing the layout and flow of production factors, only with the central 
government’s plan and command, may result in the loss of production efficiency. 
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Besides, for effective implementation of the planned economy, it is essential to 
strengthen vertical bureaucratic management agencies’ power and weaken the 
local government’s power, which will not only result in “vertical departments’ 
dictatorship” and weaken the local government’s enthusiasm for development, 
but will also lead to departmental and regional fragmentation; thus, making it 
more difficult to form an effective regional coordination mechanism.  
In the second place, it is also difficult for the system to excessively 
decentralizing fiscal disbursements to effectively control unbalanced 
development among regions. According to various countries’ experience, 
although coordinated development among regions does not need a powerful 
central government centralizing everything, it still requires the central 
government to have some coordinating and planning ability. As specific 
economic subjects, local governments have their own independent benefit 
orientation. If local governments are endowed with excessive independent 
power, they may damage other regions and nations’ overall benefit, for the sake 
of their own benefit. The out-of-control macro economy and sharp expansion of 
regional disparity during the Great Leap Forward period were typical negative 
case examples. 
In the third place, “large-scale centralization and decentralization” of the 
fiscal power is not in favor of narrowing regional disparity. Power distribution, 
between the central government and local governments, requires the continuing 
support of a stable system. Only in this way can the central government extend 
“credible commitment” to local governments, on the basis of maintaining its 
central ability of regulation and control, so as to provide effective and stable 
encouragement for local governments. Excessively using political and 
administrative power to adjust the distribution of the fiscal power between the 
central government and local governments may reflect an incorrect incentive to 
local governments; for local governments always adjust their behavior 
according to the changing political wind, instead of being guided by economic 
laws or national development strategies; thus, finally causing the situation that 
“decentralization leads to chaos and centralization leads to deadlock” . An 
unstable macro economy is bound to result in the disorder of the regional 
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economy; thus, eventually expanding the development disparity among regions. 
 
3.2 Fiscal Decentralization under the Strategy of Regional 
Unbalanced Development 
 
In 1978, the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Congress of the CPC began 
a new exploration regarding the developmental path of socialism with unique 
Chinese characteristics. China’s strategy related to regional development 
gradually transformed from a balanced development to unbalanced development, 
which was a turning point with historical significance, and was formed on the 
basis of Chinese communists’ judgment of the prevailing domestic and 
international situation.  
From the perspective of the domestic environment, over the past three 
decades, since the founding of the new China, the Chinese Communist Party had 
been faced with the old China’s backward productivity and the unreasonable 
distribution of productivity. As required by the national defense security at that 
time, it attempted to direct priority to the development of heavy industries and 
balance the allocation of productivity between the coastal regions and the inland 
region, for the purpose of narrowing regional disparity and achieving equitable 
and common prosperity. Nevertheless, depending mainly on administrative 
instruction and national investment to balance productivity distribution was so 
advanced, subjective and blind that it tended to lower the efficiency level of 
various production processes. 
Moreover, faced with the complex national situation and serious doubt about 
the Soviet pattern, the decision makers desired to arouse local governments’ 
enthusiasm for development, by means of fiscal decentralization, so as to rapidly 
achieve the nation’s sustainable development strategy. However, because of the 
inherent contradiction between the national planning and power decentralization, 
it was most difficult for China’s development to escape from the repetitive circle 
that “decentralization leads to chaos and centralization leads to deadlock” . 
Moreover, the difference in the industrial foundation, industrial environment, 
geographical location and management level among regions, as well as the 
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unevenness in scientific inquiry and execution of the micro-level plan, 
prevented the state’s input and output from being directly proportional, which 
not only lowered the development efficiency of the overall economy, but also 
failed to substantially narrow the development disparity among regions. 
Therefore, based on a full understanding of the arduous and long-term 
regional balanced development, Chinese communists realized that the regional 
balanced development, at the cost of sacrificing efficiency, was not compatible 
with China’s national condition, so “it should make some regions get well-off 
first instead of adhering to egalitarianism”. 211  From the perspective of the 
international environment, despite obvious risk factors, the world situation 
tended to be easing off, i.e. “peace and development are the two major themes 
in the world today”. Since then, the influence relating to national defense factors 
have gradually lowered in China’s economic layout, which has created a sound 
and sustainable environment for the development within the eastern coastal 
region.  
In the meantime, “the world scientific and technical revolution flourishes and 
the position of economy, technology becomes increasingly prominent in 
international competition”,212 which required China to seize opportunities and 
meet challenges, incorporate China’s economic development layout into a 
general pattern compatible with the world economy, enhanced the degree of 
opening-up, and attached particular importance to the development of the 
eastern coastal region. Affected by both domestic and foreign factors, China’s 
strategy of regional development transformed from a balanced development to 
an unbalanced development. 
 
3.2.1 Basic Content of the Regional Unbalanced Development Strategy     
The regional unbalanced development strategy mainly ran through the “6th 
Five-Year Plan” and the “7th Five-Year Plan”.  
The Strategy of Giving Priority to the Development of the Eastern Coastal 
Region during the “6th Five-Year Plan”. After “adjustment, reform, rectification 
                                                   
211 Deng, X. (1994). Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: Volume 3. People’s publishing house, p19. (In Chinese) 
212 Deng, X. (1994). Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: Volume 3. People’s publishing house, p354. (In Chinese) 
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and enhancement” at the end of the “5th Five-Year Plan”, the national economy 
began to exhibit significant improvement. The “6th Five-Year Plan” pointed out 
that China should actively promote the enhancements of the coastal region’s 
existing economic foundation, give full play to their specialties, “facilitate 
industrial construction of energy, traffic, raw material (in the inland region), and 
support economic development in the coastal region”.  
Apart from providing preferential policies on investment, taxation, credit 
loans and prices in the coastal regions, the state gradually determined the 
strategy of vigorously developing the external-oriented economy in the coastal 
regions. The central government required that coastal regions should give full 
play to their comparative advantages, seize the opportunity of the international 
economic industrial adjustment, and take an active role in international 
competition, so as to “transform internal-oriented economy to external-oriented 
economy”.213 In 1984, the State Council approved 14 coastal cities; including 
Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Tianjin, Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, 
Shanghai, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Zhanjiang and Beihai as the 
earliest cities opening up to the outside world; indicating that the strategy of 
external-oriented development in the eastern coastal region began to be fully 
implemented (see Table 3-6). The state’s focus of investment in infrastructure 
also turned to advantageous regions; thus, the ratio of investment in the eastern 
coastal region surpassed that of the central and western regions for the first time, 
reaching 47.7%, but the western region was reduced to 17.2%.214 According to 
the developmental trend of regional disparity, China’s provincial regional 
disparity leveled off and then declined. 
 
Table 3-6 the regional opening process during the 6 th five-year plan 
Year Opening regions 
1979 Guangdong province and Fujian province 
1980 Special Economic Zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou 
1984 14 costal opening cities 
1985 Expanding of coastal economic opening zones, including 239 counties and cities 
Source: Collected by author.  
                                                   
213 Deng, X. (1994). Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping: Volume 3. People’s publishing house, p133. (In Chinese) 
214 Lu, D. (2006). Theory and Practice of China's Regional Development. Science Press, p112. (In Chinese) 
94 
 
The Strategy of Giving Priority to the Development of the Eastern Coastal 
Region, under the Strategy of Industrial Gradient Transfer during the “7th Five-
Year Plan”. The “7th Five-Year Plan” explicitly put forward that “China’s 
economy shows an objective trend of gradually advancing from the east to the 
west in the three regions like the eastern region, the central region and the 
western region, it is essential to accelerate the development in the eastern coastal 
region, focus on the construction of energy and raw material in the central region, 
and make active preparations to further develop the western region”.215 The “7th 
Five-Year Plan” divided the whole nation into three economic regions, including 
the eastern region, the central region and the western region for the first time, 
and the state established a development plan taking the three regions’ gradient 
development as a main context under the guiding idea of priority in efficiency 
and unbalanced development.  
In that same period, the state continued to strengthen the opening-up in the 
eastern coastal region, clearly proposed the continuing of consolidating and 
developing the established opening-up pattern, gave full play to the function of 
a coastal open region, and “gradually establish a more open external-oriented 
economic structure”,216 “to make this region gradually become China’s base of 
foreign trade, its base of training and providing senior technology and 
management talents for the whole country, and its base of delivering new 
technology and providing consultation, information for the whole country”,217 
thus, finally driving comprehensive and further development of China’s reform 
and opening-up. Guided by this idea, the state constructed the Hainan Special 
Economic Zone in 1988 and Pudong New District of Shanghai in 1990 
respectively. After that, the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council 
decided to implement the policy of a coastal open city in 5 cities along the 
Yangtze River, 13 border cities and counties in the northeast region, the 
                                                   
215 CCP Literature Research Center (2011).Selected Important Documents since the Twelfth National Congress of 
CCP. Central Party Literature Press, p810. (In Chinese). 
216 CCP Literature Research Center (2011).Selected Important Documents since the Twelfth National Congress of 
CCP. Central Party Literature Press, p161. (In Chinese). 
217 CCP Literature Research Center (2011).Selected Important Documents since the Twelfth National Congress of 
CCP. Central Party Literature Press, p810. (In Chinese). 
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southwest region and the northwest region, and 11 inland provincial (capital) 
cities.  
According to the distribution of fixed asset investment (see Table 3-7), the 
investment further turned to the eastern coastal region during the “7th Five-Year 
Plan”. From 1986 to 1990, the ratio of fixed asset investment in the coastal 
region to that in the central and western regions sharply increased from 1.12:1 
to 1.53:1. In 1990, the ratio of fixed asset investment in the eastern region was 
2.28 and 3.91 times respectively that in the central and western regions. The 
interprovincial disparity in per capita GDP did not ascend significantly during 
the “7th Five-Year Plan”.  
 
Table 3-7 The distribution of investment in fixed assets during 7th, 8th and 9th five-year 
plan (%) 
 Year East Central West 
7th five-year plan 
1986 52.3 27.6 14.4 
1987 55.9 26.6 14.0 
1988 57.7 25.2 13.9 
1989 57.5 24.3 14.4 
1990 56.8 24.9 14.5 
8th five-year plan 
1991 57.0 24.2 14.7 
1992 59.7 22.9 13.8 
1993 61.7 21.5 13.0 
1994 63.3 20.8 12.0 
1995 63.8 21.0 11.9 
9th five-year plan 
1996 62.2 22.2 12.5 
1997 61.0 22.4 13.0 
1998 59.6 22.3 14.7 
1999 61.8 22.7 15.5 
2000 60.6 23.4 16.0 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
3.2.2 Basic Information regarding the Third Fiscal Decentralization 
Since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, 
the breakdown of the planned economic system provided a new institutional 
framework for the adjustment of the financial relationship between the central 
government and local governments. To support the national strategy, reduce the 
resistance of reform, dilute the cost of reform and break through the bottleneck 
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of reforms, the central government strived to drive the overall development of 
the market economic system by adjusting the financial system, and in particular, 
it gave priority to the development of the eastern coastal regions for the purpose 
of achieving a breakthrough of Chinese economic development in a short time. 
To achieve the above goals, it basically structured the financial reform along 
two paths: one was power decentralization, i.e. the state designated the revenue 
and expenditure boundary between the central government and local 
governments, and gave local governments greater financial independence, all of 
which were called “fen zao chi fan (serving meals to different diners from 
different pots)”; the other was to surrender part of the profits, i.e. the state gave 
more autonomy to enterprises. Given that state-owned enterprises were major 
subjects of tax payments, the expansion of each enterprise’s autonomy, in a 
sense, represented the decentralization of fiscal power from the central 
government to local governments. This reform of power decentralization could 
be generally divided into three phases. 
Firstly, it was the stage of “division of revenue and expenditure and 
management at different levels” (1980-1984). Its basic principle was to divide 
the revenue and expenditure boundary between the central government and local 
governments, according to the subordinate relationship among enterprises and 
public institutions. In terms of revenue, it was divided into central financial 
fixed revenue218, local financial fixed revenue219, fixed ratio shared revenue220 
and central & local adjusted revenue. With regard to expenditures, it was divided 
into central financial expenditure, local financial expenditure and expenditure 
for a few special projects. To ensure that the central government and local 
governments acted within the scope of their competence and functions, the state 
also made the following stipulations: local financial arrangement should be 
made on the basis of a comprehensive consideration to the nation’s unified 
strategy and local places’ actual condition, so as to maintain an appropriate 
                                                   
218 Note: Including income of central-owned enterprises, tariff revenues and other income. 
219 Note: Including income of central-owned enterprises, Salt tax, agricultural tax, business income tax, local taxes and 
other local revenues. 
220 Note: Ihe enterprises managed directly by central government must submit 80% of income to central government, 
20% to local government.  
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balance between revenue and expenditure; the local financial budget should be 
made by local governments, reviewed by the Ministry of Finance, and then 
submitted to the State Council for approval; central government departments 
would no longer arrange expenditure for various items that should be arranged 
by local governments or distribute indicators of financial expenditure to local 
governments. Moreover, to reduce the resistance of reform and adapt to the 
development at every place, China established a different financial contract 
system for different provinces in that period. To relieve the central government’s 
financial pressure, China adjusted its financial system in 1983. Specifically, 
instead of distinguishing local fixed revenue from local adjusted revenue, it 
changed the “division of revenue and expenditure and contracting at different 
levels” to “sharing in total revenue and proportionate sharing of the revenue”. 
At the same time, it changed industrial-commercial tax on tobacco and wine 
from adjusted revenue to central revenue, and returned it to local governments 
by the base.  
Secondly, it was the stage “division of tax category and designation of 
revenues and expenditures” (1985-1988). Compared with previous stages, the 
most significant change at this stage was that the state started to transform 
revenue distribution between the central government and local governments, 
from a subordinate relationship among enterprises and institutions, to a system 
of division. This division was according to the tax category after the completion 
of the second step – “replacement of profit by tax”, i.e. it divided tax set in 
“replacement of profit by tax” into central financial fixed revenue, local 
financial fixed revenue, central & local financial shared revenue. However, 
financial expenditure was still divided according to the subordinate relationship; 
into central financial expenditure, local financial expenditure and expenditure 
for special projects unsuitable for the contract system. As a result of many 
difficulties in the transition of the new and old systems, both the subordinate 
relationship among enterprises and the tax category were utilized to divide 
revenue during that period. Furthermore, from 1985-1987, “sharing in the total 
revenue” was implemented for the time being, i.e.; except for central fixed 
revenue, local fixed revenue and central & local shared revenue which were 
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linked to local expenditure, so as to determine the ratio of revenue sharing. 
Thirdly, it was also the stage of improving the financial contract system 
(1988-1993). The improvement of the financial contract system during that 
period was mainly manifested in the implementation of different contract 
systems in different regions. Specifically, there were “contract of increased 
revenue”, “sharing in the total revenue”, “sharing in the total revenue and 
proportionate sharing of increased revenue”, “contract of increased turned-over 
amount”, “fixed turned-over amount” and “fixed amount of subsidy” (see Table 
3-9). Moreover, 13 small tax categories were distributed to local governments 
as local revenue, and the foundation of local expenditure was reduced, according 
to the amount of central loans in 1987. 
 
Table 3-9 Different financial contract systems  
Types Applicable regions Incentives and Risks 
Contract of increased revenue 
Beijing, Hebei, Liaoning 
(exclude Shenyang and Dalian), 
Harbin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Henan and Chongqing 
Strong Incentives and 
Middle Risk 
Sharing in the total revenue Tianjin, Shanxi, and Anhui 
Weak Incentives and 
Small Risk 
Sharing in the total revenue 
and proportionate sharing of 
increased revenue 
Dalian, Qingdao, and Wuhan 
Middle Incentives and 
Middle Risk 
Contract of increased turned-
over amount 
Guangdong, and Hunan 
Strong Incentives and 
Middle Risk 
Fixed turned-over amount 
Shanghai, Shandong, and 
Heilongjiang 
Strong Incentives and 
Small Risk 
Fixed amount of subsidy 
Jilin, Jiangxi, Gansu, Shaanxi, 
Fujian, Inner Mongolia, 
Guangxi, Tibet, Ningxia, 
Xinjiang, Guizhou, Yunnan, 
Qinghai, and Hainan 
Strong Incentives and 
Small Risk 
Source: collected by author. 
 
Generally speaking, the transformation of the Chinese financial system from 
“egalitarianism (eating in big pot)” to “fen zao chi fan (serving meals to different 
diners from different pots)”, as well as the gradual improvement of the financial 
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contract system provided a basic institutional guarantee for China’s fiscal 
distribution. Firstly, it avoided the previous method of fiscal distribution – 
“large-scale centralization and decentralization”, designated the revenue and 
expenditure boundary between the central government and local governments, 
and directly combined local governments’ revenue with local enterprises’ 
efficiency, tax administration system and financial expenditure management, so 
as to increase local governments’ enthusiasm for increasing revenue and 
reducing expenditure, as well as maintaining local financial balance. Secondly, 
the system “fen zao chi fan (serving meals to different diners from different pots)” 
eliminated the central vertical competent departments’ vertical financial 
intervention in corresponding local departments, as well as their improper 
intervention in micro economic behavior; therefore, local governments could 
arrange financial expenditure, according to the central development strategy and 
local objective circumstances. Thirdly, it increased the stability of the financial 
system, i.e. the system was transformed from the previous “one change a year” 
or “random change” to “remaining unchanged for 3 or 5 years”; thus, helping 
local governments arrange plans for local economic and social development. 
Fourthly, it changed the financial system that “one size fits all”, i.e. according 
to the state’s development strategy, historical tradition and development status; 
thus, China implemented a different financial contract system for different 
provinces or regions. 
 
3.2.3 The Third Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Disparities 
Based on the description above, it can be determined that this reform of fiscal 
decentralization designated the revenue and expenditure boundary between the 
central government and local governments, and increased institutional stability 
and extensibility, which, to some extent, improved the mess that “the central 
government balances various local governments’ expenditure” before the reform 
and opening-up. Therefore, central financial revenue steadily increased from 
28.4 billion yuan in 1980, to 66.5 billion yuan in 1984, at the beginning of the 
reform, and the ratio of central financial revenue to overall financial revenue 
also increased from 24.52% to 40%. Meanwhile, the central financial 
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expenditure also increased sharply, accounting for above 50% of the national 
financial expenditure for recent years. The data above visually indicated the 
improvement of the central government’s financial condition and the 
enhancement of its ability to control the macro economy. With the completion 
of the second “replacement of profit by tax”, the financial system “fen zao chi 
fan (serving meals to different diners from different pots)” also improved 
correspondingly. However, within the adjusted financial system, although the 
central government’s amount of financial revenue increased; its ratio of 
financial revenue to national financial revenue gradually reduced from 38% in 
1985, to 22% in 1993, and the ratio of financial expenditure also reduced from 
40% to 28%, which indicated that the central government’s financial and control 
mechanism was weakened.  
 
Table 3-10 The financial condition of the national and central government during the third 
wave of fiscal decentralization (Unit: Billion)  
Year 
National 
revenue 
National 
expenditure 
Central 
revenue 
Central 
expenditure 
Surplus of 
central 
government 
Rate of 
central 
revenue 
Rate of 
central 
expenditure 
1980 115.993 122.883 28.445 66.681 -38.236 24.52% 54.26% 
1981 117.579 113.841 31.107 62.565 -31.458 26.46% 54.96% 
1982 121.233 122.998 34.684 65.181 -30.497 28.61% 52.99% 
1983 136.695 140.952 49.001 75.96 -26.959 35.85% 53.89% 
1984 164.286 170.102 66.547 89.333 -22.786 40.51% 52.52% 
1985 200.482 200.425 76.963 79.525 -2.562 38.39% 39.68% 
1986 212.201 220.491 77.842 83.636 -5.794 36.68% 37.93% 
1987 219.935 226.218 73.629 84.563 -10.934 33.48% 37.38% 
1988 235.724 249.121 77.476 84.504 -7.028 32.87% 33.92% 
1989 266.49 282.378 82.252 88.877 -6.625 30.86% 31.47% 
1990 293.71 308.359 99.242 100.447 -1.205 33.79% 32.57% 
1991 314.948 338.662 93.825 109.081 -15.256 29.79% 32.21% 
1992 348.337 374.22 97.951 117.044 -19.093 28.12% 31.28% 
1993 434.895 464.23 95.751 131.206 -35.455 22.02% 28.26% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
According to the experience of the two previous fiscal decentralizations, the 
reduction of central fiscal distributions and the weakening of its control ability 
might mean the widening of regional development disparity. Meanwhile, given 
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that the central government preferred an unbalanced development strategy in the 
eastern coastal region and a financial contract system which was relatively in 
favor of eastern provinces, the disparity of industrial production efficiency and 
total output value was supposed to expand during that period.  
This adjustment is confirmed by the number of industrial enterprises and total 
industrial output value in various provinces as reflected in Table 3-11. The 
number of industrial enterprises and output value tended to increase in some 
eastern provinces. For example, the number of enterprises increased by 39% 
from 1980 to 1993 in Jiangsu Province, but its total output value increased by 
more than 14 times; the output value increased more than 17 times in Zhejiang 
Province, Guangdong Province and Fujian Province; at the same time, industry 
grew slowly in the central and western provinces, where the total industrial 
output value increased 7 times or below in provinces like Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Hunan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu and Qinghai. On the whole, 
the number of industrial enterprises increased by 4.4 times and the output value 
increased 11.3 times in the eastern region; the number of industrial enterprises 
increased by 3.5 times and the output value increased by 7.8 times in the central 
region; while the number of industrial enterprises increased by 1.3 times and the 
output value increased by 7 times in the western region. To sum up, the disparity 
of industrial development among the three regions was significantly widened in 
that period. 
 
Table 3-11 Amount of industrial enterprises (shadow) and industrial output (100 million 
Yuan) of provinces, 1980-1993 
East Central West 
Province 1993 Grow Province 1993 Grow Province 1993 Grow 
Beijing 10320 176.5% Shanxi 11853 24.3% 
Inner 
Mongolia 
9485 23.4% 
Beijing 1166.6 446.7% Shanxi 743.9 545.9% 
Inner 
Mongolia 
520 775.6% 
Tianjin 12454 198.6% Jilin 13698 24.7% Guangxi 12736 18.5% 
Tianjin 1401.8 615.4% Jilin 1033.3 667.3% Guangxi 902.9 1048.3% 
Hebei 21137 38.7% Heilongjiang 17924 20.4% Chongqing 13430 3.1% 
Hebei 2624 999.7% Heilongjiang 1394.3 471.1% Chongqing 532.7 291.5% 
Liaoning 28297 77.0% Anhui 24119 60.9% Sichuan 34526 1.4% 
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Liaoning 2610 487.9% Anhui 1558.2 1101.8% Sichuan 1819 884.3% 
Shanghai 13699 91.6% Jiangxi 17236 34.1% Guizhou 7544 -2.2% 
Shanghai 3327 455.7% Jiangxi 974.1 936.1% Guizhou 381.2 743.6% 
Jiangsu 45554 39.4% Henan 21556 35.9% Yunnan 7919 3.5% 
Jiangsu 7096.5 1416.9% Henan 2434.4 1063.5% Yunnan 690.1 956.0% 
Zhejiang 508237 1715.9% Hubei 22600 36.1% Tibet 278 9.5% 
Zhejiang 3812.4 1791.0% Hubei 1992.3 773.7% Tibet 6 302.0% 
Fujian 258904 1998.4% Hunan 544080 2561.8% Shaanxi 13229 31.6% 
Fujian 1522.4 1769.1% Hunan 1438.9 709.1% Shaanxi 793.8 621.9% 
Shandong 27976 46.4% - - - Gansu 7010 54.0% 
Shandong 4713.5 1285.0% - - - Gansu 505.2 555.4% 
Guangdong 33790 61.9% -    Qinghai 18235 1331.3% 
Guangdong 5237.4 2006.1% - - - Qinghai 75.1 426.4% 
        Ningxia 1903 73.5% 
        Ningxia 121.5 772.9% 
        Xinjiang 6970 71.6% 
            Xinjiang 448.4 1001.5% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
According to Figure 3-1, it can be clearly shown that China’s inter-provincial 
development disparity did not expand, but reflected a declining trend throughout 
that period. The variable coefficient lowered from 0.885 in 1980, to 0.592 in 
1990, and then began to rebound; reaching 0.652 in 1993. Gini coefficient and 
Theil index also presented a similar development trend. It indicates that the 
change of other factors offset the intensifying effect of fiscal decentralization 
and the national unbalanced development strategy on regional development 
disparity during 1980-1990. 
During that period, in addition to the reform and opening-up, the reform of 
the market economic system and the reform of the financial system, the most 
important reform was the reform of the rural production and operation system, 
namely, the reform of “household contract responsibility system with 
remuneration linked to output”. In the early 1980s, the reform of rural 
management system, which focused on the household contract responsibility 
system, with remuneration linked to output, greatly enhanced farmers’ 
enthusiasm for production and agricultural production efficiency; thus, 
promoting the rapid growth of the farmers’ income.  
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Moreover, the increase in the procurement price of agricultural and sideline 
products, finally, successfully brought about a substantial increase in rural 
residents’ income, and the narrowing of rural-urban disparity, which offset the 
expansion of regional disparity.221 Meanwhile, the release of the agricultural 
labor force, local governments’ desire for increase in financial income and the 
relaxation of a relevant national policy also promoted the development of labor-
intensive township enterprises. During 1980-1995, the ratio of township 
enterprises increased from 14.3% to 37.5%. 222  To some extent, the rapid 
development of township enterprises lowered the rural-urban development 
disparity, and the narrowing of rural-urban disparity also directly converted into 
the narrowing of regional disparity. 
Without GDP data in urban and rural areas, this paper is based on research 
methods adopted by scholars, like Fan Shenggen,223 i.e. it uses the per capita 
income of urban and rural residents in various provinces as the indicator 
measuring the Theil index of inter-provincial development disparity. After that, 
it resolves the Theil index into development disparity between urban and rural 
areas and development disparity inside urban and rural areas. Figure 3-2 depicts 
the result of this measurement.  
In 1979, income disparity between urban and rural areas stood at 0.081, 
accounting for 76% of the overall disparity; after 1980, the development 
disparity between urban and rural areas was rapidly narrowed, and the Theil 
index dropped to 0.024 in 1984; after that, it began to increase; however, in 1990, 
it increased to 0.052. According to the measurement, it can be ascertained that 
the coefficient of correlation between the change of overall development 
disparity and urban-rural development disparity during 1980-1990 reached 95%. 
In other words, the narrowing of urban-rural disparity helped explain the 
narrowing of regional development disparity to a large extent. However, after 
1990, the development disparity between urban and rural areas and the 
                                                   
221 Fang, C. (2008). Thirty Years of Rural Reform in China: an Analysis from the Perspective of Institutional 
Economics. Social Sciences in China, 6, 009. 
222 Xu, C., & Zhang, X. (2009). The evolution of Chinese entrepreneurial firms: township-village enterprises revisited. 
Ifpri Discussion Papers, 1-33. 
223 Fan, S., Kanbur, R., & Zhang, X. (2011). China's regional disparities: Experience and policy. Review of 
Development Finance, 1(1), 47-56. 
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development disparity in urban and rural areas, reflected an expanding trend, 
and their combination resulted in the on-going expansion of regional 
development disparity after 1990.  
 
Figure 3-2 The Theil index of China’s urban and rural development during the fen zao chi 
fan period  
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
Some new information can be acquired by observing the evolution of 
development disparity among rural areas in different provinces or urban areas 
in different provinces (see Figure 3-3). At the beginning of the rural reform 
period from 1980 to 1983, farmer’s income among different provinces showed 
a converging trend; however, after 1984, this disparity began to expand from 
0.03 in 1983, to 0.065 in 1990. After 1990, the development disparity among 
rural areas sharply increased to 0.122 within only three years.  
Obviously, this sharp expansion of disparity was unlikely derived from 
agriculture, with an average production efficiency, but likely resulted from the 
expansion of disparity in the degree of rural industrialization among different 
areas. The income disparity of urban residents among different provinces always 
remained steady prior to 1990, but after 1990, it suddenly began to expand. On 
the whole, the development disparity among rural areas and urban areas in 
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different provinces was also an important part of the overall development 
disparity. Before 1993, the development disparity among rural areas had a 
significant effect on the overall disparity. 
 
Figure 3-3 The Theil index of China’s urban and rural development disparity between 
regions during the fen zao chi fan period 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
3.2.4 Historical Experience in Fiscal Decentralization and Regional 
Development 
In general, the fiscal decentralization policy makers learned a lesson from the 
experiences before the reform and opening-up and began to guide development 
towards institutionalization, standardization and stabilization. Although “fen 
zao chi fan” awarded local governments with huge autonomy relating to 
financial revenue and expenditure; nevertheless, the macro economy did not 
exhibit a wide range of disorder during that particular period. It should be noted 
that the system of fiscal decentralization still, unavoidably, led to the decline of 
the central government’s finance and the weakening of its macro-control ability. 
Besides, the one-by-one negotiation between the central government and 
various provincial governments objectively fostered self-interest and closing 
trend at various places.  
Theoretically speaking, the shift of the central government and local 
governments’ power might not contribute to the narrowing regional 
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development disparity. The description of continuously expanding industrial 
production efficiency as well as the efficiency disparity above, also verifies the 
theoretical judgment above. However, rural production efficiency released by 
the “household contract responsibility system with remuneration linked to 
output” rapidly narrowed the rural development disparity among different areas; 
thus, driving the convergence of overall regional disparity.  
This interesting phenomenon indicates, from one side, that balanced 
development among regions is not only related to spatial layout of productivity 
or industry and commerce, but also the coordinated development of the entire 
social economy, which also includes industry and agriculture. Therefore, to 
coordinate the further development among regions, it is essential to pay close 
attention to the centralization and decentralization of fiscal distribution, as well 
as the adjustment of comprehensive power including politics, economy and 
society.  
 
3.3 Fiscal Decentralization under the Strategy of Regional 
Balanced and Coordinated Development 
     
To overcome problems like excessive decentralization of fiscal distribution, 
the decline of central control ability, mismatch of rights and responsibility, an 
overly complex system, poor policy continuity and confusion relating to 
financial management of the contract system on revenue and expenditure, China 
had initiated the reform of the revenue-sharing system, whose main feature was 
the dividing of the revenue and expenditure boundary between the central 
government and local governments. The establishing of a separate central and 
local taxation authority since 1994, relied on the principle of a socialist market 
economy, based on summarizing successful experiences and lessons from failure 
in the reform of the financial system since the founding of new China and 
thoroughly investigating beneficial achievements of the financial systems in 
various countries around the world.  
The reform of the revenue-sharing system reflected China’s fiscal distribution 
between the central government and local governments; thus, introducing the 
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period of institutionalization and stabilization. To some degree, the 
implementation and precision of the revenue-sharing system improved the 
situation of the central government’s fiscal decentralization, aroused local 
governments’ enthusiasm for economic development and altered the 
institutional environment of a market economy. 
Overall, most scholars accept that China’s reform of the revenue-sharing 
system belongs to the category of fiscal federalism. Supporters of fiscal 
federalism believe that fiscal decentralization not only structures and 
coordinates the appropriate use of power to better meet the public demands, so 
as to enhance the supply efficiency and improve the quality of public products; 
but this also narrows regional development disparity under the dual action of 
local competition and voting with their feet.224 However, many scholars take a 
skeptical attitude towards this point of view, 225  for in a competitive local 
decentralization system developed regions that have substantial tax base and 
first mover advantage can maintain the government’s efficient operation and 
provide high-quality public services, via a relatively low tax rate. Public 
services with low tax rates and high quality can effectively attract the inflow of 
foreign capital and other valuable resources.  
Obviously, in this process, developed regions become richer, but less 
developed regions encounter a completely opposite situation and must maintain 
a high tax rate to promote and guarantee the government’s minimal operational 
standards. At the same time, instead of attracting the inflow of foreign resources, 
less developed regions squeeze local people and enterprises’ living space, so as 
to force an outflow of resources and cause poverty-stricken regions to constantly 
lose development potential. As the rich become richer and the poor become 
poorer, regional development disparity will naturally continue to expand. 
Meanwhile, in the system of fiscal decentralization, it is difficult for the central 
government to draw sufficient financial resources from rich or poverty-stricken 
areas, so as to promote the balanced development among regions.  
In a word, there is not yet a consistent viewpoint regarding the relationship 
                                                   
224 Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The journal of political economy, 64(5), 416-424. 
225 Prud'Homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralization. The World Bank Research Observer, 10(2), 201-220. 
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between the reform in fiscal federalism and regional development disparity in 
the academic circles. Thus, based on financial data after 1994, this paper 
explores the influence of the reform of the revenue-sharing system on regional 
development disparity from two perspectives – financial revenue and financial 
expenditure. 
 
3.3.1 Regional Disparity in Financial Revenue after the Revenue-sharing 
System 
The reform of the revenue-sharing system made the protocols for the revenue 
and expenditure boundary between the central government and local 
governments relatively clear. See Table 3-12 for clarified content. It should be 
noted that the central government established a tax return among local 
governments with amounts verified, by taking 1993 as the base year, so as to 
ensure local vested interest and reduce resistance of reform. After 1994, the tax 
return was linked to the growth rate of value-added-tax (75%) and consumption 
tax (“two taxes” for short) turned over to the central government, namely, the 
return based on increase, that is to say, whenever “two taxes” increase by an 
average of 1% all over China, the central finance provided an increase of 0.3% 
tax return for local governments. Besides, to properly solve problems left by the 
original system and achieve a successful transition from an old to a new system, 
China temporarily implemented a “double-track system”, with a revenue-
sharing system and a contract responsibility system paralleling each other; thus, 
gradually realizing standardization after an appropriate transition period. 
 
Table 3-12 The division of the revenue and expenditure boundary between the central 
government and local governments in the revenue-sharing system  
The Central Government’s 
Fixed Revenues 
Local Governments’ Fixed 
Revenues 
Central and Local Shared 
Revenues 
Tariff, value-added-tax 
withheld by the customs, 
consumption tax, 
corporate income tax paid 
by central enterprises, 
corporate income tax paid 
by local banks, foreign-
Business tax, corporate 
income tax paid by local 
enterprises, urban 
maintenance and 
construction tax (all of the 
three above exclude the 
part converted into central 
Value-added-tax (excluding the 
part converted into central 
revenue), with 75% shared by the 
central government and 25% 
shared by local governments, 
according to the resource variety 
of resource tax revenue; most 
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funded banks and non-
bank financial institutions, 
revenues (including 
business tax, corporate 
income tax, profit and 
urban maintenance and 
construction tax) paid by 
railway, various bank 
headquarters and various 
insurance headquarters, 
profit paid by central 
enterprises, etc. foreign 
trade enterprises and all 
export rebates are covered 
by central finance. 
revenue), profit paid by 
local enterprises, 
individual income tax, 
profit paid by local 
enterprises, individual 
income tax, urban land use 
tax, regulation tax of fixed 
asset investment, real 
estate tax, vehicle and 
vessel use tax, stamp tax, 
butchery tax, agricultural 
tax, animal husbandry tax, 
farmland occupation tax, 
deed tax, inheritance and 
gift tax, land value 
increment tax, revenue of 
compensable use for state-
owned land, etc. 
resource tax revenue is 
categorized as local revenue, and 
offshore petroleum resource tax 
revenue is categorized as central 
revenue; as for securities 
transaction tax, the central 
government and local 
governments share 50% of it 
respectively. 
Gradually Adjusted Content after 1994  
Individual income tax was changed to central and local shared tax (with regard to present 
distribution ratio, 60% of revenue was stipulated to the central government and 40% of 
revenue was stipulated to local governments); most corporate income tax was no longer 
categorized as central revenue and local revenue, according to the  subordinate relationship 
among enterprises, but distributed in specified proportions (similar to individual income tax); 
the state did not begin to collect securities transaction tax, and repeatedly adjusted the 
distribution ratio of stamp tax revenue; collected by the stock exchange, that is, according to 
the existing provision, 97% of it was categorized to the central government and 3% of it was 
categorized to local governments; butchery tax, agricultural tax and animal husbandry taxes 
were abolished; the collection of regulation tax of fixed asset investment was stopped; the 
revenue of newly increased vehicle purchase tax was categorized to the central government; 
export rebates started to be covered by the central government and local governments 
respectively, and the collection of offshore petroleum resource tax, inheritance and gift tax 
did not begin. 
Source: collected by the author 
 
(1) Disparity in the Amount of Financial Revenue after the Revenue-sharing 
System 
Local per capita financial revenue was an important indicator to measure and 
judge the degree of financial balance among regions. Before the reform of the 
revenue-sharing system, due to the frequent changes of China’s financial system, 
inconsistent financial system in various regions, unstable local revenue sources 
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and unclear local expenditure items, it was very difficult to conduct an objective 
and horizontal comparison of financial revenue and expenditure in various 
regions. The reform of the revenue-sharing system not only clearly defined the 
scope of local revenue and expenditure, but also attempted to universally 
establish a consistent financial system throughout China.  
Moreover, after 1994, the revenue-sharing system merely adjusted the 
existence or abolishment, category and sharing ratio of individual taxes; 
however, the entire institutional framework basically remained unchanged. Such 
universality and stability enabled the data of financial revenue and expenditure 
to be utilized for inter-provincial and inter-regional comparisons, so as to 
discover and monitor the disparity among provinces or regions, as well as any 
other significant or relevant information. 
 
Table 3-13 China per capita revenue gap between provinces after revenue-sharing system 
Year GINI Theil coefficient of variation 
1990  0.434642 0.374997 1.148838 
1991  0.426662 0.34289 1.063868 
1992  0.411254 0.323975 1.050503 
1993  0.399546 0.293143 0.991924 
1994  0.435477 0.352175 1.083728 
1995  0.398739 0.327069 1.02929 
1996  0.401142 0.338624 1.056518 
1997  0.411847 0.366169 1.117164 
1998  0.414361 0.365201 1.105531 
1999  0.422875 0.379591 1.12496 
2000  0.434821 0.398519 1.1544 
2001  0.455923 0.436018 1.212307 
2002  0.465372 0.459739 1.259553 
2003  0.473324 0.478535 1.302645 
2004  0.477661 0.4936 1.334391 
2005  0.481439 0.496992 1.33979 
2006  0.469149 0.458048 1.257003 
2007  0.470547 0.463398 1.269113 
2008  0.457223 0.434271 1.211102 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
According to the change, the trend relating to per capita financial revenue in 
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each province (see Table 3-13), and the disparity of financial revenue among 
various provinces depicted a declining trend and the Gini coefficient dropped 
from 0.43 in 1990, to 0.399 in 1993; before the reform of the revenue-sharing 
system. After the reform of the revenue-sharing system, the disparity of inter-
provincial per capita financial revenue began to slowly increase. The Gini 
coefficient increased to 0.48 in 2005 and began to decline in 2006. On the whole, 
the disparity of per capita financial revenue and expenditure among various 
provinces was smaller than the disparity of per capita financial revenue; the Gini 
coefficient basically stabilized between 0.33 and 0.36 after 1994, and began to 
decline after 2005. It can be determined from the data above that, under the 
strategy of a central unbalanced development, the expansion of economic 
development disparity among various regions directly converted into the 
disparity of financial revenue. 
 
(2) Disparity in the Structure of Financial Revenue after the Revenue-sharing 
System 
Although the reform of the revenue-sharing system designated the revenue 
and expenditure boundary between the central government and local 
governments; according to tax categories, the tax base and tax rates were still 
uniformly made by the central government, which did not necessarily mean that 
all regions of China used the same tax standard. As a result of the state’s change 
of development strategy and development of an industry support policy, 
different regions actually enjoy different tax rates and tax bases. For example, 
the state provided a series of preferential policies for emerging industries, high-
tech industries and foreign-invested enterprises, and high-tech enterprises 
enjoyed a 15% preferential tax rate of corporate income tax.  
In this way, it actually might cause regions with concentrated enterprises and 
industries enjoying tax preference to actually enjoy a lower tax rate, and most 
enterprises and industries of this kind were extensively located in the eastern 
coastal region. Lower tax rates and preferential policies would attract more 
foreign investment; thus, driving the prosperity of the regional economy, the 
improvement of regional finance and the enhancement of regional public service 
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levels. Meanwhile, sufficient industrial & commercial tax sources and relatively 
lower taxation costs also prevented local governments from imposing tax of 
excessive fees upon agriculture with high taxation cost, but a small tax base. In 
the presence of many benefits brought about by low tax rates and tax preferences, 
the governments of the above regions was more likely to become the “helping 
hand” to support local industry, commerce and agriculture.226 Such a virtuous 
circle could encourage the regional economic development in the direction of a 
healthy development and profitable interaction. 
 
Table 3-14 The FDI comparison between cities with preferential tax policy and other cities, 
1984-1991 
 Average Median Maximum Standard 
deviation 
18 cities with a preferential tax policy 7042 2233 42212 9753 
18 neighboring cities without a preferential tax 
policy 
1505 294 17799 2989 
18 non-opening cities 402 146 4161 694 
Source: Le,w., & Sun, P. (2002). An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of China’s Regional Tax Policy. Shanghai 
Economic Research, (6).  
 
As for less developed regions, with very few enterprises enjoying a 
preferential tax policy, instead of providing various preferential policies for 
existing enterprises, they would impose excessive taxes and fees upon local 
enterprises and tend to impose taxes and fees upon agriculture with high taxation 
cost, so as to maintain the government’s normal operation. Local governments 
of less developed regions were also very likely to become the “grabbing hand” 
to hinder and inhibit economic development.  
According to the above analysis and relevant scholars’ studies, it can be 
generally assumed that within the system of fiscal decentralization, there is most 
likely the existence of an industrial and regional preferential tax policy227, which 
might make developed regions’ financial revenue more reliant on industry and 
commerce, while both of their industrial and commercial tax rates and 
                                                   
226 Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and 
inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(4), 713-726. 
227 Qian, Y., & Roland, G. (1998). Federalism and the soft budget constraint. American economic review, 88(5). 
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agricultural tax rates were relatively lower; it might also force the less developed 
regions’ tax structure to target and rely more on agriculture, while both of their 
industrial and commercial tax rates and agricultural tax rates were relatively 
higher. This disparity in the structure of financial revenue further widened the 
disparity of economic development among different regions. 
 
Table 3-15 The average tax rate of industrial enterprises within each region and province, 
1998-2008228 
West average  8.65% East average  4.67% Central average 7.30% 
Inner Mongolia 6.96% Beijing 4.35% Shanxi 7.79% 
Guangxi 6.85% Tianjin 3.93% Jilin 7.37% 
Chongqing 6.48% Hebei 5.95% Heilongjiang 9.38% 
Sichuan 6.64% Liaoning 5.10% Anhui 6.84% 
Guizhou 10.31% Shanghai 4.69% Jiangxi 6.26% 
Yunnan 19.89% Jiangsu 3.75% Henan 5.69% 
Tibet 10.74% Zhejiang 4.73% Hubei 6.00% 
Shanxi 7.24% Fujian 4.32% Hunan 9.05% 
Gansu 6.56% Shandong 4.55%   
Qinghai 7.86% Guangdong 3.75%   
Ningxia 5.92% Hainan 6.22%   
Xinjiang 8.40%     
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press.  
 
It can be determined from Table 3-15 that the average tax rate of the above-
scale industrial enterprises was 4.67% in the eastern provinces; far lower than 
the 7.3% in the central region or the 8.65% in the western region. In the eastern 
region, the lowest industrial tax rate was 3.75% for Guangdong Province and 
Jiangsu Province, and it was below 5% in most other provinces; however, it was 
generally above 6% in the central provinces, with the highest reaching 9.38% in 
Heilongjiang Province; it was generally close to 7% or above in the western 
provinces, with the highest reaching 19.89% in Yunnan Province. According to 
Figure 3-4, it can be seen that the higher the per capita GDP is (the more 
developed the province is), the relatively lower the industrial tax rate will be. 
The above data basically proves the assumption mentioned before, i.e. in the 
                                                   
228 Note: The industrial tax rate in this paper means the total amount of all kinds of related industrial tax, such as 
Business tax and VAT accounted to the total value of industrial production. 
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revenue-sharing system, the more developed the region is, the lower its 
industrial tax rate; thus, contributing to the attraction of heavy external 
investment and promoting sustainable economic prosperity. 
 
Source: calculated by author. 
 
With regard to the agricultural tax rate, it was similar to the industrial tax rate. 
It can be determined from Table 3-16 that the average or mean agricultural tax 
rate was the lowest at 0.79% in the eastern region, seconded by the central region 
at 1.35%, and in the western region, it was an average of 1.64%; doubling that 
of the eastern region. The lowest tax rate in the eastern region was 0.34% in 
Tianjin City; it was higher than 1% in only a very few provinces. The lowest tax 
rate in the central region was 0.93% in Henan Province and Jilin Province, but 
it was higher than 1% in all the remaining provinces; the lowest tax rate in the 
western region was in Sinkiang, where it was 1%, while the agricultural tax rate 
was over 1.4% in all the western provinces, except for Sinkiang and Sichuan 
Provinces.  
It can be discovered from Figure 3-4 that the lower the provincial per capita 
GDP, the relatively higher the agricultural tax rate, and vice versa. The above 
data also proves the assumption mentioned before that, due to their single tax 
revenue source, the high industrial tax rate and small tax base, the relatively less 
  
Figure 3-4 The relationship between the industrial tax rate, agricultural tax rate and 
GDP per capita of China 
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developed provinces tend to impose taxes and fees upon agriculture with high 
taxation cost and small tax elasticity. However, this method of financial 
collection further constrained less developed provinces’ development potential. 
In a competitive financial system, the development disparity among these three 
regions was bound to expand.  
 
Table 3-16 The average agricultural tax rate for each region and province of 1999 229 
West average 1.64% East average 0.79% Central average 1.35% 
Inner Mongolia 2.38% Beijing 0.47% Shanxi 1.28% 
Guangxi 1.42% Tianjin 0.34% Jilin 0.93% 
Chongqing 1.41% Hebei 0.48% Heilongjiang 2.12% 
Sichuan 1.29% Liaoning 0.77% Anhui 1.54% 
Guizhou 2.26% Shanghai 1.01% Jiangxi 1.43% 
Yunnan 2.96% Jiangsu 0.77% Henan 0.93% 
Tibet 0.00% Zhejiang 0.66% Hubei 1.54% 
Shanxi 2.48% Fujian 1.06% Hunan 1.08% 
Gansu 1.41% Shandong 1.13%   
Qinghai 1.72% Guangdong 0.73%   
Ningxia 1.30% Hainan 1.22%   
Xinjiang 1.04%     
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
3.3.2 Regional Disparity in Financial Expenditure after the Revenue-
sharing System 
The reform of the revenue-sharing system clearly defined the revenue 
boundary between the central government and local governments, but, by 
contrast, it did not definitely divide the expenditure boundaries between the 
local governments. With regard to local governments’ expenditure responsibility, 
The State Council’s Decision on the Implementation of Revenue-sharing 
Financial Management System issued in 1993, ambiguously provided that “local 
finance mainly covers the expenditure required by local political power organs’ 
operation as well as local economic and career development, and specifically, it 
includes local administrative expense, public security organs’ expense, armed 
police’s expense, militia’s operating expense, local planned infrastructure 
                                                   
229 Note:The agricultural tax rate in this paper means the total amount of all kinds of related agricultural tax accounted 
to the total value of agriculture production.  
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investment, expense for local enterprises’ technical innovation and trail 
production of new product, expense for supporting agriculture, urban 
maintenance and construction expense, operating expense for local culture, 
education and health, expense for price subsidy as well as other expenses.”  
Moreover, after this, the State Council also made a corresponding supplement 
for local governments’ expenditure responsibility,230 but, on the whole, it did 
not clearly define the expenditure responsibility boundary between the central 
government and local governments. Central and local expenditure 
responsibilities continued the basic trend of the planned economic era, i.e. local 
governments took a broad expenditure responsibility for maintaining local 
government departments, developing the local economy and providing the basic 
local public services. According to scholars’ statistical data, “in 1999, local 
governments’ expenditure accounted for 99% of overall social welfare 
expenditure, which had never changed since 1978.”231 Given that financial 
revenue was extremely different among various regions, local governments of 
various regions also had their own preferences in terms of financial expenditure, 
under the conditions and background of undefined financial expenditure 
responsibility. 
 
(1) Disparity in the Amount of Financial Expenditure after the Revenue-
sharing System 
With regard to the variation trend of per capita financial expenditure in each 
province, it reflected a wavelike rising trend and the Gini coefficient increased, 
from 0.292 in 1990, to 0.327 in 1994. The reform of the revenue-sharing system 
did not reduce the disparity of per capita financial expenditure among provinces, 
and the disparity of inter-provincial financial expenditure fluctuated between 
0.327 and 0.360; reaching its peak in 2003, and later began to decline. In 2008, 
the Gini coefficient of the inter-provincial per capita financial revenue disparity 
was 0.310; lower than that in 1994. In general, the variation trend of inter-
                                                   
230 Wong, C., & Bhattasali, D. (2003). China: national development and sub-national finance. World Bank Other 
Operational Studies. 
231 Fu, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2007). Chinese style decentralization and structural bias of fiscal expenditure: Price of 
competition for growth. Management World, 3, 4-11. 
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provincial per capita financial revenue and that of inter-provincial per capita 
financial expenditure was inconsistent.  
Furthermore, it was calculated that their correlation coefficient was 0.7766; 
indicating that the disparity of the per capita financial expenditure among 
regions did not completely change in conjunction with the change of per capita 
revenue, and most particularly the inter-provincial per capita financial 
expenditure disparity converged ahead of revenue disparity. For this reason, 
while conducting the reform of the revenue-sharing system, China was also 
trying to establish a financial transfer payment system, so as to balance the fiscal 
equity among various regions. For example, The State Council’s Decision on the 
Implementation of Revenue-sharing Financial Management System in 1993 
provided that “the state should support the development of less developed 
regions and the transformation of old industrial bases through local tax returns 
and transfer payment provided by central finance”. The efforts of balancing 
regional finances brought about some effect, i.e. the disparity of financial 
expenditure among various provinces was obviously smaller than the disparity 
of financial revenue. Nevertheless, it should be admitted that the disparity of per 
capita financial expenditure among various regions was still high. 
 
Table 3-17 China per capita financial expenditure gap between provinces after revenue-
sharing system 
Year GINI Theil Coefficient Variable 
1990  0.29212 0.139512 0.564546 
1991  0.292359 0.139391 0.56219 
1992  0.288712 0.137749 0.562583 
1993  0.296096 0.143624 0.573412 
1994  0.326829 0.188133 0.694007 
1995  0.341432 0.210433 0.74776 
1996  0.33701 0.213256 0.767908 
1997  0.34433 0.232731 0.824541 
1998  0.341197 0.226234 0.80638 
1999  0.341529 0.22622 0.802968 
2000  0.335713 0.220354 0.793046 
2001  0.344573 0.222845 0.778386 
2002  0.351484 0.233334 0.801882 
2003  0.359236 0.252092 0.851094 
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2004  0.350271 0.246728 0.859103 
2005  0.347855 0.241296 0.843284 
2006  0.327423 0.210955 0.775549 
2007  0.321676 0.204135 0.757756 
2008  0.309367 0.186136 0.713469 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
(2) Disparity in the Structure of Regional Financial Expenditure after the 
Revenue-sharing System 
After the revenue-sharing system, local governments were allowed huge 
autonomy of expenditure. As the central government further relaxed its “vertical” 
intervention regarding local financial expenditure, local governments could 
arrange expenditure related to the actual developmental aspects within various 
regions. Theoretically speaking,232 given that local revenue was linked to local 
expenditure, economically developed regions would invest most funds in high-
return infrastructure construction and investment production environment 
improvement. At the same time, they would strengthen the expenditure in fields 
such as science, education, culture and health, so as to enhance local human 
capital, promote local development and increase local tax; while less developed 
regions with a backward economy and poor tax base would invest most funds in 
“maintaining” the normal operation of local political and economic life. For 
example, they would increase the expenditure for government administration 
and social security, and, correspondingly, decrease the expenditure for 
improving the production investment environment and human capital, for the 
purpose of further weakening the potential for regional development. 
Table 3-18 reveals the financial expenditure structure of China’s three regions 
after the revenue-sharing system reform. Regarding the expenditure for 
agriculture, an average of 8% of financial revenue was utilized for agriculture 
in the western region; 7.48% in the central region and 5.2% in the eastern region. 
In terms of expenditure for science, education, culture and health,  the lowest 
was 21.47% in the western region, 22.29% in the central region, and the highest 
was 23.16% in the eastern region. Regarding the expenditure for administrative 
                                                   
232 Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and 
inequality. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(4), 713-726. 
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affairs, the highest was 14.46% in the western region, second by the central 
region – 10.93%, and the lowest was 9.99% in the eastern region; with regard 
to the expenditure for social security, the lowest was 5.46% in the eastern region, 
second by the western region – 6.98%, and the highest was 9.47 in the central 
region. The expenditure in other areas mainly included those related to 
economic development, like infrastructure construction, i.e. it was as low as 
49.83% and 50.09% respectively in the central and western regions, while it was 
as high as 56.20% in the northeast region. 
 
Table 3-18 Differences of regional financial expenditure structure after revenue sharing 
reform 
  West East Central 
Rate of agriculture 8.00% 5.20% 7.48% 
Rate of education and research 21.47%  23.16% 22.29% 
Rate of public administration 13.46% 9.99% 10.93% 
Rate of social security  6.98% 5.46% 9.47% 
Rate of others 50.09% 56.20% 49.84% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2010): China Compendium of Statistics. China Statistics Press. 
 
It can be easily determined from the above description that the expenditure for 
science, education, culture and health, as well as other expenditures related to 
economic development in the eastern region, which was obviously higher than 
those in the central and western regions, and the ratio of expenditure for 
agriculture, administration and social security was obviously lower than that in 
the central and western regions. This kind of expenditure structure was in favor 
of sustainable economic growth in the eastern region. On the contrary, the ratio 
of “maintenance” expenditure was excessive, while “development” expenditure 
was slightly insufficient for the central and western regions, which further 
weakened their development potential. 
 
3.3.3 Regional Financial Transfer Payment after the Revenue-sharing 
System 
Theoretically speaking, one of the important factors for successful fiscal 
federalism is a fair and reasonable transfer payment system. As an institutional 
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mode, featuring fiscal federalism, the revenue-sharing system was bound to 
result in the disparity of financial capacity among governments, while 
encouraging competition among local governments. To prevent the expansion 
of regional disparity, caused by different financial levels, the damage to less 
developed regions’ development potential, the inequality of civil rights and the 
weakening of national identity, the state was required to balance developed 
regions and less developed regions’ financial revenue by fiscal means.  
In 1994, the initial goal of the revenue-sharing system was to “enhance central 
financial capacity and intensify, improve macro control”. To reduce the 
resistance of reform, the state postponed establishing the fair financial transfer 
payment system, by taking it as a task at the second stage. Meanwhile, to ensure 
local governments’ vested interest and strive for their support, the reform of the 
revenue-sharing system subsidized local finance through tax returns.233 In brief, 
it “returned more to rich provinces and less to poor provinces”, according to the 
amount of tax paid by them. After the reform of the revenue-sharing system in 
2002, China’s financial transfer payment system gradually developed and 
improved, forming an institutional system composed of tax returns, general 
transfer payments and special transfer payments (see Table 3-19).  
 
Table 3-19 Overview of China’s Transfer Payment System after the Reform of Revenue-
sharing System 
Tax Return 
Provide compensation for local governments for the part that was 
categorized to the central government, but originally belonged to 
local governments 
General Transfer 
Payment234 
Balancing transfer payment: to balance financial disparity among 
regions 
Transfer payment in minority regions: to support the development 
of minority regions 
County-level basic financial guarantee capital: to maintain the 
operation of county-level agencies 
Transfer payment for wage adjustment: to compensate for 
retirement pension and wage in old industrial bases and central & 
western regions 
                                                   
233 Note: the formula for the tax return: 𝑇𝑡 = 𝑇𝑡−1(1+0.3), T is the tax return in year t. R is the growth rate of 
consumption tax and value-added tax. 
234 Note: the detailed types of transfer payment can be find at the website of Chinese financial administration. 
http://www.mof.gov.cn/zhuantihuigu/czjbqk2011/cztz2011/201208/t20120831_679750.html 
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Transfer payment for the reform of the rural taxation system: to 
compensate for the reduced basic finance, by reason of the reform 
of the rural taxation system 
Financial transfer payment as compensation for resource-exhausted 
cities 
Transfer payment for industry and the commerce department’s 
cessation of two tax collections: to compensate for the reduced 
revenue, because of industry and the commerce department’s 
cessation of two taxation collections 
Transfer payment for the reform of taxes and fees for refined 
petroleum products: to compensate for local governments’ reduced 
revenue, due to the reform of taxes and fees for refined petroleum 
products 
Transfer payment for compulsory education, transfer payment for 
the new rural cooperative medical system, and the new rural 
transfer payment  
Special Transfer 
Payment 
Special financial subsidy for the central government’s powers and 
responsibilities: to subsidize affairs related to central powers and 
responsibilities, but implemented by local governments 
Transformed financial subsidy for the central government and local 
governments’ common powers and responsibilities: to subsidize 
commonly involved powers and responsibilities  
Special subsidy for local powers and responsibilities: to subsidize 
local powers and responsibilities, in line with the target of central 
control 
Source: Collected by the Author 
 
In general, before the reform of the income tax sharing system in 2002, 
China’s transfer payment was mainly focused on tax returns, which accounted 
for 75.3% of the overall transfer payments in 1994. Since the amount of tax 
return depended on the local government’s tax contributions to the central 
government, it was unrelated to every province’s GDP, financial revenue, per 
capita financial expenditure, public service level and geographical and natural 
environment, which caused “the equalization effect of tax return to be totally 
reverse – aggravating but not narrowing the disparity of financial capacity and 
basic public service among regions”.235  
For example, in 1995, regions receiving the most central financial subsidy 
                                                   
235 An, T., & Ren, Q. (2007). Equity of Public Service: Theory, Problem and Policy. Finance & Trade Economics, 8, 
010. 
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included Guangdong, Shanghai, Shandong, Jiangsu, Liaoning and other eastern 
coastal developed regions, with the amount of subsidy reaching 81.9 billion 
yuan; those receiving the least subsidy were Tibet, Ningxia, Qinghai, Hainan, 
Gansu and other economically less developed regions, with the amount of 
subsidy reaching 12.66 billion yuan. From the perspective of a subsidizing effect, 
before subsidizing, the top five provinces’ disposable income was 13.8 times 
that of the last five provinces, and after subsidizing, it decreased to 9.4 times, 
without any real reduction of disparity. According to the specific analysis of 
scholars like Ma Shuanyou, “more than 80% of transfer payment was to widen 
regional disparity” during that period.236 
 
Table 3-20 The conditions of provincial revenue and transfer payment acceptation in 1995 
Top 5 Local 
revenues 
Central 
subsidies 
Available 
finance 
Last 5 Local 
revenues 
Central 
subsidies 
Available 
finance 
Guangdong 382.3 191.8 574.1 Tibet 2.2 31.3 33.5 
Shanghai 219.6 180.2 399.8 Qinghai 8.6 19.1 27.7 
Shandong 179 130.5 309.5 Ningxia 9 16.2 25.2 
Jiangsu 172.6 163.2 335.8 Hainan 28.5 13.3 41.8 
Liaoning 184.4 153.3 337.7 Gansu 33.9 46.7 80.6 
Total 1137.9 819 1956.9 Total 82.2 126.6 208.8 
Source: Collected by the Author 
 
After the reform of the income tax sharing system in 2002, the ratio of general 
transfer payments and balancing transfer payments to central transfer payment 
continued to increase, and the ratio of tax returns constantly declined. In 2011, 
the central government provided a total of 3.731 trillion yuan transfer payments 
for local governments, including 1.7336 trillion yuan general transfer payments, 
composed of 660.9 billion yuan balancing transfer payments and 506.8 billion 
yuan tax returns. Generally speaking, the equalized transfer payments greatly 
improved the financial disparity among regions. For example, in 2010, the ratio 
of the three regions’ per capita general budget revenue was 1: 0.36: 0.41 before 
transfer payment, and the ratio of their per capita financial revenue was 1: 0.67: 
                                                   
236 Ma, S., & Yu, H. (2003). Inter-Governmental Transferment and Regional Economic Convergence in China. 
Economic Research Journal, 3, 26-33. 
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0.8 after transfer payment.237  
Although balancing transfer payments distributed financial resources, 
according to the standard of financial equalization, which was highly 
normalized and transparent; nevertheless, according to studies of scholars, like 
Jia Xiaojun, except for regions like Beijing and Shanghai that did not accept a 
balancing transfer payment, in provinces accepting transfer payments, the “per 
capita transfer payment fund and financial level are significantly positively 
correlated, that is to say, the stronger the fiscal is, the more the per capita value 
of transfer payment fund will be”.238 For this reason, it was because present 
balancing transfer payments took “maintaining institutions’ normal operation 
and guaranteeing civil servants’ normal payment” as the basic principle; thus, 
making economically developed provinces, with large populations being 
supported by finance and receiving more balancing transfer payments. To some 
extent, this principle deviated from the basic target of financial equalization. 
Moreover, special transfer payments gradually became a part of the transfer 
payment system. In 2011, the special transfer payment was 1.4905 trillion yuan, 
accounting for 40% of the overall the transfer payment. There were as many as 
110 kinds of special transfer payments and a corresponding fund distribution 
which involved 37 central departments. Being different from the tax return and 
general transfer payment system, the special transfer payment was from a 
subsidy fund the central government provided for local governments’ specific 
items, where a special fund was required to be used for a specific purpose, and 
in most cases local governments were required to provide a supporting fund.  
The special subsidy had a series of drawbacks; such as excessive expenses, 
too many items, a wide coverage of departments, a defective disbursement 
system and unclear standards, which not only challenged the central 
government’s monitoring capability, but also possibly resulted in its excessive 
intervention in local governments. From the perspective of region distribution 
of the special subsidy, most special transfer payments flowed into developed 
                                                   
237 Xie, X. (2011). China’s Public Finance Management. Chinese Fiscal Economics Press, p38. 
238 Jia, X., & Yue, X. (2012). Distribution of Equalization for Intergovernmental Transfer in China. Economic 
Research Journal, 1, 004. 
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regions, rather than less developed regions. Since most central subsidies 
required a supporting fund, economically developed regions could apply for and 
support more special subsidies, but it was difficult for less developed regions to 
apply for more funds, due to their limited financial funds. 
 
3.4 Introspections on Fiscal Decentralization and Regional 
Development Based on the Exploration of China 
 
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, the fiscal aspect is mainly 
decentralized for the purpose of increasing local governments’ independence 
and responsiveness to the supply of public services. At the initial stage of 
development, relevant theories of fiscal decentralization are not associated with 
regional balanced development. Balancing regions and reducing disparity 
among regions is the central government’s exclusive function and responsibility. 
As western countries’ economic growth slowed and central financial pressure 
increased in the 1980s, many countries began to reflect on the rigidity and low 
level of efficiency of regional policy led by the central government and tried to 
encourage local governments’ autonomous development and mutual 
competition, via further power decentralization, so as to achieve the efficient 
dynamic balance, instead of a low-efficiency static balance among regions. On 
the whole, the experiment of power decentralization, in the process of western 
countries’ regional development, was still developing, but an experimental 
consensus was never reached. 
However, fiscal decentralization, in the course of China’s regional 
development, experienced nearly six decades of practice. In Chinese regional 
policies, excluding several years of witnessing the imbalance of the macro 
economy, the decentralization of fiscal power was always regarded as an 
important means to encourage local governments’ enthusiasm for development, 
establish a relatively independent industrial system and achieve regional balance. 
Although the reform of the revenue-sharing system in 1994 enhanced the central 
government’s ability of absorbing financial resources, nevertheless, due to the 
institutionalization and legalization of financial relationships between the 
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central government and local governments, this reform was considered by many 
scholars as a reform of a fiscal federalism type with significant characteristics 
of power decentralization. In China’s nearly six decades of fiscal 
decentralization practice, the degree of regional balanced development at 
different stages exhibited different characteristics, which provided rich 
materials for analyzing the relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
regional balanced development.  
 
3.4.1 Explorations on Fiscal Decentralization in the Process of Regional 
Development 
Theoretically speaking, fiscal decentralization in the process of regional 
development is mainly to solve the incentive problem, i.e. the state arouses local 
governments’ development initiative, motivation and innovation by endowing 
local governments with relatively independent fiscal attributes, to prevent 
regional development from falling into a low-level static balance. Moreover, the 
decentralization of fiscal authority is bound to encourage local governments’ 
autonomous and independent trends, which may not only weaken the central 
government’s control and coordination ability, but also result in the combination 
of financial resources and a series of uncontrollable variables; such as local 
resource endowment, industrial structure, development foundation and 
developmental potential; thus, aggravating the tendency of a regional 
unbalanced development in a short time frame, whereby the state must adopt a 
relevant system or policy to control the potential pitfalls within the process of 
fiscal decentralization. Thus, for the implementation of national regional policy 
and the realization of regional balanced development, it is essential to establish 
a dynamic balance point between local incentive and central control, so as to 
“arouse both the central government and local governments’ enthusiasm”. 
China’s relevant explorations can be concluded as follows. 
 
(1) Insisting on Providing Economic Incentive for Local Development via 
Fiscal Decentralization 
Theoretically, the first-generation theory of fiscal federalism holds that in the 
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system of fiscal decentralization, the competition among regions can force local 
governments’ expenditure arrangement to better reflect the local people’s 
preference, so as to enhance the efficiency of public service supply.239 However, 
as for the reason why local governments have an incentive to enhance the quality 
of public services and maintain a market order, the first-generation theory does 
not provide a plausible or definite explanation. On this basis, the second-
generation fiscal federalism breaks the government’s “redeemer” image in the 
previous generation’s discussion and holds that both local governments and 
local officials are self-serving subjects of special interests, and they would 
launch competition and innovations driven by special interests, such as 
protecting their own power, enhancing government payment and enlarging 
government scale, and the result of competition is most compatible with the 
local people’s welfare. 240  In general, most relevant theories hold that the 
decentralization of fiscal authority can provide a strong economic incentive for 
local governments, so as to enhance the efficiency of public product supply and 
achieve a balanced development among regions through the course of horizontal 
or vertical competition.241 
With regard to China’s specific situation, studies of scholars, like Qian Yingyi, 
have found that the M-type government structure established before 1979 
awarded local governments with considerable fiscal independence, which 
enabled the central government to encourage competition among local 
governments by means of index assessment, so as to strengthen the excessive 
constraint of local budgets and local governments’ active intervention in 
economic development 242. Therefore, the incentive mechanism, focusing on 
fiscal decentralization, became an important secret catalyst for China’s 
economic enhancement.  
According to the specific exploration process, after stabilizing the economy 
                                                   
239 Oates, W. E. (1968). The theory of public finance in a federal system. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1(1), 
37-54. 
240 Montinola, G., Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1995). Federalism, Chinese style: the political basis for economic 
success in China. World Politics, 48(01), 50-81. 
241 Breton, A. (1998). Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance. Cambridge 
University Press. 
242 Qian, Y., & Roland, G. (1998). Federalism and the soft budget constraint. American economic review, 88(5), 1143-
1162.. 
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and society, via centralization at the beginning of the founding of the new China, 
the decision makers then realized the low efficiency of a totally centralized 
bureaucratic system. Thus, the central authority began to encourage local 
governments by decentralizing most financial revenue and expenditure power 
to establish a relatively independent industrial system for the purpose of 
promoting a balanced plan of productivity. In the political atmosphere of that 
period, financial incentives had an immediate effect, and local governments all 
over China strived to enlarge the scale of investment and infrastructure (see 
Table 3-2). Afterwards, when economic loss was caused by a lack of control 
over “the Great Leap Forward”, via central decentralization, Mao Zedong 
proposed the idea “xu jun gong he” (also called constitutional monarchy) in 
1966 and argued that economic authority and fiscal power should be distributed 
to local governments. Furthermore, he carried out the second large-scale fiscal 
decentralization movement in the early 1970s. Similarly, this decentralization 
of fiscal distribution greatly aroused local governments’ initiative and self-
interest; thus, greatly solidifying local interest and forming a series of 
“independent closed systems”.243  
Since the reform and opening-up, as the country needed to be rebuilt, and 
central financial capacity was weak, the decision makers had to continue to 
arouse local governments’ development initiative and support for the reform by 
“decentralizing power and surrendering part of the benefits” on the basis of 
maintaining existing central financial capacity. In the system of “fen zao chi 
fan”, the central government conducted a one-by-one negotiation with local 
governments, so as to determine the revenue and expenditure boundary between 
them and gave “credible commitment” to ensure the relative stability of the 
fiscal decentralization system. It should be noted that, being different from 
previous fiscal decentralization, this fiscal decentralization reflected obvious 
asymmetric characteristics. Guided by a national unbalanced development 
strategy, the eastern coastal provinces obviously enjoyed more financial 
autonomy and tax privileges. The incentive of fiscal decentralization gives local 
governments strong impetus to drive economic development and local officials 
                                                   
243 Wang, S. (1997). China's 1994 fiscal reform: an initial assessment. Asian Survey, 801-817. 
128 
can directly benefit from local economic development.244  
Although the reform of the revenue-sharing system in 1994 strengthened the 
central government’s ability to absorb financial resources, nevertheless, the 
financial relationship between the central government and local governments 
became more legalized. Local government had legal revenue and expenditure 
parameters, which, to some extent, intensified the “credible commitment” in the 
process of fiscal decentralization; local governments could develop a relatively 
fair “yardstick competition” in line with basically consistent standards, which 
greatly encouraged local governments’ development initiative, achieved rapid 
development of China’s overall economy, and created a basic institutional 
environment for a regional dynamic balanced development. 
In a word, providing an economic incentive for local governments through 
fiscal decentralization has always been an important characteristic of China’s 
regional development pattern. To some extent, fiscal decentralization enhanced 
local governments’ development autonomy and initiative, laying a foundation 
for the achievement of China’s regional balanced development. In some sense, 
the practice of encouraging local development, by means of fiscal 
decentralization, not only created China’s unique regional development pattern, 
but also confirmed the mainstream practice of worldwide regional development. 
From the perspective of effect, fiscal decentralization inevitably resulted in a 
dynamic expansion of regional development disparity, and asymmetric 
decentralization, after the reform and opening-up further aggravated this 
tendency. Therefore, for China, it is difficult to achieve the purpose of a regional 
balanced development, by providing economic incentives for local governments, 
which reinforces the idea that the central government’s authority and control is 
still indispensable.  
 
(2) Trying to Control Local Self-interest via Central Planning 
Due to its long-term implementation of a planned economic system, China 
controlled local governments’ self-interest behavior and regional development 
disparity mainly through central planning. In different periods, central planning 
                                                   
244 Wu, G., & Zheng, Y. (1995). On Central-Local Relations. Oxford Press, p33-39. 
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has varying degrees of control, due to the shifting variables of regional 
development. 
Faced with an extremely unbalanced regional pattern and economic structure, 
in desperate need of restructuring, China firstly imitated and referred to the 
Soviet pattern and used a planned economy to balance the limited productivity, 
which greatly improved China’s overall development. Thus, without having a 
socialist state’s mature experience and corresponding theoretical guidance, 
during the first power decentralization, the central government decentralized all 
power, including financial and taxation autonomy, enterprise management 
power and planned management power to local governments. Consequently, it 
lost the methods and resources to effectively control local governments. With 
powerful economic incentives, local governments’ self-interest quickly 
awakened and their development goals also rapidly deviated from the state’s 
overall development strategy. The imbalance of the macro economy greatly 
damaged less developed regions, while the central government did not have 
sufficient financial resources to support them, which led to the failure of the 
regional balanced development strategy and deteriorated the trend of regional 
unbalanced development.  
In this circumstance, the central government had no choice, but to control 
local governments’ behavior by the central government’s totally centralized 
planned economy mode. With the control of central planning, the national 
economy recovered in a short time; however, local development evolved to the 
difficult position, whereby “centralization leads to deadlock” . To encourage 
local governments to coordinate with the central government’s regional 
balanced development strategy, focusing on the “third-line” construction, fiscal 
and planned management power were decentralized again to local governments. 
Differentiating from the first power decentralization, in the second power 
decentralization process, the central government reserved considerable financial 
expenditure power and attempted to control the orientation of investment, so as 
to restrict the local governments’ excessive self-interest behavior. Although this 
control model prevented the “Great-Leap-Forward” imbalance of the Chinese 
economy to some extent, nevertheless, given that planning, management and 
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revenue power was held by local governments, it sharply increased the central 
government’s deficit and made the central government’s control continuously 
passive. The competition between local governments and the central 
government resulted in low-efficiency implementation of the regional balanced 
development strategy.  
After the reform and opening-up, due to the change in the regional 
development strategy, the central government relinquished absolute control over 
local governments, but began to focus on giving economic incentives to local 
governments in exchange for China’s reform and opening-up, as well as its 
overall development. The central government collaborated with local 
governments mainly through negotiation, for the purpose of ensuring local 
governments and the central government’s consistent target. As the central 
government did not hold independent financial resources and absolute planning 
rights, its macro control ability was bound to be greatly weakened, and the 
central government also held a relatively disadvantageous position in 
negotiations. To prevent the reduction of state capacity from exerting an adverse 
impact upon economic development, national identity and social stability, the 
reform of the revenue-sharing system in 1994 began to strengthen the central 
government’s financial absorbing ability.  
However, in order to win local governments’ support, the central government 
continued to protect local governments’ vested interest by means of a tax return. 
While the control power of central planning was absent, a balancing mechanism 
of modern central financial transfer payments had not yet been established, 
which caused China’s regional development disparity to expand after 1994. 
Since the reform of the income tax sharing system in 2002, China’s financial 
transfer payment system was gradually established and improved to coordinate 
with the state’s regional balanced development strategy, but, in general, the 
modern transfer payment system, aimed at balancing financial capacity and 
public services, has yet to be improved. As a result of the long-term existence 
of a planned economy philosophy, the central government continued to 
intervene in local development, through a plan-featured special transfer payment 
system in the process of regional coordination. 
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In summary, in the process of regional development, China’s long-term 
control over fiscal decentralization, through national planning, may cause local 
self-interest that might inhibit the state’s overall regional policy. However, the 
irreconcilable contradiction between planned control and economic incentive 
always creates a deterrent to fully implementing China’s regional development 
policy. 
 
3.4.2 Reflections on Fiscal Decentralization in the Process of Regional 
Development 
According to incentive theory, the problem regarding incentives among 
governments at multiple levels resulted from information asymmetry among 
different governments and their inconsistent development target. Since local 
governments have a series of advantages; such proximity to the market, 
closeness to people and a flexible management operation cannot be matched by 
the central government. Therefore, national development and regional balance 
is essential to providing economic incentives for local governments through 
fiscal decentralization, which, to some extent, reflects that local governments 
have a self-interest. Thus, the central government’s major task is to constrain 
and control various risks, which are possibly caused by local self-interest in a 
variety of ways according to the regional development strategy within a specific 
period. It can further be determined from the above description that the Chinese 
central government has balanced the drawbacks of power decentralization, 
mainly by means of planned control for an extended period of time.  
Theoretically speaking, on the one hand, the planned control model can force 
local governments to maintain a consistent development target along with the 
central government, by means of central planning. On the other hand, the central 
government can intervene in local micro economic activities through vertical 
agencies, so as to reduce information asymmetry between the central 
government and local governments. However, according to the practice of 
regional development, there is an irreconcilable contradiction between central 
planning control and the local economic incentive. 
In the first place, central planning control and fiscal decentralization are 
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certainly not compatible. According to the practice of socialist states, like the 
Soviet Union, the implementation of a planned economic pattern requires the 
central government to centralize all powers; including planning authority or 
power, fiscal power, personnel power, implementation power and supervision 
power. Among them, fiscal authority is an important guarantee for effective 
implementation of a specific plan. The advantage of the planned control model 
is that it can centralize essential human resources, material resources and 
financial resources throughout the entire society for key constructions, adjust 
the key structure of the national economy and reasonably distribute productivity 
in a short time. As for its disadvantages, since it cannot hold sufficient 
information regarding micro economic activities; it cannot reasonably adjust the 
economic interest relationship among various economic entities; thus, it easily 
inspires short-term motivation, low efficiency and a lack of vitality. In some 
sense, although power decentralization can overcome certain disadvantages, the 
decentralization of specific power is bound to result in the overall failure of the 
planned control model. For example, once fiscal distribution is decentralized to 
local governments, local governments have the ability to refuse to implement 
central planning directives; faced with local governments’ refusal to cooperate, 
the central government can temporarily constrain their behavior through 
political punishment or personnel adjustment, but it still does not possess the 
economic resources to adjust the macro economy.  
In the presence of such a dilemma, the central government has to maintain its 
planned control by continuing fiscal decentralization. Practice has proven that 
there is a trade-off relationship between central planning control and fiscal 
decentralization and a balance point that cannot only protect central authority, 
but also arouse local enthusiasm for development between them. However, this 
balance point has yet to be attained, causing a vicious circle, whereby 
“centralization leads to deadlock and decentralization leads to chaos”. Therefore, 
this model cannot achieve the “two enthusiasms” required by a regional 
balanced development. 
In the second place, central planning control aggravates information 
asymmetry. The most significant characteristic of the central planning model is 
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its direct control over local micro behavior. Due to the complexity of micro 
economics, it is difficult for the central government to fully understand micro 
economic activities and the complex and changing social demands.  
In general, the central government has two methods to cope with this dilemma: 
one is to enhance the number and power of vertical departments attached to the 
central government, establish central government departments according to 
every category of the micro economic area, and directly collect relevant 
information from vertical departments in local micro economic activities; the 
other is to collect relevant information, via local governments and provide 
feedback to the central government. According to practice, the first model is 
bound to cause the so-called “vertical departments’ dictatorship”, which not 
only stimulates bureaucratic organizations to expand sharply, but may also result 
in an imbalance of resource distribution and low economic efficiency, due to the 
low efficiency of the information delivery process and the information 
interruption among horizontal departments. Although the second model has high 
efficiency of information collection, nevertheless, due to the narrow-
mindedness of local interests, local governments always deliver relevant 
information according to their own interest demand. For example, affluent areas 
would try every means to hide the achievements of economic development, so 
as to reduce the amount of finance paid to the central government and obtain 
corresponding subsidies from the central government; as for poverty-stricken 
areas, in order to qualify for the central government’s reward, they would always 
exaggerate the achievements of economic development, causing a gross 
distortion of information. In view of this, it is difficult for the central 
government to obtain complete and accurate information, so as to make sound 
and effective regional policies with either model. The above description of 
China’s failed financial transfer payment system is an important illustrative 
example.  
In the third place, central planning control intensifies financial inequality 
among regions. Regarding the central planning control model; since the central 
government holds most resource distribution power, resource distribution power 
is always held by different central government departments, which establishes 
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central-level resource distribution, based on fuzzy or faulty principles without 
specific rules or formulas. Central government departments always create 
different rules for resource distribution, according to their own work mode or 
departmental interest; thus, making it difficult for the central government to 
implement the plan of regional coordination, and, as a result, a large amount of 
resources are consumed in the process of internal friction and disputes among 
departments.  
Moreover, without a clearly established set of rules, the process of resource 
distribution is inundated with “rent-seeking” space. For the sake of their special 
interests, local governments scramble for relevant resources in a non-
institutional way; thus, causing the so-called “getting fund by interpersonal 
relationship net”. Studies have shown245that regions with a strong economic 
foundation always have more lobbying resources and greater policy influence; 
therefore, the relatively affluent regions always become beneficiaries of 
resource distribution, which substantially aggravates financial inequality among 
local governments and goes against a balanced development among regions. 
 
3.4.3 Improvement of Decentralization in the Process of Regional 
Development 
According to the brief description above, it can be found that there is an 
irreconcilable contradiction between central planning control and local 
economic incentives in the process of regional development. As the problem of 
regional unbalanced development becomes more complex, if the state continues 
to apply a control model with a planning feature, it will not only be difficult to 
solve existing regional problems, but may also provoke new contradictions 
between regions. According to existing relevant theories, the central control 
model compatible with the decentralization of fiscal power is mainly balanced 
through the transfer payment system, i.e. it redistributes national financial 
resources through a clear and definite formula, based on the principle of local 
financial equality and public service equality, for the purpose of ensuring 
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roughly equivalent developmental conditions and the developmental potential 
among regions. 
Theoretically speaking, the central macro control model is based on the 
balanced transfer payment and local incentive model, which are complementary, 
and are focused on fiscal decentralization, First of all, the balanced transfer 
payment and fiscal decentralization are totally compatible. Fiscal 
decentralization is aimed at creating more financial resources, while ensuring 
the achievement of local interests, by arousing local governments’ development 
initiative, so it belongs to the category of “primary distribution”; while the 
balanced transfer payment belongs to the category of “redistribution” and it does 
not intervene in local governments’ micro economic activities. However, there 
is not a trade-off relationship between them, and by giving play to local 
initiatives not only contributes to increasing the total amount of financial 
resources, but also indirectly supports the increase of the transfer payment fund. 
Thus, the effective utilization of a balanced transfer payment fund will not only 
ease local governments’ redistribution burden, but will also create an excellent 
competitive environment for local development.  
Secondly, a balanced transfer payment system will not aggravate information 
asymmetry. Given that the balanced transfer payment does not involve the 
collection of concrete information about local behavior, and resource 
distribution mainly relies on macro-economic data relating to every region’s 
financial revenue and expenditure as well as its basic public services, the central 
government needs only to strengthen the vertical management of statistical and 
audit agencies. This would be done, so as to overcome the disadvantage of 
dependence on the central departments or local governments to acquire 
information.  
Thirdly, a balanced transfer payment will not aggravate the financial 
inequality among regions. Since the balanced transfer payment always has 
definite rules and formulas for resource distribution, and its operation is seldom 
affected by local government departments and local governments’ lobbying 
ability; thus, it can increase the procedure, transparency and fairness of the 
resource distribution process, while reducing “rent-seeking” space, so as to 
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reach the goal of bridging regional financial disparity. 
From a historical perspective, since the reform of the income tax sharing 
system in 2002, the central government’s financial capacity has gradually 
increased and the system of transfer payment has begun to gradually develop 
and improve. However, due to the long-term existence of planned control 
thought, the distribution power of transfer payment resources was held by more 
than 20 central government departments and definite, consistent rules for 
transfer payment fund distribution had not yet been formed. For this reason, the 
Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC clearly 
proposed “cleaning, classifying and standardizing special transfer payment 
items, gradually abolishing special and local supporting funds in competitive 
fields, strictly controlling directive, economic and emergency special items, 
screening reserved special items, and dividing local affairs into general transfer 
payment”. This policy indicates that the central government has begun to 
gradually reduce planned control and increase the orientation of macro-control 
reform. However, it should be noted that, as a result of the macro characteristics 
of the balanced financial transfer payment model, how to ensure that the transfer 
payment fund really serves to enhance the quality of public services, improve 
the environment of economic development and bridge the disparity of regional 
development has become an important subject in future development.  
According to various countries’ practice, a balanced transfer payment fund 
should be effectively utilized on the basis of the following conditions: firstly, 
the state should establish the domain and target of the transfer payment fund use 
and strengthen the monitoring and effect appraisal of fund use in a legal and 
institutional way.246 Secondly, the state should simplify the government scale 
of assisted areas, so as to prevent the transfer payment resources from being 
consumed by oversized public organizations. 247  Thirdly, the state should 
intensify the public’s supervision over transfer payment fund use, reduce the 
central government’s information distortion in the monitoring process, and 
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ensure that the fund is really used to supply public products and improve the 
public’s life.  
In a word, controlling fiscal decentralization through balanced transfer 
payments may result in many drawbacks; thus, not only should the existing 
fiscal distribution model be adjusted, but it also needs the cooperation, support 
and adjustment of the administrative power and the public service power. 
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Chapter 4 Administrative Decentralization and 
Regional Disparities: an Exploration of China 
 
Introduction 
Decentralization not only refers to the decentralization of fiscal power in the 
context of fiscal federalism, but also encompasses multiple dimensions such as 
political, administrative and welfare power.248 In general, most literatures probe 
into relevant issues in the context of fiscal decentralization, but very few involve 
the research of administrative power. Conceptually, administrative 
decentralization refers to the process of transferring planning power, organizing 
power, coordinating power and controlling power from the central government 
(or superior government) to the local government (or inferior government), 
which is inclusive of the government’s internal management power, as well as 
economic and society management power. Since the latter extensionally 
overlaps fiscal decentralization and public service decentralization, 
administrative decentralization mentioned here only refers to the distribution of 
control and incentive power among different levels of state administrative 
organizations.  
According to scholars’ studies, administrative decentralization contributes to 
reducing a governmental hierarchy, enhancing the efficiency of information 
delivery among governments and improving the government’s response to the 
public’s requirements; thus, lessening the difficulty of policy implementation. 
Moreover, administrative decentralization is in favor of simplifying and 
confining the government’s power, improving the market and the public’s 
initiative in respect of public product supply, encouraging government 
innovation, enhancing the adaptability of government work, boosting  
government staff’s morale and sense of belonging, and promoting the quality 
and efficiency of government service. 
With regard to the relations between administrative decentralization and 
regional balanced development, most researches are developed in the context of 
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regional governance, i.e. regional government or regional cooperative 
organizations are built to cope with regional problems across administrative 
boundaries. Naturally, most researches of regional governance are aimed at 
achieving the accumulation of social capital and the aggregation of production 
factors in a region by emphasizing local governments’ voluntary cooperation, 
as well as transnational organizations, private organizations, social 
organizations and individual citizens’ active participation. Hence, some scholars 
highlight that the federalist system is the best carrier of regional governance, 
which is not only because local governments in the federalist system have 
substantial decision-making and enforcement power, but also because regional 
interest groups and citizen groups have a powerful capacity for action and can 
play their flexible and effective roles in public affairs; thus, creating a basic 
premise for the efficient cooperation among multiple subjects. Some scholars 
have found from case analyses that in a federalist system, it is difficult to shake 
local governments’ decision-making power, and it is hard for the central 
government to effectively restrain their power. Driven by shallow local interest, 
local interest groups always treat common interest with a narrow mind, which 
makes it difficult to reach multiple subjects’ voluntary cooperation in practice.  
Some scholars have discovered, by sorting out cases of regional governance 
in the USA, that there is not sufficient evidence supporting the view that 
“federalism system is beneficial to regional governance” 249 . Instead, many 
studies have indicated that under the background of rapid economic and social 
reform, a federalist system tends to result in low efficiency of regional 
development policy implementation,250 thus, damaging the effective operation 
of regional governance. In view of this, for a regional balanced development, 
the central government should moderately centralize its administrative power to 
constrain local governments’ self-serving behavior. In a word, since the research 
on the relations between administrative decentralization and regional 
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development is still inconclusive, this thesis is aimed at conducting a primary 
research on this issue based on China’s experience.  
 
4. 1 Local Government size and Regional disparities 
 
Government size is one of the core issues discussed in economics and public 
administration. Over the past years, scholars have probed from multiple 
perspectives into the problem as to what size of government can promote the 
government’s work efficiency, drive economic and social development, and 
expand social benefits. For instance, Keynesianism advocates “big government”. 
A series of reasons such as the limitation of a market economy, the publicity of 
government services and the externality of public goods may cause “market 
failure”. Therefore, it is essential to build a “big government” by adding 
government employees, expanding the government’s fiscal expenditure and 
carrying out government-leading development plans; thus, further enhancing the 
social employment level, economic stabilization and development, and the 
public’s welfare. However, western liberal economists propose a “small 
government” by concluding that the expansion of the government size is bound 
to result in the government’s low efficiency, corruption phenomena, 
overburdened social finance, distorted market rules, malformed social 
development and restricted individual freedom. Just as Nozick stated that it can 
be proved that a minimal state’s function is only limited to protecting its people 
from violence, theft, fraud and an enforced performance of contractual 
obligations; any multi-function state would infringe on people’s rights and force 
people to do something, which cannot be proven.251 
There are numerous other theories highlighting the necessity of continuous 
expansion of government size from different perspectives. For instance, 
Wagner's law, also known as the law of increasing state spending, demonstrates 
that factors such as the maintenance of complex market rules, the increase of 
public demand, and the size effect of public enterprises let modern governments 
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constantly expand their size.252 According to James Buchanan’s “bureaucratic 
interests maximization model”, as economic men, the bureaucrats’ appeal for 
interests is reflected in the salary obtained, the size of the organization, the 
number of employees, the reputation of individuals and the expansion of power. 
Moreover, the above objectives are positively correlated to the maximization of 
department size and budget size, and the non-market producers’ role is to meet 
their own demand for special interests instead of making efforts to reach the 
final goal in the public field.253 In addition, Anthony Downs’ economic theory 
of democracy, Parkinson’s Law 254 and Mancur Olson’s analysis of interest 
groups and government size propose unique ideas about the expansion of 
government size from different perspectives. 
To sum up, instead of excessively pursuing “big government” or “small 
government”, modern scholars probe into the reasons for the expansion of 
government size and the methods to improve public organizations’ operation 
efficiency on the basis of admitting the necessity of government size expansion. 
In the above themes, the exploration on the relationship between government 
size and economic development is one of the pertinent topics. Many scholars 
have utilized economic data for systematic quantitative analysis of this issue. 
Some scholars believe that government size and economic development are 
positively correlated.  
For instance, Rubinson 255  has obtained a positive correlation between 
government size and economic development from transnational panel data; 
Ram256 has conducted research on 115 states and also reached a conclusion that 
the size of government consumption and the speed of economic development 
are highly positively correlated; Ma Shuanyou has applied China’s data from 
1979 to 1998 to discover that the Chinese Government’s labor services are 
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featured by significant productivity and further expansion of government size 
(per capita government consumption expenditure) is beneficial to economic 
growth;257 Ouyang Zhigang has made use of China’s data from 1980 to 2002 to 
construct a simultaneous equation and concluded that the expansion of the 
Chinese Government’s expenditure size is indeed beneficial to the enhancement 
of the GDP growth rate.258  
Moreover, other scholars consider that government size and economic 
development are negatively correlated. For instance, according to the research 
on developing countries and developed countries’ transnational data, Landau 
has reached a conclusion that the growth of government expenditure is 
prejudicial to economic growth;259 according to 24 OECD countries’ data from 
1951 to 1980 and other countries’ data from 1961 to 1980, Grier and Tullock 
have determined that the GDP growth is negatively correlated to the ratio of 
national fiscal revenue to the GDP in European, African and Latin American 
countries; however, they are positively correlated in Asian countries;260 based 
on 98 countries’ data from 1960 to 1985, Barro has also concluded that 
government’s high consumption distorts the market economic system and 
reduces the efficiency of economic growth; 261  Hu Dongshu has taken 
government financial resources as the index to measure government size262 and 
scholars such as Chen Jian have taken the ratio of government officials to total 
populations as the index to measure government size,263 and all of them have 
used the data before 2001 to draw a conclusion that government size and per 
capita GDP growth are negatively correlated.  
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Naturally, there are also scholars arguing that there is no correlation between 
government expenditure size and economic growth. For instance, Kormendi and 
Meguire have discovered from 47 states’ statistical data, from 1961 to 1980, that 
there is an insignificant correlation between the ratio of government expenditure 
to the GDP and GDP growth rate;264 Evans265 conducted research on 92 states 
and reached a similar conclusion in 1997. 
According to the above literature review, it is not difficult to determine that 
different scholars have reached different conclusions about the relationship 
between government size and economic development. To sum up, these are the 
following reasons.  
Firstly, different time intervals of research result in poor comparability during 
the research. Secondly, research samples are dissimilar, i.e. although different 
scholars have conducted a large aggregation of transnational comparative 
studies, they selected different samples and sample sizes. Thirdly, scholars have 
established different definitions for government size, which include the ratio of 
government finance to GDP, gross government expenditures, per capita 
government consumption expenditures, the ratio of government officials to total 
populations, the ratio of civil servants to employed populations, etc. Fourthly, 
scholars select different research methods, which include multiple linear 
regression, multiple quadratic regression, simultaneous equation, correlation 
analysis, etc.  
Furthermore, although scholars have attempted to probe into the general 
relationship between government size and economic development via 
transnational comparative research, all countries’ different political and 
economic systems, social development stages, as well as the domestic and 
international environment make it difficult to uniformly select control variables; 
thus, failing to reach a consistent conclusion in relevant researches. Hence, 
based on a clear definition of government size, this thesis specifically studies 
the relationship between China’s local government size and local economic 
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development, for the purpose of partially explaining the reasons for China’s 
regional unbalanced development. 
 
4.1.1 Definition and Dimension of Local Government size 
With regard to government size, different scholars always create a variety of 
different definitions for it. Specifically, it is primarily defined in broad and 
narrow senses. Broad government size refers to the range of activity when the 
government performs its functions, as well as its quality and quantity, and it not 
only involves the scope of government functions and authority, but also covers 
government organizations and personnel.266 In other words, the measurement 
of government size includes the measure of government function, government 
structure, government organizations, government employees and government 
expenditures. Narrow government size only refers to the size of government 
personnel and fiscal expenditure, namely, the absolute quantity of government 
employees or its ratio to the total populations, as well as the ratio of government 
fiscal expenditure to the GDP. When it comes to this research, and as it is 
difficult to effectively measure broad government size, this thesis selects the 
narrow government size and measures the size of China’s local government 
from two aspects such as the government’s employee number and fiscal 
expenditure. 
 
(1) Personnel Size of Local Government  
According to China’s national condition, concepts that can measure the size 
of government personnel include civil servants, officials, cadres, and personnel 
supported by finance. Civil servants refer to “personnel who are required to 
fulfill public duties in accordance with the law, incorporated into state 
administrative establishment, and paid by national finance”, which was refined 
in Civil Servant Law and enforced in 2006. They are mainly composed of state 
administrative organizations’ full-time staff. According to the statistical result 
at the end of 2012, there were about 7,089,000 civil servants.  
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As a continued concept of identity since the age of planned economy, cadres 
cover mental workers in party groupings, governments, troops, state-owned 
enterprises, collective enterprises, public institutions and mass organizations, 
with a size of about 36 million.267 In the process of research, as a concept 
corresponding with “the public”, officials include full-time staff of party 
organizations, legislative bodies, judicial organs, government agencies and 
social groups, with a size of about 11 million.268 Personnel supported by finance 
refer to “staff whose individual incomes and office expenses are paid by 
finance”. In a statistical sense, they refer to all personnel who seek a livelihood 
by finance, including logistic workers and retirees of party organizations, public 
institutions, mass organizations, some village cadres and related departments. 
Due to the different definition and statistical caliber of this part  of personnel, 
scholars have concluded that there are about 30-50 million personnel supported 
by finance. 
According to the brief description above, it can be easily seen that as a formal 
concept, civil servant has been applied for a short time and it is difficult for its 
application range to cover the size of government personnel in the traditional 
sense. As a concept of identity, cadre covers a wide range, including a large 
number of personnel unrelated to the government’s public behaviors. The 
concept of government “official” is similar to that of “government employee” 
and “public servant” in western countries; however, it excessively emphasizes 
the aspect of “government” and may overlook a large number of social 
organizations’ workers, who are supported by government finance, bear public 
services and provide public goods. The concept of “personnel supported by 
finance” covers a wide range, including all personnel related to public services 
and public institutions’ personnel who provide medical, educational and cultural 
services.  
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To sum up, this thesis selects the concept of “personnel supported by finance” 
which is widely utilized by scholars but sets the following limitations to it:269 
“personnel supported by finance” used in this thesis mainly refers to those who 
are paid by financial budget allocations in public departments and social 
organizations, excluding personnel of self-supporting institutional organizations, 
entitled groups and personnel of local agencies vertically managed by the central 
government.270 To be specific, this thesis uses the following indexes to measure 
the size of government personnel: the ratio of personnel supported by finance to 
total populations, the ratio of personnel supported by finance to all local social 
employees, the number of personnel supported by finance per unit of GDP, and 
per capita fiscal expenditure of personnel supported by finance. 
 
(2) Fiscal Size of Local Government  
Indexes measuring the fiscal size of the local government are as follows. 
Firstly, it is the local government’s expenditure size, namely, the ratio of local 
government’s fiscal expenditure to local GDP. This index, which is widely used 
by Chinese and foreign scholars, can effectively measure the influence of 
government consumption on social-economic development. Secondly is local 
government’s administrative expenses, namely, the ratio of total administrative 
expenses to total fiscal expenditures. It directly reflects the government’s 
administrative cost; thus, mirroring the government organization’s operation 
efficiency to some extent. Thirdly is the local financial self-support ratio, 
namely, the ratio of the general budget revenue to prefecture-level fiscal 
expenditure, which is used to measure local government’s independence. 
Theoretically, low financial self-support ratio indicates that the local 
government has a huge requirement for the central government’s transfer 
payments. This behavior is greatly restricted by the central government to a 
certain extent. However, on the other hand, the low financial self-support ratio 
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may increase the cost of the game between the central and the local, as well as 
the local government’s rent-seeking behavior. 
 
4.1.2 Change and Measurement of Local Government size 
Since the People’s Republic of China was founded, the lack of experience in 
socialist construction has caused the Chinese Government’s design structure, 
organizational setting and personnel allocation to be in a changing and 
fluctuating state. In the early years of the nation, affected by the Soviet Union’s 
political-economic model and based on the Chinese Communist Party’s 
experience in political power construction which was accumulated in the 
process of the democratic revolution, China established the pattern of the local 
government administrative system “taking party administrating cadres 
appointment system as the core, administrative order system as the subject, and 
ideological mobilization as the impetus”271 in the form of the constitution and 
the law. In this administrative system, erasing distinctions between the Party 
and the government, the government and the enterprise, and the government and 
the society, makes it is difficult to define the size of the government and it is 
also challenging to distinguish political identities such as government personnel 
and “cadres”. Since the reform and opening-up, in order to meet the demand of 
a socialist market economy development and socialist political and 
administrative modernization, China had established the administrative system 
of “central unified leadership and local structured responsibility”, and adjusted 
the government size and optimized government functions through constant 
reforms of a government administrative system. 
 
(1) Local Government’s Reform Course 
Since the reform and opening-up, guided by the core idea of transforming 
government functions, China’s administrative system has experienced five 
rounds of top-down reform. Most of the reforms aimed at adjusting government 
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structure and streamlining government personnel, which kept the size of all 
levels of China’s local government changing continually. Roughly, there were 
the following reforms.  
Government Reform in 1983. To meet the requirement of a socialist economic 
reform, this reform substantially dissolved economic management departments, 
reduced the departments of the State Council from 100 to 61 in 1981, and 
sharply cut down the number of organizations, as well as personnel in various 
provinces, direct-controlled municipalities and autonomous regions. It 
explicitly stipulated the post number, age and educational structure of the 
leading groups in each department. The policy of making cadres “revolutionary, 
younger, knowledgeable and professional” started to be implemented. Economic 
management power, financial revenue and expenditure power and personnel 
management power began to be decentralized. Moreover, the size of the 
personnel force was shrunken, i.e. the number of personnel in all departments 
of the State Council was reduced to 30,000, the number of personnel in 
provincial organs was reduced from 180,000 to 120,000, and the number of 
personnel in city-level and county-level organs was reduced by 20%. 
Government Reform in 1988. Based on previous reforms, this reform further 
weakened the economic management departments’ excessive intervention into 
macroeconomic activities, intensified the government’s macro-control function, 
and proposed that “the transformation of government function is the key to 
organization reform”. This reform was implemented using the top-down way by 
steps. First of all, the central government started to adjust its organizational 
setting, transformed government functions, improved the way of working, 
accelerated administrative legislation, and enhanced work efficiency. However, 
due to a series of complex political and economic factors, the originally 
scheduled local government reform in 1989 was postponed. Moreover, the 
unstable economy caused the streamlined departments to start growing and 
expanding again. 
Government Reform in 1993. This organizational reform was carried out 
based on the establishment of a socialist market economy system. The focal 
point of the reform was to transform government function with its core idea to 
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separate government functions from enterprise management, and its major task 
was to straighten out the division of powers and duties, adjust all levels of 
organizational setting, and reallocate and reduce government personnel. In 1993, 
the State Commission Office of Public Sectors Reform issued Opinions about 
All Levels of Local Party and Government Organization Setting272 to explicitly 
stipulate the basic principles for the setting of local government organizations 
and its specific number. For instance, about 55 work agencies were set for 
interprovincial party committees and governments, and 30 administrative bodies 
were set for regional party committees and administrative offices. There were 
three kinds of work agencies for municipal party committees and governments, 
60, 50 and 30 of which were set respectively. Furthermore, the way of 
classification design was taken for county-level and town-level work agencies. 
Meanwhile, the reform of public institutions started to be implemented. On the 
principle of separating public service units from government and socialization, 
it aimed at promoting public institutions’ classification management, as well as 
“three settings” such as agency setting, function setting and establishment 
setting. 
Government Reform in 1998. This reform was the most systematic and 
largest-size one since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Based on 
the preliminary reform exploration and global countries’ experience in 
government reform, China’s government reform started to march forward along 
a legalized, standardized and sustained path. Principles such as executing the 
separation of government functions from enterprise management, strengthening 
macro-control, retreating from micro-management, promoting downsizing, 
dividing government functions, fulfilling the integration of power and 
responsibility and implementing “rule of law” strategy, gradually penetrated 
into all levels of the government’s reform activities. During this period, almost 
all industrial economic departments were dissolved, which gradually removed 
the chronic question of the separation of government functions from enterprise 
management. With regard to local government’s reform, Opinions on Local 
Government’s Organization Reform issued by the CPC Central Committee and 
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the State Council in 1999 and Opinions on City-level, County-level and Town-
level Personnel Downsizing at the national local agency’s reform conference 
stipulated the principles and specific requirements for the local government’s 
function transformation, government structure optimization and government 
downsizing. According to the effect, the number of provincial government 
agencies was cut down from 55 to 40, reducing by 47%; the number of 
prefecture-level government agencies was reduced from 45 to 30; the number 
of county-level government agencies was reduced from 28 to 18. By June, 2002, 
a total of 1.15 million administrative establishments had been reduced from all 
levels of party, government and mass organizations in China.273 
Government Reform in 2003. After accessing to the WTO, China started a 
new round of administrative system reforms. The Second Plenary Session of the 
16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued Opinions on 
Deepening Administrative System and Organization Reform to define the 
orientation and objective of the reform. In terms of local government’s reform, 
based on the central government’s functions of adjusting and intensifying 
macro-control, state-owned enterprises, circulation system, financial 
supervision, food and drug safety, local government no longer completely 
conformed to or kept pace with the central government, but adjusted government 
functions and personnel according to local conditions on the basis of the central 
government’s unified deployment. In practice, many local governments began 
to intensify the management over departments of safety production management, 
land and resources administration, and sanitation and disease supervision. 
Moreover, they simplified the procedure of administrative management and 
enhanced the efficiency of administration via the administration service hall. 
During this period, administrative staff downsizing did not become the focus of 
work in various regions. Instead, local government’s organization setting and 
personnel allocation was basically unchanged or even expanded to different 
degrees. 
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Government Reform in 2008. Based on the “Super-ministry System”, the 
Chinese Government started a new round of reforms, i.e. “according to the 
principles of unity, simplicity and effectiveness as well as the requirement that 
decision-making power, enforcement power and supervision power should be 
restrained mutually and coordinated mutually, the government paid close 
attention to function transformation and responsibility rationalization, to further 
optimize government organization structure, standardize organization setting, 
explore the super-ministry system implementing organic unity of functions, and 
improve the administrative operating mechanism”.274 As for local government’s 
reform, Opinions on Deepening Administrative System Reform proposed, “Both 
the central government and local government’s positive roles must be played. 
Under the central government’s leadership, local governments should be 
encouraged to conduct reform and innovation by combining the reality.” 
“According to all levels of government’s responsibilities, local governments’ 
organization setting should be reasonably adjusted. Within the quotas 
determined by the central government, organizations to be set uniformly should 
be corresponding from superiors to subordinates and other organizations should 
be set according to local conditions.” That “one size fits all” was encouraged in 
local reform during this period. Instead, all regions proceeded from reality to 
innovative pursuits within the local administrative system; thus, bringing about 
positive reforms and innovations, such as the “Hainan Mode” and “Fuyang 
Mode”.275 
 
(2) Measurement of Local Government size 
It can be determined from the brief description above that China’s local 
government size displays a periodic characteristic and constantly changes along 
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administrative examination and approval items are changed from 724 to 299. The conception “Power List” are adopted 
by the report of CPC. 
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with the advancement of every reform. According to the latest data, this thesis 
provides a primary description of the current government size. 
According to all provinces’ fiscal sizes, this thesis groups and collates all 
provinces and figures out of the average value of all indexes, based on the data 
in the China Statistical Yearbook in 2011 and China’s three regions (eastern 
China, central China and western China). Indexes measuring all provinces’ 
government size include: fiscal revenue, fiscal expenditure, administrative 
expenses, the ratio of fiscal expenditure to GDP (expenditure-GDP ratio), the 
ratio of fiscal revenue to fiscal expenditure (revenue-expenditure ratio), the ratio 
of administrative expenditure to total fiscal expenditure (administrative-
expenditure ratio), and the ratio of administrative expenditure to total fiscal 
revenue (administrative-revenue ratio). 
 
Table 4-1 Fiscal size of local government in 2011（Unit：Billion Yuan/%） 
Regions Province Revenue Expend 
Admin 
Expenses 
Expend 
/GDP 
Revenue 
/Expend 
Admin 
/Revenue 
Eastern 
Region 
Beijing 300.628 324.523 26.138 19.97% 92.64% 8.69% 
Tianjin 145.513 179.633 11.781 15.89% 81.01% 8.10% 
Hebei 173.777 353.739 41.493 14.43% 49.13% 23.88% 
Liaoning 264.315 390.585 41.523 17.57% 67.67% 15.71% 
Shanghai 342.983 391.488 23.611 20.39% 87.61% 6.88% 
Jiangsu 514.891 622.172 74.845 12.67% 82.76% 14.54% 
Zhejiang 315.08 384.259 47.155 11.89% 82.00% 14.97% 
Fujian 150.151 219.818 24.747 12.52% 68.31% 16.48% 
Shandong 345.593 500.207 61.848 11.03% 69.09% 17.90% 
Guangdong 551.484 671.24 80.741 12.61% 82.16% 14.64% 
Hainan 34.012 77.88 8.202 30.87% 43.67% 24.12% 
Eastern Average 285.312 374.14 40.189 16.35% 73.28% 15.08% 
Central 
Region 
Shanxi 121.343 236.385 25.158 21.04% 51.33% 20.73% 
Jilin 85.01 220.174 23.14 20.83% 38.61% 27.22% 
Heilongjiang 99.755 279.408 25.637 22.21% 35.70% 25.70% 
Anhui 146.356 330.299 34.534 21.59% 44.31% 23.60% 
Jiangxi 105.343 253.46 25.8 21.66% 41.56% 24.49% 
Henan 172.176 424.882 55.902 15.78% 40.52% 32.47% 
Hubei 152.691 321.474 39.495 16.37% 47.50% 25.87% 
Hunan 151.707 352.076 46.674 17.90% 43.09% 30.77% 
Central Average 129.298 302.27 34.543 19.67% 42.83% 26.36% 
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Western 
Region 
Inner 
Mongolia 
135.667 298.921 30.453 20.82% 45.39% 22.45% 
Guangxi 94.772 254.528 32.218 21.72% 37.23% 34.00% 
Chongqing 148.833 257.024 22.458 25.67% 57.91% 15.09% 
Sichuan 204.479 467.492 48.511 22.23% 43.74% 23.72% 
Guizhou 77.308 224.94 30.721 39.45% 34.37% 39.74% 
Yunnan 111.116 292.96 28.205 32.94% 37.93% 25.38% 
Tibet 5.476 75.811 9.594 125.14% 7.22% 175.20% 
Shanxi 150.018 293.081 34.132 23.42% 51.19% 22.75% 
Gansu 45.012 179.124 17.492 35.68% 25.13% 38.86% 
Qinghai 15.181 96.747 6.54 57.92% 15.69% 43.08% 
Ningxia 21.998 70.591 5.196 33.58% 31.16% 23.62% 
Xinjiang 72.043 228.449 24.536 34.56% 31.54% 34.06% 
Western Average 90.159 228.306 24.171 39.43% 34.87% 41.50% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2012). China Statistical Yearbook 2011. China Statistic Press. 
  
Regarding fiscal revenue (see Table 4-1), the fiscal revenue of eastern China 
was 285.3 billion yuan, 2.2 times that of central China and 3.2 times that of 
western China. In eastern China, Guangdong province obtained the highest 
fiscal revenue, reaching 551.5 billion yuan. In terms of fiscal expenditure, it was 
374.1 billion yuan in eastern China, 1.2 times that of central China and 1.6 times 
that of western China. Guangdong Province obtained the highest fiscal 
expenditure, reaching 671.2 billion yuan. With regard to administrative 
expenditure, it was 40.2 billion yuan in eastern China, 1.1 times that of central 
China and 1.6 times that of western China. Judged by the fiscal condition only, 
the average size of the provinces in eastern China is the biggest, followed by 
central China, and it is the smallest in western China. 
As for the ratio of fiscal expenditure to GDP (see Table 4-1), it was the biggest 
– 39.43% of western China, twice that of central China and 2.4 times that of 
eastern China. Except for Tibet, Qinghai had the highest ratio of government’s 
fiscal expenditure to GDP – 57.9%. Speaking of the ratio of fiscal revenue to 
fiscal expenditure, eastern China had the highest fiscal self-support rate – 
73.28%, and it was 42.83% in central China and 34.87% in western China. 
Beijing had the highest self-support ratio – 92.64%. In terms of the ratio of 
government’s administrative expenditure to its total revenue, it was the highest 
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in western China – 41.50%, central China ranked second with 26.36%, and it 
was the lowest in eastern China – 15.08%. 
 
Table 4-2 Number of public organization staff of provinces in 2011 
Regions Province 
Staff 
number 
Staff 
number/ 
population 
Staff number/ 
urban 
population 
Expenditure 
/staff 
Average 
wage 
Eastern 
Region 
Beijing 431 2.13% 6.28% 6.07 66.038 
Tianjin 141 1.04% 5.25% 8.37 71.673 
Hebei 810 1.12% 14.58% 5.12 31.284 
Liaoning 506 1.15% 8.73% 8.21 39.177 
Shanghai 194 0.83% 3.90% 12.17 89.882 
Jiangsu 650 0.82% 8.01% 11.51 64.229 
Zhejiang 599 1.10% 6.01% 7.87 69.421 
Fujian 306 0.82% 5.14% 8.07 47.138 
Shandong 1058 1.10% 10.07% 5.84 39.284 
Guangdong 989 0.94% 7.99% 8.16 57.5 
Hainan 106 1.21% 12.45% 7.74 43.316 
Eastern Average 526 1.11% 8.04% 8.1 56.3 
Central 
Region 
Shanxi 584 1.63% 14.26% 4.3 30.012 
Jilin 325 1.18% 11.71% 7.11 31.765 
Heilongjia
ng 
428 1.12% 9.19% 5.98 34.016 
Anhui 471 0.79% 11.44% 7.34 37.899 
Jiangxi 461 1.03% 13.39% 5.6 34.013 
Henan 1061 1.13% 12.65% 5.27 30.691 
Hubei 547 0.95% 9.33% 7.22 36.364 
Hunan 767 1.16% 13.90% 6.09 32.611 
Central Average 581 1.12% 11.98% 6.11 33.4 
Western 
Region 
Inner 
Mongolia 
366 1.48% 13.96% 8.31 47.346 
Guangxi 405 0.87% 11.85% 7.96 34.83 
Chongqing 266 0.91% 7.89% 8.44 44.028 
Sichuan 793 0.99% 12.92% 6.12 39.555 
Guizhou 414 1.19% 17.17% 7.42 33.992 
Yunnan 470 1.02% 13.43% 6 34.402 
Tibet 100 3.30% 42.96% 9.58 50.336 
Shanxi 506 1.35% 12.84% 6.75 37.033 
Gansu 364 1.42% 18.26% 4.81 29.806 
Qinghai 92 1.62% 15.23% 7.09 46.408 
Ningxia 84 1.31% 13.77% 6.2 37.427 
Xinjiang 382 1.73% 13.67% 6.43 39.862 
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Western Average 353 1.43% 16.16% 7.09 39.6 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2012). China Statistical Yearbook 2011. China Statistic Press. 
 
Regarding the number of public organization staff (see Table 4-2), it was an 
average of 526,000 in the provinces of eastern China, 581,000 in the provinces 
of central China and 353,000 in the provinces of western China. Populous 
provinces such as Shandong and Henan had the most officials, 1,058,000 and 
1,061,000 respectively. With regard to the ratio of each province’s public 
organization staff number to total populations, it was 1.43% in western China, 
1.12% in central China and 1.11% in eastern China. Except for Tibet, Beijing 
had the highest “official-citizen ratio”. As for the ratio of each province’s public 
organization staff to urban employed persons,276 it was 16.16% – the highest in 
western China, 11.98% in central China and 8.04% in eastern China. Even if 
Tibet was excluded, the ratio of western China still reached 13.72%. Speaking 
of public organization staff’s average administrative expense, it was 81,000 
yuan – the most in eastern China, followed by 71,000 yuan in western China, 
and it was 61,000 yuan – the least in central China. Public organization staff’s 
mean wage was roughly the same as per capita administrative expense. 
Generally speaking, the ratio of officials to citizens and the ratio of officials to 
urban employed persons in western China were higher than those in the other 
two areas, and public organization staff’s average wage and per capital 
administrative expense were also higher than those in central China. 
 
4.1.3 Local Government size and Grabbing Hand 
According to the brief description above, it can be seen that western provinces’ 
local government size is larger than that of other provinces throughout China in 
respect of both fiscal expenditure and personnel. Theoretically speaking, both 
Keynesian Theory and Developmental State Theory hold that powerful 
government intervention is an essential condition for the great-leap-forward 
development of the economy in backward areas. On the one hand, government-
                                                   
276 Note: Most public sectors are established at urban areas. After the cancellation of agricultural tax, the expenses of 
public sectors are mainly from non-agricultural tax. Hence, by counting the proportion of public staff number accounted 
for urban employed population, we can observe the real size of the public sector. 
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led development plans and public investment contribute to strengthening the 
infrastructure of economic development, enhancing employment and 
stimulating economic growth; on the other hand, the government can make full 
use of its power to establish an excellent economic system, legal norms, 
incentives and good public-private partnerships within a short time, to create a 
well-organized environment for economic development. Just as some scholars 
asserted, “Those with vibrant economy are powerful states.”277  
This conclusion is also applicable to the catching-up of backward areas in a 
country. Nevertheless, many schools advocating the neo-liberalism economic 
theory believe that a large government size will lower the government’s 
operational efficiency, enhance its operations cost, add burden to social finance 
and tax, disturb normal economic operation and weaken the potential of 
economic growth. Therefore, for the development of backward countries and 
regions, government expenditure should be reduced and government size should 
be shrunk. Particularly, small-sized government’s “low tax burden” is in favor 
of the influx of capital and talents278, thus laying a firm foundation for economic 
growth. 
In addition, the theory of “grabbing hand” is noteworthy, for it entails that the 
government’s target is not to maximize social welfare, but to pursue its private 
interests. 279  The methods to pursue private interests include: setting more 
government positions for interest transfer and exchange, and intensifying the 
government’s approval, intervention and control ability to intervene in normal 
economic and social life, so as to create space for rent-seeking. In other words, 
according to this theory, instead of optimizing the reallocation of social 
resources, the expansion of government size will cause great losses of social 
efficiency while feathering the government’s nest. Public choice schools also 
hold a similar view that both the government and the market are “rational 
                                                   
277 Weiss, L., & Hobson, J. M. (1995). States and economic development: a comparative historical analysis. Polity Press, 
p6. 
278Weingast, B. R. (2009). Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives. Journal of Urban 
Economics, 65(3), 279-293. 
279 Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (2002). The grabbing hand: Government pathologies and their cures. Harvard 
University Press, p4. 
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economic agents”, and apart from providing public goods and eliminating the 
external effect, the government would expand its size for its own interests.280 
Based on the “Grabbing Hand” model, an important reason why “large-size 
government” restricts economic growth is because government organizations 
have made rent-seeking a career, rather than assuming a productive career in 
some backward counties or regions. The most outstanding social members 
always make full use of their intelligence and wisdom to garner benefits and 
obtain a bright career prospect, by assuming office in the government, which 
leads to insufficient human resources for industry, agriculture, commerce and 
social public service which can create social wealth; thus, weakening the 
development potential of regions. During the period of the Renaissance, the 
prosperity of northern Italy, Low Countries and Burgundy possessing 
decentralized government power, as well as their decline since the establishment 
of the Habsburg Dynasty’s centralization system, proved the argument above to 
some extent. 
In the present Chinese society, the “civil servant fever” has become a common 
phenomenon. Stable career prospects, abundant social welfare, recessive space 
for rent-seeking and high social status become important reasons for young 
people to select and seek government positions, which to some extent arouses 
people’s concern about the loss of creative elites in the society; thus, possibly 
weakening the society’s creativity and increasing the fiscal burden. This thesis 
calculates the disparity between the average salary of public servants in China’s 
three areas and the average wage in society to primarily verify the argument 
above. If the forecast of “Grabbing Hand” is correct, Chinese officials’ average 
salary is supposed to be high in western China, but low in eastern China. 
 
Table 4-3 Average salary of government officials and social staffs (unit: Yuan) 
Provinces Official Social  Province Official  Social  Province Official  Social  
Inner 
Mongolia 
47346 41118 Beijing 66038 75482 Shanxi 30012 39230 
Guangxi 34830 33032 Tianjin 71673 55658 Jilin 31765 33610 
                                                   
280 Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytic foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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Chongqing 44028 39430 Hebei 31284 35309 
Heilongjia
ng 
34016 31302 
Sichuan 39555 37330 Liaoning 39177 38154 Anhui 37899 39352 
Guizhou 33992 36102 Shanghai 89882 75591 Jiangxi 34013 33239 
Yunnan 34402 34004 Jiangsu 64229 45487 Henan 30691 33634 
Tibet 50336 49464 Zhejiang 69421 45162 Hubei 36364 36128 
Shanxi 37033 38143 Fujian 47138 38588 Hunan 32611 34586 
Gansu 29806 32092 Shandong 39284 37618    
Qinghai 46408 41370 Guangdong 57500 45060    
Ningxia 37427 42703 Hainan 43316 36244    
Xinjiang 39862 38238       
Western 
average 
39585 38585 
Eastern 
average 
56267 48032 
Central 
average 
33421 35135 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2012). China Statistical Yearbook 2011. China Statistic Press. 
 
An interesting phenomenon can be found from Table 4-3, which is, the salary 
of government staff in western China was slightly higher than the average wage 
in society by about 1,000 yuan, the average salary of government staff in eastern 
China was far higher than the average wage in society by more than 8,500 yuan, 
and the average salary of government staff in central China was lower than the 
average wage in society. On the whole, government wages were high in eastern 
and western China, but low in central China, which obviously went against the 
result – high in the west, but low in the east, forecasted by the government’s 
“Grabbing Hand” model. Can it prove from the opposite side of the argument 
that government’s high wages enables professionals, who meet the requirements 
of modern government, to develop their abilities in public departments, so as to 
enhance the government’s transparency, accountability and work efficiency? 
The answer is apparently no.  
According to the description above, it can be found that although civil 
servants in the east are well paid, they account for only 8.04% among the urban 
employed populations, and this proportion is 16.16% in the west; twice that of 
the east. In other words, although government staff in the provinces of eastern 
China are well paid, they account for a small proportion among urban employed 
populations, which can encourage civil servants to improve the quality of public 
service without damaging the society’s production capacity and innovation 
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capacity; government staff in the provinces of western China are not only well 
paid, but also account for a high proportion among the society’s employed 
populations. This is equivalent to five urban social workers supporting one 
government staff member, which not only generates a great burden of finance 
and tax, but also weakens the society’s sustainable development capacity.  This 
point can also be proved by the ratio of R&D personnel to civil servants: the 
eastern region is 42.3%, central region is 16.9%, and the western region is 
11.1%. 281  In addition, according to the data of “China Local Government 
Innovation Award”282, more than 50% of local government innovations are 
invented by eastern region. This rate of western region is less than 20%.  
Another argument of the government’s “Grabbing Hand” theory is, compared 
with well-developed regions with a solid economic foundation, abundant 
finances, tax resources and a profound development potential, relatively 
undeveloped regions always tend to impose a heavy tax on economic activities, 
in order to maintain the government’s operation. This behavior of draining the 
pond to get all the fish, usually forces easily flowing industrial and commercial 
institutions with normally abundant tax sources and low tax costs to move to 
areas with a lower tax rate and a better developmental environment. However, 
the frequent emigration of industrial and commercial enterprises, forces local 
governments to impose taxes on sectors that cannot move, such as the 
agricultural sector. Due to the high cost and low efficiency of taxation on the 
agricultural sector, the local government has to add staff, which further expands 
the government size and increases the pressure of fiscal support. In this vicious 
circle, the backward areas’ developmental potential is further weakened.  
When studying the development disparity between China’s coastal area and 
inland, scholars such as Fan Shenggen283 provided a detailed description of the 
                                                   
281 Note: The number of R&D personnel can be found from the website of National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/rdzyqc/decrdzyqc/201011/t20101124_72822.html.  
282 Note: The award is managed by some independent academic agencies, such as Beijing University, and 
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau. This award is published every two years from 2000 and 20 
innovations of local government are awarded each time. The list of awards can be found from 
http://www.chinainnovations.org/.  
283 Fan, S., Kanbur, R., & Zhang, X. (2011). China's regional disparities: Experience and policy. Review of Development 
Finance, 1(1), 47-56. 
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above trend. According to the results of their studies, in 1993, the average 
agricultural tax rate and industrial tax rate was 0.81% and 2.74% respectively 
in the coastal areas of China, and it was 1.15% and 5.95% respectively in inland 
China, which showed that mainland China’s industrial tax rate was apparently 
higher than that of coastal areas. As the trend continued until 2000, the average 
agricultural tax rate and industrial tax rate was 1.06% and 0.8% respectively in 
the coastal areas, and it was 1.72% and 1.30% respectively in mainland China. 
As a result, not only was mainland China’s industrial tax rate higher than that 
of the coastal areas, but also, its agricultural tax rate increased by about 70% 
comparable to 1993. Under this background, the disparity in the development 
between the central and western areas was further widened. Along with the 
reform of rural tax since 2000, the taxes and fees on the rural township 
elimination plan, rural education funding, governmental funds, agriculture and 
agricultural special products began to be reduced and reformed. In 2006, China 
completely abolished the agricultural tax. Since then, an agricultural tax with 
low efficiency and high cost has been placed in the museum of history. After 
the agricultural tax was abolished, faced with limited tax sources, tax bases as 
well as relatively fixed and standardized tax rates, undeveloped areas were 
bound to release their pressure of fiscal support via new approaches. As a result, 
increasing the non-tax revenue became their important “life-saving straw”. 
Non-tax revenue include special income, administrative charges, confiscated 
income, state-owned capital operation income, state-owned resource income 
and other income. Administrative charges refer to the fees charged to special 
service objects, according to the cost reimbursement and non-profit principle, 
as when the government provides special services for citizens and legal persons. 
It is customary worldwide that the government charges for public goods with 
small externalities. Theories such as New Public Administration emphasize the 
importance of paid services by holding that the government should introduce a 
profit motive into the activities of public services, turn administrators into 
entrepreneurs, learn to save money by spending money, and make an investment 
for returns.284 Yet in practice, compared with statutory taxes, administrative 
                                                   
284 Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2007). The new public service: Serving, not steering. ME Sharpe, p4. 
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charges, items and standards are made by multi-level government sectors; such 
as the central government, provincial government and local government, 285 
which leave institutional space for the phenomena such as “arbitrary charges”. 
  
Table 4-4 Non-tax revenue and administrative charges accounted to total budgetary 
revenue  
Province 
Non-tax 
/total 
Charges 
/total  
Province 
Non-tax 
/total  
Charges 
/total  
Province 
Non-tax 
/total  
Charges 
/total  
Inner 
Mongolia 
27.34% 6.07% Beijing 5.04% 1.45% Shanxi 28.07% 6.46% 
Guangxi 31.96% 10.09% Tianjin 30.97% 12.64% Jilin 26.57% 8.47% 
Chongqing 40.80% 20.75% Hebei 22.40% 6.80% Heilongjiang 25.63% 8.48% 
Sichuan 24.81% 6.88% Liaoning 25.28% 6.00% Anhui 24.27% 8.59% 
Guizhou 32.98% 5.95% Shanghai 7.50% 3.14% Jiangxi 26.23% 11.07% 
Yunnan 20.63% 4.88% Jiangsu 19.89% 6.24% Henan 26.64% 9.37% 
Tibet 16.31% 2.21% Zhejiang 6.31% 1.29% Hubei 30.11% 13.56% 
Shanxi 37.75% 4.64% Fujian 16.46% 4.58% Hunan 39.66% 12.64% 
Gansu 36.90% 8.37% Shandong 24.68% 8.07%    
Qinghai 21.05% 3.56% Guangdong 17.52% 6.70%    
Ningxia 19.48% 7.52% Hainan 13.06% 3.48%    
Xinjiang 17.63% 5.08%         
Western 
average 
27.30% 7.17% 
Eastern 
average 
17.19% 5.49% 
Central 
average 
28.40% 9.83% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2012). China Statistical Yearbook 2011. China Statistic Press. 
 
As displayed in Table 4-4, according to the ratio of non-tax revenue to 
budgetary fiscal revenue, and the ratio of administrative charges to budgetary 
fiscal revenue, central China had the highest level, followed by western China, 
and eastern China was at the lowest level. The ratio of these two in eastern China 
was obviously less than that in central and western China. Despite the small 
ratio in western China, it did not leave a gap from that in central China, even if 
the minimum value of autonomous regions such as Tibet was excluded. In 
particular, the non-tax revenue accounted for more than 30% of budgetary 
revenue in provinces like Shaanxi, Gansu, Guizhou, Chongqing and Guangxi. 
                                                   
285 Notes: In China, administrative charges are very complicated systems, including the following types: administrative 
charges based on the central government’s administrative approval items and standards, administrative charges based on 
central government’s administrative approval items and provincial standards, administrative charges based on provincial 
government’s administrative approval items and standards, and administrative charges based on provincial government’s 
administrative approval items and low level department’s standards.  
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To some extent, it proves that compared with economically developed coastal 
provinces and some central provinces, the western provinces were more likely 
to gain fiscal funds using a non-tax method. Without uniform legal norms, and 
faced with fiscal shortages, the governments in the backward areas were likely 
to create rent-seeking and charging space by strengthening administrative 
examination and approval, setting administrative charge and prolonging 
approval process, so as to worsen the investment and production environment, 
enhance living cost, cause the outflow of capital and human resources, and 
finally further weaken the local development potential. 
 
4.2 Government Structure and Regional Balanced 
Development 
 
Government structure refers to administrative organizations and 
administrative subjects’ spatial arrangement mode, behavioral patterns, as well 
as the relationship among the parts. According to structural-functional theory, 
the government is an overall system similar to a living organism, namely, the 
organic combination of multiple sub-systems and sub-divisions, with each sub-
system bearing some functions of all the departments. The realization of 
government functions is the outcome or influence of specific government 
structure’s activities. Different government structures appear in different 
societies or at different stages of social development.286 From the perspective 
of the government’s actual operating state, government structure refers to the 
form of government organization, departmental relationship and hierarchical 
connection to stipulated authoritative documents, such as the constitution and 
the law. Generally speaking, it is inclusive of the horizontal departmental 
structure and the vertical hierarchical relationship. 
When it comes to China, given that there are a broad-sense and narrow-sense 
“government”, the research on China’s governmental structure not only includes 
the study of administrative organs’ internal relationships, but also covers the 
                                                   
286  Riggs, F. W. (1980). The ecology and context of public administration: A comparative perspective. Public 
Administration Review, 107-115. 
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structure of CPC organizations, national power organs, national consultation 
agencies and national judicial organizations, as well as their relationship. But in 
general, most scholars studied government structure from the perspectives of 
the Chinese government’s vertical hierarchical structure, horizontal 
departmental relationship and vertical-horizontal-combined relationship. For 
instance, Ma Lihong stated that China’s government structure is basically 
featured by “the combination of central departments and local governments”. 
According to his argument, “as a basic structural relationship in China’s 
administrative organization system, the combination of central departments and 
local governments is affects and restricts the whole government’s administrative 
management from different levels in different areas”.287  
Zhu Guanglei considered that China’s government structure is a pattern of 
uniformity between the central and local government, namely, “different levels 
of government’ high unity and consistency in horizontal functions, duties and 
institution setting”. 288  If the government of every level sets government 
organization according to the upper-level government’s mode, on the one hand, 
it will result in organizational overlapping and low efficiency; on the other hand, 
it will complicate the authority-responsibility relationship between the upper-
level and lower-level governments; thus, sharpening the contradiction between 
departments and hierarchies. In a word, most studies related to China’s 
government structure focus on descriptive analysis, namely, the illustration of 
the history, evolution, status, problems and optimizing countermeasures of 
China’s government structure. 
Regarding the relationship between government structure, economic 
development, and regional disparities, few thematic researches can be found. 
Most scholars involved the above issue when they studied fiscal decentralization, 
fiscal federalism and the system of tax distribution. For instance, Weingast 
argued that economic success required not only a reasonable economic system, 
but also an accurate political structure, while as the smallest system of market 
                                                   
287 Ma, L. (1998). The vertical and horizontal relationships in the process of government administration. CASS Journal 
of Political Science. (4),73-78. 
288 Zhu G. L., & Zhang, Z. H. (2005). A Critique of “Isomorphic Responsibility” Governmental System. Journal of 
Peking University (Humanities and Social Sciences), 1, 014. 
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intervention, (fiscal) federalism not only promoted America and Britain’s 
economic growth, but also heavily drove the economic take-off since China’s 
reform and opening-up. 289  Zhang Xiaobo expounded on the relationship 
between China’s economic decentralization and political centralization and 
argued that the dislocation of this government structure was an important reason 
for regional developmental disparity in China.290 Scholars like Fu Yong studied 
the relationship between Chinese-style decentralization and the local economic 
development to determine that China’s unique system, which combines 
economic decentralization with political vertical management resulted in the 
present situation that local public expenditure structures valued economic 
investment and infrastructure, but overlooked human capital and public 
service.291 When studying the relationship between institutional supply and 
China’s fiscal decentralization, Yao Yang and Yang Lei emphasized that the 
sharp contradiction between fiscal decentralization and the government’s 
administrative vertical decentralization was an important obstruction to weaken 
the standardization of China’s fiscal decentralization system; thus, producing an 
insufficient supply of a supporting system related to fiscal decentralization.292  
To sum up, most researches have not established the theoretical relationship 
between government and regional balanced development even up till now, and 
some tentative researches are limited to the exploration of the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and regional disparity. Essentially speaking, 
since the fiscal decentralization system is directly affected by government 
structure, any fiscal relation must be adjusted on the basis of the adjustment of 
government structure, otherwise, the fiscal structure and government structure 
may be unmatched; thereby, weakening the overall effect of reform. Therefore, 
based on previous studies, this thesis attempts to primarily explore the 
                                                   
289 Weingast, B. R. (1995). Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic 
Development, The. JL Econ. & Org., 11, 1. 
290 Zhang, X. (2006). Fiscal decentralization and political centralization in China: Implications for growth and inequality. 
Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(4), 714-726. 
291 Yong, F. (2010). Fiscal Decentralization, Governance and Non-Economic Public Goods Provision. Economic 
Research Journal, 8. (In Chinese) 
292 Yang,Y & Lei Y (2003). The consequences of system supply imbalance and China's fiscal decentralization. Strategy 
and Management, 3. (In Chinese) 
165 
relationship between China’s present government structure and regional 
balanced development. 
 
4.2.1 China’s Regional Policies and Government Structure Evolution 
Rules 
Government structure mentioned in this thesis refers to a three-dimensional 
government operation mode, which is formed by vertical and horizontal 
governmental departments. The concept of government structure differs from 
that of the form of state structure, for the latter attaches more importance to the 
horizontal distribution form of the special state power, namely, the relationship 
between the whole state and its constituent parts, or the relationship between the 
central government and local governments. Moreover, government structure 
also has a different concept from that of an organizational form of political 
power, for the latter focuses on the combination of the state’s horizontal powers 
and their relationship, such as the relationship between power organs and 
government agencies, judicial organs and party organizations. In brief, 
government structure mainly relates to “the horizontally and vertically 
interlaced relationship among governments as well as the relationship among 
government in different regions, and it includes the relationship between the 
central government and local governments, the relationship among local 
governments, the relationship among governmental sectors, and the relationship 
among governments in different regions.”293 Concepts similar to government 
structure include “vertical-horizontal relationship”, “vertical-horizontal 
structure”, etc. In the process of this research, the above concep ts are utilized 
on an equal basis. 
Theoretically speaking, the introduction and implementation of any national 
development strategy must be supported and enforced by the corresponding 
government structure, and specific government structures may, in turn, affect 
the implementation effect of the specific national development strategy. Since 
new China was founded, the regional development strategy has always been a 
pertinent part of China’s overall developmental strategy. It has experienced the 
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period of regional economic balanced development guided by the heavy industry 
development strategy (1949-1978), the period of regional non-balanced 
development guided by the strategic idea that “the rich first push on those being 
rich later” (1978-1990), the period of regional balanced and coordinated 
development guided by the development idea of “efficiency first and fairness 
considered” (1991-2000) and the period of an overall regional coordinated 
development represented by the western development and the main functional 
areas guided by scientific development perspectives. The following will 
describe the government structure and implementation effect in each period of 
the regional development strategy, for the purpose of primarily exploring the 
relationship between government structure and regional policy. 
 
(1) Government Structure during the Period of Regional Balanced 
Development Strategy (1949-1978) 
During the period of the regional balanced development strategy, the Party 
and the government’s strategic target was to establish a relatively independent 
industrial system, not only throughout China, but also in all the regions due to 
China’s overall backward situation, unbalanced economic development and 
repeatedly deteriorating international environment. To reach this target, on the 
one hand, the government had to create a spatial arrangement for its overall 
economic development, and on the other hand, it had to stimulate a positive 
local development and encourage local governments to support the realization 
of the national strategy by self-reliance.  
During the early days of the nation, China’s lack of experience in economic 
construction and national administration, as well as years of war and weak 
industrial foundation, resulted in extremely deficient capital required by the 
economic construction at that time. Affected by the Soviet Union’s economic 
management mode and construction experience, China started to employ all 
available resources for large-size infrastructure and economic layout. Supported 
by the highly centralized fiscal system “unified revenue and expenditure”, 
China’s planning power and administrative power were concentrated by the 
central government and the so-called “vertical departments’ dictatorship” was 
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formed. Such government structure based on the Soviet pattern played a role of 
stabilizing the society and developing the economy in the early days of the 
Party’s governance.  
However, faced with China’s vast territory, diversified cultures and complex 
political system, the central government quickly realized the drawbacks of 
excessive centralization and started to implement the fiscal system “with 
division of revenue and expenditure and with management at different levels” 
by endowing some financial power to the local governments in 1951. Meanwhile, 
instead of being weakened correspondingly, there had been as many as 81 
planning and vertical sectors of the central government by 1956, covering all 
economic aspects like human resources, financial resources, material resources, 
production, supply, and marketing. The government structure with excessively 
centralized power obviously did not conform to the conception of “both central 
and local initiatives”. Therefore, China rapidly changed the Soviet pattern to a 
highly-centralized administrative structure and started to delegate power to the 
local governments. Guided by On the Ten Major Relationships and relevant 
resolutions of the 8th CPC National Congress, a wide range of powers such as 
the plan management power related to local governments, project approval 
power, fiscal expenditure and taxation power of some enterprises subordinate to 
the central government’s various departments were delegated to the local 
governments. Meanwhile, the State Council started to cut the number of the 
planned economic departments which reduced from 81 in 1956 to 60 at the end 
of 1959. Decentralization contributed to the rapid expansion of the local 
governments’ power and the formation of the vertical and horizontal 
government structure, as well as the game among them. 
Since this reform of government structure was based on the decentralization, 
and the Great Leap Forward was executed at the same time, and the wave and 
influence of the “left” submerged the original intention of “mobilizing both 
central and local initiatives”, therefore, it was difficult to control the local 
governments’ power expansion; thus, bringing about a disastrous effect to the 
national economy and regional balance. Moreover, under the guidance of 
“adjustment, consolidating, enriching and improving”, the central government 
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began to readjust the power distribution between the central government and 
local governments and emphasized the central government’s unified leadership. 
Temporary Provisions on Management System Adjustment  issued in January, 
1961 marked the start of a new round of government structure adjustments.  
From the perspective of reformed contents, first of all, the central government 
set up six central bureaus in Northern China, Northeast China, Eastern China, 
Central-south China, Southwest China and Northwest China, for the purpose of 
centralizing the central power and enhancing the unified leadership of the 
regional economy. Secondly, it extended the range of planning, unified 
management, expanded planning targets from 12 types in 1961 to 20 types in 
1963, and made them more detailed than those during the “1st Five-Year Plan”. 
Thirdly, the central government strengthened the centralized management of 
finance, infrastructure, goods and materials, and restored the highly-centralized 
planned economic system. Fourthly, it centralized and decentralized the 
enterprises’ management power, i.e. the central departments administered the  
enterprises’ power of administrative management, material distribution, 
production command, and personnel arrangement. Finally, it added management 
organizations, i.e. given that the highly-centralized economic management 
system expanded the central ministries and commissions’ management range 
and administrative functions, the corresponding “vertical” organizations had to 
be added, and as a result, the State Council institutions increased from 62 in 
1961 to 79 in 1965. Power centralization had achieved an immediate effect and 
the central government rebuilt the control over the national economy. Apart 
from the steady recovery of the economy, the state’s balanced developmental 
strategy was also implemented with some effect, because the trend of widening 
the regional disparity caused by the Great Leap Forward and natural disasters 
was contained. 
After the economic crisis, decision-makers such as Mao Zedong still 
questioned the central government’s absolute centralized system and believed 
that it was not a good idea that the central government managed everything 
rigidly.294 Meanwhile, strategies such as the “Third Front Movement”, active 
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preparation for the war and the establishment of an independent industrial 
system in all regions also objectively needed local governments’ great 
cooperation. Thus, the central government’s authority was further weakened in 
the atmosphere of the “Cultural Revolution”.  
Since 1970, a new round of government structural adjustments featured by 
decentralization had been developed throughout China. In a short time, the 
management of a large number of centrally controlled national strategic 
enterprises, which included Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation, FAW 
and Daqing Oilfield, was delegated to local governments. According to the 
statistics, as many as 10,533 state-owned enterprises were controlled by the 
central government in 1965, accounting for 42% of the gross national industrial 
value. Since the decentralization in 1970, only 142 enterprises are controlled by 
the central government, accounting for 8% of the gross industrial value.295  
Meanwhile, the central government’s institutions and personnel were 
substantially dissolved and reformed into a smaller group merged with other 
departments, i.e. the departments of the State Council were cut from 79 
departments to 32 departments, 19 of which were actually managed by the State 
Council, and another 13 of which were led by the Central Cultural Revolution 
Team and Central Military Commission. Moreover, the size of the State 
Council’s personnel force was also reduced from more than 50,000 before the 
Cultural Revolution to about 10,000. Furthermore, the ratio of the central fiscal 
revenue to the overall fiscal revenue also lowered from 35.17% in 1966 to 11.85% 
in 1975. In this case, the central government’s “vertical” control ability was 
weakened to the greatest extent since the founding of new China, while the local 
governments’ “horizontal” power was strengthened in the process of 
decentralization. In this government structure, the local governments had 
sufficient power to implement economic and industrial policies in favor of areas 
under administration and constructed a local self-sufficiency economic system. 
To some degree this contributed to achieving the strategic conception of 
constructing a complete range of large heavy industry systems and a series of 
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emerging industrial centers in the central and western area in a short period of 
time. “Horizontal departments” with a strong economic capability, unique local 
interests and political “bargaining” power were also trained.  
After the shift of two rounds of power – “vertical power” and “horizontal 
power”, an interlaced state had basically been formed: although the central 
government had always been trying to promote the initiative of the local 
development by actively restricting its own power, it didn’t fundamentally shake 
China’s centralized political system. Furthermore, the central government was 
able to maintain the final control over the overall economy through leaders’ 
personal charisma, the Party’s vertical organization, as well as legislation and 
planning. Moreover, in the process of decentralization, local governments 
gradually accumulated the experience in managing local public affairs and the 
vested interests of local development; however, the “cellularized” government 
structure made it difficult for the central government to integrate the local 
economy into a highly-centralized government structure like the Soviet Union. 
The dynamic game between vertical and horizontal departments became the 
main trend of China’s government structure for the future. 
From the perspective of regional development, although the regional balanced 
development and average productivity layout were important national 
developmental strategies during this period, the CPC did not have adequate 
experience in implementing these strategies. On the one hand, the CPC’s leaders 
incisively realized that it would not only smother the initiative of local 
development, but it would also increase the risk of bureaucracy to implement 
the Soviet’s highly-centralized government structure in China – being such a 
state with complicated national conditions. On the other hand, the 
incomprehension of the scientific governmental structure, as well as the radical 
and unsophisticated means in which the process of the government structure 
adjustment caused China’s economic development to be trapped in a vicious 
cycle where “decentralization leads to chaos and centralization leads to 
deadlock”.  
In this cycle, the different economic development efficiencies in different 
regions, the lockdown and mutual competition among local governments and 
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the central government’s lowered ability of macro-control resulted in China’s 
overall widening regional disparity during this period (Fig. 3-1). Obviously, the 
high centralization, excessive local decentralization and excessively changing 
government structure during this period went against the regional balanced 
development and overall balance of China’s economy. The experience and 
lessons during this period of regional development, as well as the primarily 
formed “vertical-horizontal relationship” had become the foundation and basic 
space for China’s regional policy making and implementation. 
 
(2) Government Structure during the Period of Regional Unbalanced 
Development (1978-1990) 
In the early days after the “Cultural Revolution”, faced with the complex tasks 
such as setting things right, restoring the economy and adjusting politics; it was 
imperative for the Chinese Government to recover government structure and 
functions. The old planned economic management system and expectations, 
were still the Chinese Government’s major governing mode and experience at 
that time; thus, the orientation of government reform was still set to establish 
“vertical” departments’ control over the economy by means of power recovery.  
From 1976 to 1981, the number of the State Council departments increased 
to 100 and the size of the personnel force reached 51,000, both of which 
achieved the biggest size since the founding of new China. Some key enterprises’ 
administrative power decentralized during the Cultural Revolution started to be 
centralized again, and the number of enterprises and public institutions directly 
under central management increased from 1,260 in 1978 to 2,680 in 1981. As 
for the fiscal system, the government continued to use the system of “integrating 
expenditure with revenue and sharing in the total revenue”, and both the central 
government and local governments were supported by the big pot – national 
finance. From the government’s perspective, several specialized coordination 
committees were established between the State Council and its ministries and 
commissions, to achieve uniform leadership and centralized management by 
setting specified departments over the departments of agriculture, machinery 
and energy.  
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In a word, since the Cultural Revolution, China’s government structure had 
been featured by bloated organizations, overstaffing and increasing levels. 
Leaders like Deng Xiaoping emphasized on multiple occasions that the cause of 
the above problems was closely related to the central government’s highly-
centralized management system. He said, “Our leading agencies have been 
handled a lot of things they should and cannot interfere with.” 296 Based on 
introspecting previous government structures and the alteration mode of 
government structure, the central government started to promote the reform of 
government structure focusing on rationalizing the power relationship and 
delegating power to local governments in a constitutional and legal way.  In 
essence it decentralized state-owned enterprises and weakened the national 
ministries’ planning and commanding power; it dissolved the State Council’s 
overlapped organizations from 100 in 1981 to 42 and optimized all departments’ 
functions.  
Furthermore, it constructed the “municipally affiliated county” system, 
overcoming the disadvantage of a confused division of powers and 
responsibilities, as well as overlapped agencies in the previous regional 
management system. Municipalities were also built with independent planning 
status; thereby, broadening the central government’s management span and 
tightening the adjustment and control over core cities; it implemented the system 
– “serving meals to different diners from different pots”, mobilized local 
governments’ enthusiasm and responsibility for increasing revenue and 
reducing expenditure by adding local governments’ financial autonomy. 
Moreover, it also thoroughly transformed the previous “vertical-oriented” fiscal 
management mode into a “horizontal-oriented” management mode; it delegated 
local legislative power, e.g. the Local Organization Law in 1979 and the 
Constitution in 1982 stipulated that the provincial people’s congress and its 
standing committee had the power to formulate local laws and regulations when 
different constitutions, laws and administrative laws and regulations collided 
with each other.  
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In addition, it expanded the local power of personnel administration, 
transformed cadre management authority from “managing two subordinate 
levels” to “managing one subordinate level”, and reduced the number of cadres 
directly managed by the central government from more than 14,000 to less than 
4,000. It also executed asymmetric decentralization, i.e. the central government 
provided numerous preferential policies and preferential conditions in respects 
of tax, credit, land, foreign trade and foreign capital in the eastern coastal areas, 
“bringing about four different levels of tilting decentralization – special 
economic zones, open coastal cities, inland economic and technological 
development zones, and inland provinces”.297 
During this period, under the guidance of the central government’s regional 
unbalanced development strategy, China’s regional development d isparity was 
gradually bridged (Fig. 3-1). Many scholars have provided possible 
explanations for it. Some scholars stated that the reform of the rural management 
system, which focused on the household contract responsibility system, with 
remuneration linked to output in the early 1980s, greatly enhanced the peasants’ 
enthusiasm for production and agricultural production efficiency; thus, 
promoting the rapid growth of rural income. According to their argument, the 
increasing purchasing price of agricultural and sideline products finally 
contributed to the substantial increase of the rural resident’s income, and the 
narrowed urban-rural disparity finally offset the widening regional disparity.298 
Some scholars considered that “the rapid development of light industry in 
central and western regions has bridged the disparity with metropolises’ 
industrialization degree in some period”, 299  thus, controlling the sharply 
widening regional disparity. To some degree, the narrowed regional disparity 
indicated that compared with an excessively-centralized planned economic 
system, institutionalized decentralization reform was in favor of encouraging 
                                                   
297 Xie, Q. (2000). Study on the relationship among governments in China. Journal of Beijing University, (1), 26-34. 
298 Fang, C. (2008). Thirty Years of Rural Reform in China: an Analysis from the Perspective of Institutional Economics. 
Social Sciences in China, 6, 009. 
299 Dong, X. (2004). Understanding the Regional Income Disparity in China, 1952—2002. Economic Research Journal, 
9, 002. 
174 
local governments to discover their development potential, so as to achieve a 
dynamic regional balanced development in the course of competition.  
However, it’s noteworthy that the adjustment of government structure during 
this period was obviously featured by asymmetry and non-thoroughness, that 
was, while the central government endowed the eastern coastal areas with more 
autonomous rights, the residual of a planned economic system still existed. 
Before government functions were completely transformed, “vertical” 
departments started another round of expansion. Compared with the eastern 
coastal areas, the central and western areas’ development was intervened by 
“vertical” departments, which limited the orientation of development and the 
initiative of reform. Although this asymmetric government structure promoted 
China’s economic aggregate development to some extent and laid the necessary 
foundation for the gradient transfer of industrial resources, it also brought about 
hidden troubles to further widen the disparity in China’s future regional 
development. 
 
(3) Government Structure during the Period of Regional Balanced and 
Coordinated Development (1991-1999) 
The government structure of decentralization during the last period greatly 
aroused the enthusiasm for local development, but due to the lack of 
standardization, stability and fairness in the division of the relationship between 
the central government and local governments, the government structure was 
always being adjusted. In the fiscal decentralization and contract system, the 
central government used every limited scope and channels to gain revenue. 
Central finance was enslaved to local finance, which greatly weakened the 
central government’s ability of macro-control. Driven by interest, the local 
governments competed for infrastructure construction and high-profit projects, 
which led to a great deal of redundant construction, imbalanced industrial 
structures, as well as investment inflation and waste. As a result, the industrial 
structure convergence among various regions paralleled the widening regional 
disparity. In this case, directed by the overall objective of building a socialist 
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market economy, China started a new round of government structure 
adjustments focusing on a “revenue-sharing system”.  
First of all, on the principle of combining financial power with powers or 
authority of office, it defined the central government and local governments’ 
range of fiscal revenue according to the categories of tax, and established two 
tax systems such as state tax and local tax, breaking the “principal-agent 
relationship” between the central government and local governments in terms of 
revenue collection and management. In this way, not only was the central 
government’s stable growth mechanism of fiscal revenue formed, but also the 
distribution pattern that “the central government enjoys the largest share” was 
constructed and the central government’s ability of macro-control was 
strengthened. Secondly, it adjusted the State Council’s departments, intensified 
the state comprehensive economic management departments, and enhanced 
macro-control. Specifically, it transformed the specialized economic 
management department into enterprises or industry associations, and reduced 
the specific intervention into the micro economy; it sharply adjusted and 
streamlined departments and administrative bodies directly under the State 
Council; thereby enhancing administrative efficiency. Thirdly, it encouraged 
and pushed forward local governments’ administrative reform, weakened the 
function of microeconomic management, reduced affairs of administrative 
approval, and resolutely separated government functions from enterprise 
management. Moreover, it streamlined and standardized the local government 
agency setting, explicitly specified the number of all levels of government 
agencies, developed “better troops and simpler administration”, and determined 
local governments’ reasonable size.  
In general, on the one hand, the reform of government structure during this 
period standardized and centralized the central government’s financial power 
and strengthened the central government’s ability of macro-control through the 
“revenue-sharing system”; on the other hand, the adjustment of government 
functions through the reform of government structure made the government 
retreat from micro economic management and return the power to the market. 
From the perspective of the change in government structure, based on the 
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“vertical-horizontal” relationship constructed in previous reforms, the 
government strengthened the “vertical” departments’ macro controlling ability, 
and weakened the “vertical” departments’ function of a planned economy; thus, 
promoting the modernization of government structure. 
At this stage, regional disparity started to deepen. Many studies have 
determined that 1990 was a turning point and after the reform and opening-up, 
the trend of constantly narrowing regional disparity became reversed, i.e., 
regional disparity continued to deepen from then on (Fig. 3-1). On the one hand, 
it was because the dividend of rural reform was gradually exhausted and the 
major components of the regional development disparity turned from agriculture 
into industry and commerce; on the other hand, it was directly related to the 
strategy of regional unbalanced development and asymmetric decentralization 
after the reform and opening-up. Since the reform and opening-up, the eastern 
coastal areas had always enjoyed various preferential policies awarded by the 
central government with very few “vertical” interventions, and they had 
basically constructed a government administrative system and economic 
operational mechanism based on market economization.  
Although the reform of a market-oriented economy had been implemented 
throughout China since 1993, the strategy of national unbalanced development 
still contributed to a lot of preferential policies to the eastern coastal areas. 
Meanwhile, the excellent industrial foundation of the eastern areas further 
magnified the dividend of a socialist market economic reform; thus, further 
widening the disparity in development among regions.  
In addition, although the government structure was optimized and adjusted 
on the basis of marketization and modernization, the basic structure of “vertical-
horizontal” relationship was not changed yet: despite the strengthened financial 
power, the central government did not have a scientific and reasonable transfer 
payment system; thereby, failing to effectively bridge the fiscal disparity among 
regions. Moreover, policies such as tax returns and special subsidies objectively 
protected the developed areas’ vested interest, but they caused the existing 
system to play limited roles in promoting a balanced development. Furthermore, 
obstacles of communication among “horizontal” departments were not cleared 
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yet; after realizing many problems such as the convergence of industrial 
structure in all regions, the prevailing redundant construction, and repeated low-
level competition, the central government proposed a series of principles like 
“overall planning, rational division of labor, complementary advantages, 
coordinated development, benefit consideration and common prosperity” for 
regional development. However, the lack of a coordination mechanism among 
the “vertical” departments and communication mechanism among “horizontal” 
departments in the existing government structure made the ideas of rational 
division of labors and complementary advantages become formalistic. 
 
(4) Government Structure during the Period of Regional Overall Coordinated 
Development (2000-present) 
During this period, China had experienced four administrative reforms in 
1998, 2003, 2008 and 2013 respectively, and government structure was adjusted 
four times correspondingly. Despite their different background, reasons, 
concrete steps, contents and achievements, they had a consistent direction: to 
establish a government system in line with a socialist market economy, 
strengthen the government’s function of macro-control, and reduce the 
government’s excessive intervention in the micro market. The following will 
provide a brief introduction to the key points in all previous government 
structure reforms.  
In 1998, the reform of government structure focused on the reform of 
government agencies and personnel streamlining, and the number of State 
Council departments were reduced from 40 to 29. In that reform, the State 
Council’s 9 industrial management departments were degraded to national 
offices under the State Economic and Trade Commission all at once, completely 
separating the government’s functions from enterprise management. 
Furthermore, the government supervision department’s functions were 
enhanced, which included implementing vertical management to departments of 
industry and commerce, quality inspection and drug regulations, streamlining 
all levels of government components, and determining the number of 
government agencies at all levels.  
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In 2003, the reform was implemented by continuing the idea of transforming 
government functions, including reforming the administrative approval system, 
abolishing a total of 1,195 administrative approval projects in 2002 and 2003, 
issuing the Administrative License Law in July, 2004; thus, creating a limited 
government and law-based government in market economy conditions. 
Moreover, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
was established, implementing the reform idea of separating administrative 
functions from enterprise management and separating proprietorship from 
management rights; the State Development Planning Commission was renamed 
as the National Development and Reform Commission, the State Economic and 
Trade Commission was abolished, the intervention in the market by means of 
planning was reduced, and the central government’s ability of macro -control 
was strengthened. Furthermore, the central government’s regulatory capacity 
was enhanced, the China Banking Regulatory Commission was founded, the 
State Food and Drug Administration was built, and the State Bureau of Safe 
Production Supervision and Administration was upgraded; together with the 
existing China Securities Regulatory Commission and China Insurance 
Regulatory Commission, the central government’s vertical supervision system 
was preliminarily improved.  
The adjustment of government structure in both 2008 and 2013 was 
implemented along with the idea of a “Super-Ministry System”, i.e. “with an 
aim of transforming government functions and rationaliz ing departments’ 
responsibilities, the reform explored the super-ministry system of organically 
unified functions”.300 In other words, the reform of the “Super-Ministry System” 
attempted to solve problems such as the separation of departments, the difficulty 
in coordination, and low efficiency caused by too detailed department settings 
through function integration among government agencies, so as to separate 
government functions from enterprise management, separate government 
functions from asset management, separate administrative units from public 
institutions, and give play to the government’s macro adjusting and controlling 
function. Besides, the reform of an administrative approval system continued 
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during this period. For instance, after Li Keqiang took office in the government, 
the government promised to abolish and delegate the central government’s 1/3 
of 1,700 administrative approval affairs, namely, 567 items. By 2013, a total of 
221 items had been abolished and delegated. 
Since 2000, the regional development disparity has displayed a fluctuating 
tendency (Fig. 3-1). According to the provincial per capita GDP, regional 
disparity came to a head in 2004 and then declined. The growth rate of GDP in 
the central, western and northeast areas also started to exceed that in the eastern 
coastal areas in 2004. Regional disparity showed a convergent tendency, but the 
rate of convergence was obviously less than the expansion rate of regional 
disparity after 1990, which indicated that it was an arduous task to achieve 
regional balanced development. During this period, to achieve the strategy of an 
overall regional coordinated development, China adjusted its government 
structure correspondingly.  
First of all, it established a regional development coordination agency to 
coordinate the “vertical” departments’ responsibility to assignments in regional 
development. For instance, to support the strategy of western development, the 
State Council set up a western development leading group in January, 2000, 
with the previous premier serving as the group leader. Its group members were 
composed of most ministries and commissions’ heads. Meanwhile, an office for 
the western development leading group was implemented separately in the State 
Development Planning Commission, to be responsible for researching and 
proposing western developmental strategies, developmental plans, major issues, 
as well as relevant policies, laws and regulations. In the strategy of rejuvenating 
the old northeastern industrial base of China, similar leading and coordinating 
agencies were established. Secondly, through the removal and merger of 
ministries and commissions, as well as the “Super-Ministry System” reform, the 
integration and cooperation among “vertical” departments was strengthened and 
a great deal of internal friction caused by department’s separation was reduced, 
which to a certain extent contributed to the implementation of a regional 
balanced and coordinated development strategy. Thirdly, by abolishing and 
delegating administrative approval affairs, the central government approved 
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local governments with more power of economic development to encourage 
their enthusiasm for local development; thus, bridging the regional dispari ty in 
local competition. At last, China strengthened the central vertical supervision 
departments’ power to guarantee the central government’s ability of macro-
control, i.e. it tried to ensure the stability of a macro economy and the 
implementation of national strategies via public policies instead of direct 
intervention.  
In general, China learned a lot of lessons and gained experience from previous 
reforms to adjust the government structure in this period. Although regional 
strategies were implemented using the top-down method, the central 
government did not directly control the micro economy and local development 
by means of a target or plan, but paid more attention to guiding the orientation 
of China’s regional economic development by integrating “vertical” 
departments’ macro adjusting and controlling functions on the basis of arousing 
the initiative for local development. This powerful and moderate government 
structure not only played its role in the implementation of the strategy of 
regional balanced and coordinated development, but also contributed to the 
convergence of the regional economy to some degree. 
 
4.2.2 Present Government Structure and Difficulties in Regional 
Balanced Development 
According to the experience of other countries, regional balanced 
development requires the balanced combination of market regulation and 
government intervention, the organic combination of central adjustment and 
local coordination, as well as the dynamic combination of local competition and 
local cooperation. To meet the above requirements, the government’s structure 
should have the following characteristics: firstly, it should have the functions of 
weakening the government’s intervention into the micro market and 
strengthening the government’s macro-control; secondly, based on endowing 
local governments with sufficient independent developmental power, the central 
government should take diversified measures to supervise and punish local 
governments; thirdly, in addition to forming benign competition among local 
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governments, it should have an institutionalized coordinating and collaborating 
method.  
From a general view, China’s inherently rigid “vertical-horizontal” 
government structure began to change after more than 6 decades of exploration 
and change. Apart from awarding local governments with more independent 
developmental powers, the central government mainly directs and intervenes in 
local governments through macro fiscal and financial means. Nevertheless, 
despite the great achievements, there are still a lot of problems being to the 
disadvantage of regional balanced development in the current government 
structure. 
 
(1) The Uniformity between Central and Local Government and Rigid 
Government Structure 
The uniformity between the central and local government means all levels of 
government have generally the same functions, but different characteristics in 
an organizational setting – “vertical and horizontal consistency”. 301  Some 
scholars name this system the “administrative level-by-level contracting 
system”302, i.e. a superior government delivers all power, except for legislative 
power, to local governments, and subordinate government is basically the sized-
down version of the superior government. Theoretically speaking, the 
uniformity between the central and local government is in favor of reducing the 
central government’s burden of information collection, and its cost of 
supervising the subordinate government in particular historical periods. 
Nevertheless, as economic activities become complicated, the highly consistent 
uniformity between central and local government gradually reveals its 
disadvantages. From the perspective of regional development, the biggest 
problem of the uniformity between the central and local government is the 
establishment of multi-level local governments similar in size on the principle 
that “one size fits all” in all regions throughout China, without considering their 
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economic development, population size, resource endowment, economic 
structure and geographical location, which causes backward regions to be 
responsible for government agencies and fiscal-supported personnel of a similar 
size to that in the developed regions. On the one hand, limited to tax bases and 
tax sources in the central and western regions, an excess of “maintenance” 
expenditures such as administrative expenditure and fiscal-supported personnel 
expenditure is bound to reduce “development” expenditures such as science, 
education, culture and health expenditure and economic construction 
expenditure; thus, weakening the backward regions’ developmental potential. 
On the other hand, “the uniformity between central and local government”, 
which is protected by laws and regulations, removes the motivation or reason 
for backward regions to adjust government functions, streamline government 
agencies and reduce fiscal-supported personnel, which further hinders the 
backward regions’ local governments from promoting their work efficiency.  
 
(2) Management Based on Territories and Local Protectionism 
Management based on territories is an important principle for the system of 
uniformity between central and local government, i.e. the central government 
divides the territory into several administrative regions and evenly allocates the 
generally same government functions, so that the government of each 
administrative region can execute independent and closed management of 
affairs within the region. In traditional society where public affairs were 
relatively simpler, management based on territories contributed to the central 
government’s control over the whole state. However, in modern society where 
a market economy is highly developed, due to the overflow of natural resources, 
the mobility of production elements and the externality of public service, it is 
crucial to break the closed administrative jurisdictional territory and the self-
sufficiency economic system, so as to establish a broad coordination and 
cooperation mechanism among local governments.  
However, in the existing system, given that all local governments undertaking 
similar functions are responsible for their common superior government, they 
always treat their “competitors” with an attitude of “implementing regional 
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blockade, undermining each other’s work, and sacrificing principle for profit” 
for benefit maximization of the head in their jurisdictional territory or region. 
This results in a series of problems like local protectionism, governments’ 
vicious competition, high convergence of industries, and overexploitation of 
common resources. This situation or state obviously goes against the 
establishment of an intergovernmental collaboration mechanism and the 
achievement of regional balanced development. 
 
(3) Vertical Departments’ Intervention and Separation of Department 
Functions  
In the present government structure, although the central “vertical” 
departments’ function of intervening in the micro economy has been further 
weakened, they assist in implementing China’s regional development policies 
by macro fiscal disbursements, taxes, and other financial means. Furthermore, 
in the implementation of strategies such as the western development and 
rejuvenation of the old northeast industrial base, “vertical” coordination 
agencies like the western development leading group have been gradually 
established and started to play their roles. However, generally speaking, the 
separation in “vertical” departments still exists, which is mainly reflected in the 
following aspects: “vertical” departments actually still have substantial powers 
like administrative approval power and special subsidies granting power, and 
these special powers maintain “vertical” departments’ special interest, which 
generates numerous difficulties to the integration of “vertical” departments; 
secondly, the reform of the “super-ministry system” is still advancing, so it is 
an arduous task to effectively integrate the “vertical” departments’ functions; 
thirdly, although the premier of the State Council serves as the leader and 
relevant ministries’ heads are component members of the “vertical” 
coordinating agencies, such as the western development leading group, the 
specific administrative bodies are subordinate to the National Development and 
Reform Commission and they are departmental-level units. This power 
allocation obviously goes against coordinating the agencies’ effective work 
proceedings. 
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4.3 Government Incentive Mechanism and Regional Balanced 
Development 
 
In brief, incentive means arousing the enthusiasm for work. The normal and 
successful operation of specific institutions not only relies on reasonable designs, 
but also rests with the coordination of individual members’ actions. In real 
political life, an important reason why a well-designed institution fails to reach 
an expected effect is that the designer overlooks individual members’ support 
and compliance in the operation of this institution. Although pure legal 
enforcement and violence intimidation may compel participants to act in 
accordance with specific rules for a short period of time, as time goes on, a 
variety of open struggles and secrete resistances will result in institutional 
failure. In neo-institutional economics, this phenomenon is explained as the 
coordination among formal institutions, informal institutions and the 
implementation mechanism. 303  Reasonable coordination will produce 
efficiency and cooperation, while unreasonable coordination may lead to low 
efficiency and internal friction. Moreover, organization theory also holds that 
an organization is composed of three structure levels, 304  namely, the 
organization’s power and resource structure (statutory power and  resource 
allocation), interaction structure (personal attitude and action strategy), and 
organization paradigm (game rules and institutionalized thought structure). For 
a stable operation of an organization’s statutory power and resource allocation, 
participants are required to conduct benign interaction according to specific 
game rules. 
In general, there are three incentive methods to maintain institutional 
operation, namely, compulsion, negotiation, and reciprocity. Compulsion means 
restraining participants’ noncooperation or violations via violence, menace and 
punishment, so as to reach the goal of institutional operation. Negotiation refers 
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to a rule-based behavioral pattern formed by repeated games in which 
participants take part in division of labors and collaboration for their own 
interest. Reciprocity refers to “a system in which both sides assume obligations, 
i.e. when one side makes an action of giving, the given side must provide 
corresponding feedback; similarly, one side’s illegitimate deceit wi ll also cause 
the other side to break off all relations with the deceiver.” Different from 
negotiation, reciprocity is based on not only self-interest, but also obligations to 
others. 
Theoretically speaking, the incentive problem can be simplified into a 
principal-agent problem305, which comes about for two reasons: the information 
asymmetry between the principal and the agent, as well as the goal conflict 
between the principal and the agent. Information asymmetry means different 
people have different acquisitions of related information in the trading process, 
i.e. people with rich information are generally at an advantaged position, but 
those with poor information are always at a disadvantaged position. In particular, 
some participants hide the information they possess from others for their own 
interests; thus, damaging or inhibiting others’ benefits. Goal conflict refers to 
the principal and the agent’s inconsistent interest preference. For instance, the 
central government’s goal is to maintain a smooth operation of a macro economy, 
but local governments’ goal is to make the local economy develop rapidly. This 
conflicting goal always causes great damage to the principal’s interests. To 
solve the incentive problem, it is essential to reduce the information asymmetry 
and goal conflicts between the principal and the agent. Theoretically speaking, 
solving one problem contributes to solving the incentive problem. 
According to the three methods of maintaining an institutional operation 
mentioned above, “compulsion” is to force the agent to act in line with the 
principal’s goal by means of punishment and constrain the agent’s behavior with 
a complex supervising system, so as to reduce damage to the principal’s interests 
caused by information asymmetry. Although this method contributes to 
achieving the principal’s goal in a short time, it always fails to continue due to 
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the huge costs of punishment and supervision. The way of “negotiation” is to 
make both sides realize that “they will gain more benefits by mutual consultation 
than by unilateral action or breach of agreement” through repeated consultation 
and games.306 By utilizing this method, a point of balancing the interest between 
the principal and the agent is discovered; thus, reducing the goal conflict 
between the principal and the agent. The way of “negotiation” is aimed at 
reducing huge costs because of information asymmetry by bridging the goal, but 
this neglect of supervision is exactly the fatal flaw. In the real “negotiation” 
process, for the sake of their own interests, the agent always acts in a way that 
can maximize their benefits; thereby, causing damage to the principal’s benefits. 
The way of “reciprocity” is to make the principal and the agent’s exchange 
behavior proceed by arousing people’s “double motives”307. Even if two sides 
receive unbalanced benefits in an exchange activity, “it makes people have a 
common expectation, that is, if they bring benefits to others, others will bring 
benefits to them in the future”. 308  The way of “reciprocity” is to build 
cooperative behavior on the basis that it is more stable than the philosophy of 
personal benefit maximization, which can effectively reduce the principal and 
the agent’s goal conflict and information asymmetry. However, correspondingly, 
the initial condition for “reciprocity” is harsh and a long and stable interaction 
process is required, which means that once one side will breach this “reciprocity” 
cooperation at some point, and all previous efforts may be totally destroyed.  
 
4.3.1 Historical Context of the Chinese Government’s Incentive 
Mechanism 
The Chinese Government’s incentive mechanism mainly refers to the central 
government’s incentive for local governments, namely, the method in which the 
central government constrains local governments’ behaviors and arouses their 
enthusiasm for development for the purpose of keeping the consistency between 
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local governments’ behaviors and the central government’s developmental 
strategy. In China, a unitary state, local governments are empowered by the 
central government and enforce local administrative power on behalf of the 
central government. Except for legal provisions, the central government 
constrains local governments’ behaviors by adjusting personnel administrative 
power and fiscal power. Hence, the following will describe the dynamic changes 
of personnel’s administrative power and fiscal power between the central 
government and local governments with an aim of analyzing the central 
government’s incentive mode for local governments. It’s worth pointing out that 
instead of taking a single mode, the central government always combines 
different modes to encourage local governments.  
 
(1) The Chinese Government’s Incentive Mechanism before the Reform and 
Opening-up 
Since the founding of new China, China has followed the Soviet Union to 
gradually establish its centralized planned economic system – the central 
government uniformly fulfilled the power of planning various economic and 
social affairs. Nevertheless, as the national economy recovered, the central 
government began to realize the decision-making and implementation burden 
caused by excessive power concentration. To achieve the national strategy of 
industrialization and balanced productivity distribution better and faster, the 
central government has started to decentralize most planning power, state-
owned enterprise administrative power and infrastructure construction power to 
local governments since 1957. Most importantly, the central government 
endowed the local governments with a considerable autonomy of power related 
to taxes and fiscal funds and promised that this policy would not be changed 
within the five years after local income, expense items and sharing proportion 
were divided. Based on fiscal decentralization, to further arouse local 
governments’ enthusiasm for development, the central government made use of 
its personnel’s administrative power to adjust 12 provinces’ major leadership 
from 1957 and 1959, mainly involving cadres who held reservations for the 
“Great Leap Forward” and behaved passively when promoting aggressive 
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policies. 309  As a consequence, the concept of arousing local governments’ 
enthusiasm for development via the decentralization of economic power and the 
adjustment of personnel quickly brought about an effect, i.e. all regions began 
to construct various enterprises and infrastructures to stimulate economic 
growth. Nevertheless, with the decentralization of fiscal power and the 
reduction of the central government’s revenue, the central government’s ability 
of control over the national macro economy began to lower sharply. 
Additionally, due to the radical policies against the objective reality and natural 
disasters, China’s economic and social development suffered a disastrous effect. 
Faced with disasters, the central government soon adjusted the policies of 
decentralization in 1962 and began to not only centralize, but also decentralize 
local governments’ economic management power. In particular, it recovered the 
local governments’ capital expenditure power, but changed it into central special  
appropriations. Meanwhile, the central government continued to make use of its 
personnel management power to accelerate power centralization and error 
correction. This decentralization-centralization mode kept being repeated 
during the Cultural Revolution when every adjustment of economic power was 
made along with personnel adjustment, and the major leaders of almost every 
province were replaced. 
According to the description above, it can be found that in the fiscal system 
of “egalitarianism (eating in big pot)”, the central government attempted to 
establish a “reciprocity” fiscal decentralization system to actively encourage 
local governments to develop the economy and expand tax bases and tax sources, 
for the purpose of increasing the central government’s revenue while achieving 
the state’s developmental strategy. It dispatched officials who remained 
consistent with the central government’s goal through the “compulsory” 
personnel power centralization system, to reduce the goal conflict between the 
central government and local governments. From a theoretical perspective, 
although the “reciprocity” fiscal incentive mode was of good original intentions, 
the decision makers did not realize that the principal and the agent’s mutual trust 
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was required for the successful establishment of this mode. In other words, 
either side’s breach of agreement would generate difficulties for the effective 
operation of the whole reciprocity mechanism. At that time, the central 
government had the absolute right of power distribution, i.e. it could either 
promise “changeless financial allocation proportion within five years” or cancel 
the commitment at any time on the basis of economic fluctuation, which made 
it difficult to operate the reciprocity mechanism and resulted in local 
governments’ serious opportunistic tendencies. Additionally, due to the 
powerful “compulsory” political or personnel incentive mechanism, local 
governments would keep wavering along with the change of “wind direction”, 
and correspondently, China could not extricate itself from the vicious cycle that 
“excessive decentralization results in disorder but excessive centralization leads 
to inefficiency”. In general, the “reciprocity-based” decentralization incentive 
mechanism failed to play the expected roles, and instead, the “compulsory” 
personnel and cadre system was regarded as the most important tool to guarantee 
local governments’ consistent goals with the central government. From some 
aspect, it reflected that the central government’s limited means of contro l over 
local governments inevitably resulted in the high costs of incentive. 
 
(2) The Chinese Government’s Incentive Mechanism during the Period of 
“Fen Zao Chi Fan” (Serving Meals to Different Diners from Different Pots) 
Since the Cultural Revolution, in the presence of the ravaged economy and 
devastated state, the central government sharply reversed the situation of the 
national economic development through temporary centralization. Nevertheless, 
central decision makers were still skeptical about the excessively centralized 
planned economic system. Despite many problems with the decentralization 
during the Mao era, its effect of arousing local governments’ enthusiasm for 
development cannot be ignored. After the national strategies of the national 
industrialization and regional balanced development were transformed into the 
national economic development and regional unbalanced development, the idea 
of arousing the enthusiasm for local development via economic decentralization 
was on the agenda again. First of all, the original fiscal system – egalitarianism 
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(eating in big pot) was transformed into “serving meals to different diners from 
different pots” (fen zao chi fan). Specifically, fixed revenue, shared revenue and 
adjusted revenue were classified, forming a fiscal relationship of classified 
contracts and self-balance based on revenue and expenditure classification. The 
central government began to restrain “vertical” departments’ economic 
management so that the local governments could arrange expenditures by 
themselves according to central policies and their own financial state. 
Meanwhile, the central government officially promised to amend the settings of 
the contract base negotiation from “every year” to “every five years”, in order 
to increase policy stability. According to the personnel and cadre system, 
although the central government still ensured its integral control over the whole 
state by “firmly holding personnel distribution power such as selection power, 
promotion power and removal power” 310 , the transformation of personnel 
management power from “managing two subordinate levels” to “managing one 
subordinate level” meant empowering local governments to effectively control 
the appointment and removal of local officials apart from endowing them with 
the power of administering local economic affairs. Local governments had great 
decision-making power in respects of the economy and personnel, which 
contributed to arousing and encouraging their enthusiasm and initiative for local 
development. Additionally, this mode was in favor of assigning the central 
government and local governments’ powers and responsibilities. During this 
period, the central government actively stopped replacing provincial leaders 
who failed to strictly comply with the central government’s development 
strategies through the “compulsory” personnel and cadre system, but began to 
coordinate various possible contradictions between the central government and 
local governments via active negotiation. 
According to the description above, it can be determined that in the system of 
“serving meals to different diners from different pots” (fen zao chi fan), instead 
of continuing the “reciprocity-based” incentive in line with local interests, the 
central government coordinated its interest based relationship with local 
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governments through negotiation and consultation, while awarding local 
governments with more autonomous powers pertaining to economic 
development from a pragmatic perspective. On the one hand, the central 
government admitted the local governments’ discretion and self-interest; on the 
other hand, it tried to let the local governments know, by persuasion, that 
cooperation might help them gain more interests. To prove its reliable promise 
of decentralization to the local governments, the central government 
transformed the “compulsory” personnel management mode into a “negotiation-
based” management mode. Instead of absolutely controlling provincial leaders 
by means of threats, such as removal, the central government employed 
measures, which included open consultation, negotiation, and promise of 
promotion to encourage the local governments’ leaders to remain consistent 
with its decisions in essence and in form, while striving for local interests. 
During this period, a large number of provincial governmental leaders became 
Central Committee members, surpassing those from the central Party and 
government organizations in number. In this way, local leaders started to play 
their important roles in a nationwide political arena. From a theoretical 
perspective, the government’s incentive mechanism began to be balanced from 
two extremes – “reciprocity” and “compulsion” in this period. Based on a 
balanced economic and political decentralization, a “negotiation” mechanism 
between the central government and local governments was constructed; thus, 
reducing their goal conflict. As a result, the “negotiation” mechanism took effect 
soon, i.e. the central government’s reform and opening-up policy and regional 
unbalanced development policy of “letting some regions get well-off first” were 
implemented efficiently by the local governments, and the local governments 
started to take various measures to promote the reform and develop the economy. 
However, at the same time, another problem began to emerge, that was, the 
central government was unable to generate sufficient financial resources to 
properly execute the national strategy and macro-control policy due to the rapid 
growth of the economy. Along with the asymmetric growth of the central 
government and local governments’ strength, as well as the weakening of a 
“compulsory” personnel mechanism, the central government was always at a 
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disadvantaged position in the process of negotiation; thereby, failing to 
effectively coordinate and suppress the local governments’ destruction of the 
macroeconomic order, because of their self-interested behaviors. Generally 
speaking, a “negotiation-based” economic and personnel incentive mechanism 
efficiently bridged the goal conflict between the central government and local 
governments at the initial stage of its implementation, promoting the reform and 
opening-up and accelerated economic and social development. Nevertheless, 
due to the central government’s lack of effective restriction and supervisory 
mechanism, the serious information asymmetry made the central government’s 
control over local governments reach a record low. 
 
(3) The Chinese Government’s Incentive Mechanism during the Period of 
“Revenue-sharing System” 
To prevent various economic and political risks caused by the lowered central 
government’s control ability, China started the far-reaching “revenue-sharing 
reform” in 1994, achieving financial power centralization and enhancing the 
central government’s ability for macroeconomic adjustments and control by 
institutionalizing the relationship between the central government and local 
governments. Based on institutionalization of the “revenue-sharing system”, 
central tax, local tax and shared tax were divided, the central government set the 
standards for taxation, and local governments were not allowed to increase or 
abate tax arbitrarily. Furthermore, the central government and local 
governments’ revenue and expenditure boundaries were divided, so that they 
performed their own duties respectively; the central government’s independent 
tax collection and management institutions was established, making the central 
government deactivate its dependence on the local governments in the process 
of taxation. Moreover, based on further removal and mergers of the State 
Council’s specialized economic departments, as well as the decentralization and 
repeal of the administrative approval authority, the central government’s 
“vertical” intervention in the micro economy was reduced. The central 
government also balanced various regions’ financial resources by establishing 
the financial transfer payment system. According to the personnel and cadre 
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system, the “negotiation-based” incentive mechanism, after the reform and 
opening-up, was basically extended after the “revenue-sharing system”. On the 
one hand, regarding the principle of managing one subordinate level, the central 
government awarded provincial leaders with autonomy in personnel use within 
their jurisdiction and encouraged local governments to work hard on economic 
development; on the other hand, it awarded or constrained local governments by 
means of promotion, so that they would not go beyond the central policy 
framework. It’s noteworthy that during this period, the incentive method of the 
personnel and cadre system was gradually transformed into inspecting cadres’ 
work results; especially their achievements in economic development. For 
instance, in September 1994, The CPC Central Committee’s Decision on 
Several Important Issues of Strengthening the Party’s Construction  made 
explicit demands on cadre assessment that, “Related departments should make 
scientific assessment system and standards according to different characteristics 
to conduct comprehensive assessment and accurate evaluation of work 
results.” 311  Based on the data research during 1979-2002, scholars have 
determined that in this mechanism, taking economic performance as the main 
incentive standard, provincial officials’ promotion probability was positively 
correlated to the economic growth of their jurisdictions.312 
It can be ascertained from the above description that during this period the 
government basically continued to use the incentive system during the period of 
“serving meals to different diners from different pots”, but made some 
amendments according to its defects. Firstly, it brought the financial power 
distribution between the central government and local governments into the 
orbit of institutionalization in a legal way; thus, reducing disputes in the process 
of negotiation and damage to cooperation, because of excessive self-interest 
behaviors. Secondly, apart from decentralizing the fiscal power to the local 
governments, the central government reserved its power of making and 
explaining relevant laws; thus, guaranteeing its control and constraint to local 
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governments. Thirdly, in addition to endowing local governments with a 
tremendous power of independent economic development, the central 
government gradually reclaimed their powers related to macro-control such as 
banking, securities, safety supervision and quality supervision for vertical 
management, so as to strengthen its ability of macro-control. Fourthly, regarding 
personnel incentives, more explicit economic standards were utilized to replace 
the previous fuzzy political standards, which not only created a fair competition 
platform for local governments, but also intensified the central government’s 
legitimacy and operability of supervising local officials; thus, reducing the 
information asymmetry between the central government and local governments. 
The above improvement measures further perfected the central government’s 
“negotiation-based” incentive mechanism for local governments; thereby, not 
only arousing local governments’ enthusiasm for development, but also 
strengthening the central government’s control and supervisory ability. In the 
process of transforming the state’s regional unbalanced developmental strategy 
into the regional balanced and coordinated developmental strategy, the above 
mechanism ensured that the central government had sufficient financial 
resources and coordinating abilities to achieve the implementation and 
promotion of the western development and rejuvenation of the old northeast 
industrial base. 
Not only should the huge advantages of the “negotiation-based” incentive 
mechanism be highlighted, but also, its insurmountable defects should be 
noticed. According to the description above, it can be determined that an 
important condition for the effective operation of the “negotiation-based” 
incentive mechanism after the “revenue-sharing system” was the combination 
of personnel incentive and economic incentive. Local government officials 
worked hard not only for the local economic growth and the local people’s 
welfare, but also their own promotion and rewards from the superior government. 
Since the central government provided limited positions, a large number of local 
governmental leaders had to stand out in the fierce competition, which resulted 
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in a competition mode similar to a “political tournament”.313 This mode has a 
lot of advantages: firstly, a tournament can create an intense competitive 
atmosphere; thus, providing strong incentives to the participants; secondly, in a 
tournament, the competition is based on the temptation of interests, and rewards 
are clearly published in advance; thirdly, the tournament system is features an 
easy design, convenient operation and little controversy. However, just like a 
double-edged sword, this mode unavoidably has many disadvantages: firstly, if 
there is a big capability disparity among the different participants, it may cause 
the weak to drop out; secondly, due to the overly powerful incentives, 
participants may undermine each other’s work; thirdly, if there are diversified 
competition targets, the agent may focus all their efforts on the task which can 
be easily observed, but then overlook hidden tasks. It is exactly the powerful 
tournament-type incentive mode that maintains the continuous and rapid growth 
of the Chinese economy, but correspondingly, it is the mode that gradually 
widens the development disparity among regions, worsens the vicious 
competition among local governments, and makes the GDP-oriented idea 
continue despite repeated prohibitions. 
 
4.3.2 Government Incentive Mechanism and Competition Revolving 
around Poverty-stricken Counties 
In the present government incentive mechanism, local governments develop 
“benchmark competition” for their own benefits. 314  According to some 
scholar’s views, the weak position of some backward areas in the competition 
may result in these areas’ withdrawal and developed areas’ inexertion. 315 
However, facts have proved that instead of withdrawing from the competition, 
the backward areas develop an intense competition in the field of the national 
poverty alleviation policy. 
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Since the 1980s, China’s poverty alleviation policy has been featured by 
“regional aim”. In September, 1984, The CPC Central Committee and the State 
Council’s Notification on Helping Poverty-stricken Areas Change Their Present 
State Soon explicitly stipulated, “The key points should be highlighted when 
solving poverty-stricken areas’ problem. At present, efforts should be focused 
on problem solution of a dozen of contiguous poverty-stricken areas.” Owing to 
China’s existing government structure, the regional poverty alleviation policy 
was naturally implemented by Taking County as the basic unit. Hence, the 
government first determined 273 national poverty-stricken counties in 1986, and 
let them enjoy preferential policies in respect of land use, tax deductions and 
exemptions, as well as financial aid. In 1994, the government issued the Seven-
Year Priority Poverty Alleviation Program and further increased the number of 
poverty-stricken counties to 592. In 2001, the Outline of the Development-
oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China (2001-2010) formulated 
the principle of poverty alleviation and development “by taking county as the 
basic unit and poverty-stricken village as the base”, to highlight the roles of the 
village level as the foundation of poverty alleviation, but county-level areas 
were still considered as the basic unit of poverty alleviation to enjoy various 
preferential policies. In 2011, the State Council issued the Outline of the 
Development-oriented Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China (2011-
2020), which still employed the county level as the basic unit for poverty 
alleviation, proposed “making and implementing poverty alleviation program 
based on county under the guidance of the state”, and determined 14 
concentrated contiguous exceptionally poverty-stricken areas, covering 679 
poverty-stricken counties. 
Although the poverty alleviation policy, based on the county unit, simplifies 
the procedure of policy implementation and responsibility assignment in the 
current incentive mechanism that encourages local governments’ “self-interest”, 
the huge benefits in aspects of education, technology, investment attraction, land 
use, tax deductions and exemptions, and financial aid contained by the poverty 
alleviation policy, are always the targets strived for by the local governments. 
Additionally, since there is not an explicit withdrawal mechanism for the 
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existing poverty-stricken county selection system, counties and cities receiving 
state aid have been growing over the years, which results in a once-for-all title 
of a poverty-stricken county and relevant preferential policies. Thus, it becomes 
not only the target competed for by the poverty-stricken counties, but also the 
title coveted by affluent cities, which therefore leads to the farce of “celebrating 
the election of poverty-stricken county”.  
In general, the present poverty alleviation and development mode for poverty-
stricken counties goes against reducing poverty and regional disparity, which is 
reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, in the competition for the title of a 
poverty-stricken county, relatively affluent counties have an advantage in the 
competition, because of their rich lobbying resources, but real poverty-stricken 
counties may fail to obtain relevant policy support. For example, the nationally 
renowned affluent areas such as Fuyuan County in Yunnan Province and 
Shenmu County in Inner Mongolia have always retained the title of a poverty-
stricken county. As a joke goes, “The reason why we fail to compete for the title 
of poverty-stricken county this time is that we are really too poor.” Secondly, 
the poverty alleviation policy based on county unit cannot precisely “aim” at 
real poverty-stricken groups, i.e. in the competition for poverty alleviation 
resources, “those who own some resources and abilities are able to make full 
use of these resources to reach the goal of throwing off poverty, but those 
suffering from extreme poverty always fail to obtain poverty alleviation 
resources because of their limited resources and abilities”.316 Thirdly, in the 
incentive mechanism, the employing of economic indicators as the major 
assessment item, large-size infrastructures and industrial-mining projects for 
GDP and political performance, are still major orientations drawing the 
investment of poverty alleviation resources, which means it is difficult to use all 
the poverty alleviation resources for public service supply and support for 
poverty-stricken populations. Fourthly, as the source of policies and funding for 
poverty-stricken counties involves a dozen of central ministries and multi-level 
local governments, the disorder of rights and liabilities results in tremendous 
corruption and waste of poverty alleviation resources. In December, 2013, the 
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Audit Office conducted a selective examination of 19 counties from 592 
national-level poverty-stricken counties to find that 17 of them defrauded the 
poverty alleviation funds, and Changning County in Yunnan, Libo County in 
Guizhou, Xunyang County in Shaanxi, Gulang County in Gansu, Jingxi County 
in Guangxi, and Haiyuan County in Ningxia embezzled the poverty alleviation 
funds, which made it difficult for real poverty-stricken areas to relieve their 
poverty. Fifthly, the state has noticed that China’s poverty is featured by 
regional aggregation, and designated 14 concentrated contiguous exceptionally 
poverty-stricken areas, as well as proposing that “all departments of the State 
Council and local governments at all levels should reinforce planning and 
coordination”.  
However, because of the existing incentive mechanism, all poverty-stricken 
counties pay attention only to their own interests; thus, making intra-regional 
advantages complementation and coordinated development become empty talk. 
To sum up, in the existing incentive mechanism, the competition for the title of 
poverty-stricken county and the interests behind it prevents the poverty 
alleviation policy from aiding really poverty-stricken areas or for people to 
relieve their poverty, which is not in favor of achieving the goal of a regional 
balanced development. 
 
4.3.3 Government Incentive Mechanism and Difficulty in Regions’ 
Voluntary Collaboration 
Given that regional problems cross the local governments’ administrative 
boundary, according to other countries’ experience, regional balanced 
development requires not only the central government’s intervention, but also 
the coordination and cooperation of local governments in or between regions. 
However, within the current incentive mechanism, as in the case of “self-
interest”, local governments conduct fierce competition in terms of “political 
performance” for promotion of political and economic interests . Particularly, 
“the basic characteristic of the game for political promotion is to drive 
participants to only concern about their position relative to competitors, and if 
cost permits, participants not only have incentive to do something in favor of 
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their regions’ economic growth, but also have the similar incentive to do 
something to the disadvantage of their competitors’ regions”. 317  As a 
consequence, in the process of China’s regional economic development, 
phenomena such as local protectionism, redundant economic constructions and 
inter-regional vicious competition still continue, even despite repeated 
prohibitions. Furthermore, it is difficult to effectively manage the central -
leading or local-initiative regional cooperation mechanism; thus, eventually 
damaging the effect of China’s regional balanced development strategy. 
Specifically, it is manifested in the following aspects.  
In the first place, local protectionism protects “the backward”. Along with the 
increasing development and improvement of a socialist market economy system, 
the phenomena of local protectionism; featured by product blockage, resource 
competition and administrative barriers gradually decreased in the 1980s. 
However, present local protectionism is still serious, exhibiting more diversified 
forms and more concealed and sophisticated methods. In particular, the 
phenomena, such as providing extra preferential policies for local enterprises, 
limiting migrant labors, and establishing technological barriers to products seem 
to emerge endlessly.318 The prevailing local protectionism not only damages the 
state’s overall economic growth efficiency, but also protects the backward, 
sustaining the local economy in a backward state for the medium and long term, 
finally worsens the local unemployment situation, and slows down economic 
and fiscal revenue growth; 319  thus, widening the developmental disparity 
among regions.  
In the second place, local governments’ redundant construction brings about 
significant barriers to regional cooperation. In the current incentive mechanism, 
all regions always compete for large and extensive key projects in favor of 
economic growth and political performance promotion, without ever 
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considering local conditions. Take the automobile industry for example. At 
present, in China, 27 provinces and cities manufacture automobiles and their 
local governments give support for automobile manufacturing by classifying it 
as a pillar industry. Currently, there are more than 100 vehicle manufacturing 
enterprises. Vicious competition and local blockage, in the process of 
automobile manufacturing and marketing, have become obstacles preventing 
China from evolving from an automobile country to an automobile power. 
Similarly, the problem of redundant construction can be found in the field of 
infrastructure construction as well. Take airport construction for example. There 
are five large and heavily used airports, including the Hong Kong airport, 
Guangzhou airport, Shenzhen airport, Macau airport, and the Zhuhai airport 
within the range of 200 kilometers away from the Pearl River Delta. Moreover, 
Foshan and Huizhou are joining the competition. 
 After the “12th Five-Year Plan” was issued, it was evidenced from various 
provinces’ concrete plans that they are trying to retain their economic 
achievements in the local area, by establishing an “independent” industrial 
system, for the main purpose of promoting their political performance in a short 
period of time. However, such immoderate redundant construction is bound to 
distort the division system of the socialist market economy, which not only 
causes a waste of large amounts of resources, but also makes the cooperation in 
and between regions appear as nothing more than empty talk. Take, for example, 
the Yangtze River Delta region, which has made significant achievement in 
regional cooperation. Since the 1990s, mechanisms related to regional 
cooperation have been established, and now more than 20 cooperative 
agreements and documents have been issued; 320  the different regions’ 
agreements on construction and development have not yet been reached. 
Another example of airport construction, in which 17 civil airports are 
distributed within the region of the Yangtze River Delta, which means there are 
0.9 airports per ten thousand square kilometers, even exceeding the U.S. level 
of 0.6; thus, making the region of the Yangtze River Delta one of the regions 
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with the largest airport density internationally. However, according to the “self-
interest” incentive mode, many regions’ airports refuse to coordinate with 
Shanghai’s airport to become a “secondary airport”.321 It seems such cases are 
very prevalent. 
In the third place, local governments’ vicious competition adversely effects 
the development at administrative borders. Along with the overall growth of 
China’s economy and the advancement of the state’s poverty alleviation strategy, 
people are becoming more aware, and have discovered that most of China’s 
poverty-stricken areas are distributed at or near provincial borders. According 
to scholars’ statistics, more than a half of China’s poverty-stricken counties are 
distributed in borders of Hunan-Jiangxi, Shanxi-Henan-Shaanxi, Jiangsu-
Shandong-Henan-Anhui. Among 14 concentrated contiguous exceptionally 
poverty-stricken areas, designated by Outline of the Development-oriented 
Poverty Reduction Program for Rural China (2011-2020), except for three areas; 
such as Tibet, southern Xinjiang and western Yunnan are in national borders, 
the other 11 exceptionally poverty-stricken areas are located at provincial 
borders (see Table 4-5). The natural environment is one of the reasons for this 
situation, i.e. most areas mentioned above are in mountainous zones, with poor 
transportation, informational encapsulation and are a considerable distance from 
the nearest economic center. However, more importantly, it is because of the 
conflict between “economy in administrative regions” and “economy in 
administrative borders”, i.e. under the current incentive conditions, local 
governments always take the beggar-my-neighbor policy to pursue local 
benefits, that is, they attempt every means to prevent the “overflow” effect of 
resource input and retain all economic achievements in their own administrative 
regions. Therefore, they maintain an opportunistic attitude towards the joint 
development of administrative borders, in the hope of gaining profits with the 
state’s support or neighboring regions’ radiation. Besides, in the presence of the 
direct competition from neighboring administrative regions, decision makers 
always place large amounts of resources into core administrative zones where 
there are complete infrastructures, excellent natural environment, concentrated 
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human resources and a relatively centered economy, but display little 
willingness of putting resources into remote administrative borders. 
 
Table 4-5 Chinese contiguous poverty-stricken area and involving provinces and cities 
Poverty region Involved provinces 
Numbers 
involving 
cities 
Numbers 
involving 
counties 
Liupan Mountain 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, 
Ningxia 
15 61 
Qin-ba Mountain 
Henan, Sichuan, 
Chongqing, Hubei, Shaanxi, 
Gansu 
18 75 
Wuling Mountain 
Hunan, Chongqing, 
Guizhou 
12 64 
Wumeng Mountain  Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan 10 38 
Yunnan and Guangxi and 
Guizhou rocky desertification 
area 
Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan 15 80 
The mountainous border of 
western Yunnan 
Yunnan 10 56 
The mountains of south 
Daxinganling 
Inner Mongolia, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang 
4 19 
Yanshan-Taihang Mountain 
Area 
Hebei, Shanxi, Inner 
Mongolia 
6 33 
Luliang Mountain area Shanxi, Shaanxi 4 20 
Dabie Mountain area Anhui, Henan, Hubei 11 36 
Luoxiao Mountains Jiangxi, Hunan 6 23 
Tibet region Tibet 7 74 
Tibetan areas in four provinces 
Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, 
Qinghai 
12 77 
Three region in South Xinjiang Xinjiang 3 24 
Source: collected by author. 
 
It is noteworthy that most contiguous poverty-stricken areas appear in 
adjoining regions of the middle and western provinces, as these administrative 
areas have a similar natural resources endowment, economic development levels 
and leading industrial structure. In particular, they are faced with direct 
competition in terms of economic development. All of these result in their poor 
cooperative intention. It cannot be ignored that the poverty-stricken areas may 
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be located in the borders between the backward regions and developed regions, 
such as poverty-stricken areas around Beijing and Tianjin. Theoretically 
speaking, there is a difference in the industrial structure, economic level and 
development goals between the backward provinces and developed provinces;  
thus, resulting in complementary advantages and deep cooperation. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the cooperation among Beijing, Tianjin and Hebei, 
these three provinces took the lead to establish the Northern China Economic 
Cooperation Region in 1981; moreover, they would propose a cooperative plan 
every once in a while and signed many cooperation memorandums, as well as 
cooperation programs, but their cooperation has still exhibited great difficulty 
and empty talk, at least up to now. According to the brief description above, it 
can be seen that in the current government incentive mechanism, the 
complements in the economy can still pose a difficult challenge, to break the 
mutual competition and mutual guard among administrative regions; thus, 
resulting in an obstacle toward cooperation among administrative regions, and, 
finally, going against China’s regional balanced and coordinated development.  
 
4.4 Explorations and Reflections on Administrative 
Decentralization and Regional Development 
 
The effective operation of the financial decentralization system requires the 
support and supplementation of other systems covering administration and 
public service. Just as some scholars point out, “Concerning the promotion of 
efficiency, justice and macroeconomic stability, there is neither good nor bad 
fiscal federalism system, for its effect depends on the concrete institutional 
environment.” 322  The ideal fiscal federalism model, further proposed by 
Weingast, 323  requires five basic institutional environments, namely, 
government hierarchy, a degree of local autonomy, common market, significant 
budget constraint and the institutionalization of political power distribution. To 
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clearly determine the rules of interaction between the fiscal federalist system 
and the institutional environment, Enikolopov 324  et al. made a comparison 
between Chile and Argentina, as well as China and Russia to discover that the 
different effects of the fiscal decentralization system in these countries with 
similar initial development conditions are caused by their different institutional 
environments. Relatively speaking, both China and Chile have a powerful 
national party; thus, they have sufficient authority and resources to award and 
punish local governments, so as to ensure that local developments submits to an 
overall national interest. Based on a comparison between China and Russia, 
Blanchard325 et al. reached a similar conclusion, i.e. compared with Russia’s 
“crappy democracy”, China’s powerful central government is more unlikely to 
be “captured” by local elites, because it has sufficient power to restrain local 
governments’ behaviors. In a word, China’s relatively centralized political and 
administrative system has become the institutional guarantee of the “China 
Miracle” in the eyes of most scholars. 
When it comes to the target of regional balanced development, China’s 
administrative power distribution serves the fiscal decentralization system, 
trying to achieve the goal of ensuring the central government’s coordinating 
ability, while attempting to effectively mobilize the local governments’ 
initiative. According to the previous description in this chapter, it can be 
preliminarily discovered that in the current administrative system, the 
administrative incentive mode corresponding to the fiscal incentive is mainly 
reflected in terms of personnel incentives, i.e. the central government endows 
local leaders with the power of controlling local personnel and provides 
promotions and rewards for officials in line with central targets, according to a 
specific set of standards. The central government’s control over local 
governments is mainly reflected in structural control, i.e. it ensures the 
smoothness of the relevant central government decree through the vertically and 
horizontally consistent government structure. In the process of regional 
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development, China’s administrative power distribution mode is responsible for 
different roles at different stages and develops abundant practice, which 
provides a firm foundation for summarizing the relationship between 
administrative decentralization and the regional balanced development, as well 
as reflecting on problems within the existing system. 
 
4.4.1 Explorations on Administrative Decentralization in the Course of 
Regional Development  
Many scholars have pointed out that the effective operation of China’s fiscal 
decentralization system benefits from its relatively centralized administrative 
management system. However, the history of administrative power distribution 
reveals that the central decision makers have always been exploring an 
administrative power distribution mode that can effectively mobilize both the 
central and local governments’ initiative, according to different regional 
developmental strategies utilized throughout different historical periods, 
including the attempt of centralization and the exploration of decentralization, 
forming two basic clues. 
 
(1) Attempt at Combining Personnel Incentive with Local Fiscal Incentive 
During the early period of the new China, administrative power, just like 
fiscal power, was centralized by the central government, so as to ensure its 
control over national politics, the economy and society. Most particularly, the 
central government retained the power of controlling the local personnel 
structure. Afterwards, to support the first fiscal decentralization and further 
arouse the local governments’ enthusiasm for development, the central 
government used its power over personnel to transfer a large number of leaders, 
who refused to support the central government’s “Great Leap Forward” policy, 
from their original positions and appointed local cadres, who supported the 
central government’s radical policy to retain the financial power of economic 
construction. This attempt provided double incentives for local governments and 
led to their growing “enthusiasm” for local development; thus, resulting in 
disasters, such as a disordered macro economy and widened regional disparity. 
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In the process of economic adjustment, the central government once again used 
its personnel power to accelerate the centralization of fiscal power and the 
recovery of economic order, by rectifying the situation where provincial leaders 
implemented radical policies. Before the reform and opening-up, this interaction 
between administrative power and fiscal power repeated constantly, and every 
adjustment of economic power was accompanied by a personnel adjustment, 
which to some extent aggravated the vicious circle of “excessive 
decentralization results in disorder but excessive centralization leads to 
inefficiency”.  
After the reform and opening-up, the central government realized the 
inadequacies of “overlapped” personnel and financial incentives. Based on this 
reflection, instead of enforcing local governments to unconditionally accept the 
central government’s decisions, central leaders attempted to encourage local 
officials to behave with appropriate integrity for the sake of the overall interests 
relating to economic performance measurement and promotion. In particular, 
the transformation of the central government’s personnel management authority 
from “managing two subordinate levels” to “managing one subordinate level” 
meant decentralizing local officials’ power of appointment and removal, while 
decentralizing the power of local economic affairs, so that the operation of the 
fiscal decentralization system was not directly intervened by the central 
government; thus, local governments’ enthusiasm and responsibility for 
development was aroused. The system of decentralizing personnel power and 
fiscal power at the same time continued till the reform of the “revenue-sharing 
system”. Within a planned economic system, local governments started to abate 
the situation of being completely subordinate to the central government, and a 
relationship based on negotiation and consultation between the central 
government and local governments began to be established gradually. Over time, 
the central government began to be at a somewhat disadvantage, because of its 
lowered personnel management ability and fiscal extractive capacity. Therefore, 
the reform of the “revenue-sharing system” increased the central government’s 
financial strength, by designating central and local governments’ revenue and 
expenditure boundaries and establishing an independent central tax collection 
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and management system. Meanwhile, the central government improved the 
incentive mechanism for local personnel management, and in particular, the 
permanent assessment system, based on the gross national product and financial 
growth, which became the major qualifying approach for officials’ promotions. 
By then, the combination of the personnel incentive mechanism and the fiscal 
incentive mechanism became an important guarantee for the sound operation of 
China’s “fiscal federalism”. 
 
(2) Attempt of Limiting Local Governments’ Self-interest Tendency with 
Structure Control 
Since the founding of the new country, to China, a great power with an 
extremely unbalanced development, balancing productivity distribution and 
bridging regional disparity became important topics for ensuring its internal and 
external safety and stability. After the state was preliminarily steady, the central 
government attempted to mobilize the local governments’ enthusiasm and 
initiative for development, by means of fiscal decentralization, so as to 
gradually establish a local self-sufficient economic system; however, in this 
process, it still took precautions against inflicting any damage to the central 
authority, because of excessive decentralization. The elimination of localism 
had always been an important principle for the central government’s decision-
making. In the course of decentralization, before the reform and opening-up, 
due to the contradiction between “vertical” control and fiscal decentralization, 
the “vertical dictatorship” had to be broken, so as to arouse the local 
governments’ enthusiasm for development. In view of this, the central 
government concurrently delegated the planning power and fiscal power to the 
local governments. The central government mainly controlled the local 
governments’ self-interest tendency with the leaders’ personal charisma, 
ideology and personnel power. In this control mode, the central government did 
not actually have sufficient and institutionalized channels to constrain the local 
governments. Even if it could adjust the local cadres, who went against the 
central decision, through leaders’ personal charisma colored by “humanized 
governance”, it still needed to continuously strengthen the central vertical 
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agencies’ authority, so as to constrain local governments’ self-interest behaviors. 
In this central control mode, with low efficiency and side effects, the “vertical” 
and “horizontal” departments’ power shifted over and over again, failing to form 
an effectively structured central control system. After the Cultural Revolution, 
as its control force of personal authority and ideology gradually declined, the 
central government was faced with establishing a new mode to control the local 
governments’ self-interest tendencies. During this period of economic recovery, 
in addition to the transient “vertical centralization”, based on a planned 
economy, which is essential to a market economic system, the central 
government began to gradually reduce vertical agencies’ excessive intervention 
in the micro economy. They also tried to strengthen the macro-control function, 
by reducing the number of central departments and integrating the ministries’ 
authority, for the purpose of guiding local government to behave in line with 
central strategic decisions. The history of China’s administrative reform has 
proven that all reforms, since 1988, were basically established and designed in 
this direction. The weakening of the central micro “vertical” agencies did not 
inhibit nor impair the central government’s control ability, and, as a result, by  
strengthening the macro functions, the central government enhanced its 
authority of structural control over the national economy. Most significantly, 
the removal and mergers of ministries and the reform of the “super-ministry 
system” effectively intensified the integration and cooperation among the 
“vertical” departments and reduced a substantial degree of internal friction, 
caused by departmental segmentation, which, to some extent, contributed to the 
implementation of the strategy of a regional balanced development. 
 
4.4.2 Reflections on Administrative Decentralization in Regional 
Development 
In the course of regional development, since the founding of new China, apart 
from arousing local governments’ enthusiasm for development through the 
decentralization of fiscal power, China was always attempting to discover an 
improved administrative power distribution mode. This distribution mode would 
not only guarantee the achievements of fiscal decentralization, but also constrain 
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local governments’ self-interest behaviors and ensure the central government’s 
macro-control ability. After learning from some profound historical lessons, the 
state has basically created an administrative power distribution mode, which 
combines local personnel incentives with the central control structure; thus, 
laying the fundamental institutional environment for China’s overall progress 
and regional balanced development. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that 
as China’s regional problem becomes increasingly complex, numerous 
components against regional balanced development can still be found in the 
presently existing administrative power distribution mode. Specifically, the 
following aspects are included. 
In the first place, a direct combination of personnel incentives and economic 
incentives eventually leads to incentive deviation. Theoretically speaking, the 
original attention of fiscal decentralization was to make use of local 
governments’ information superiority, so as to improve the quality of the local 
public service supply.326 Afterwards, along with the development of a second-
generation fiscal federalism theory, scholars discovered that fiscal 
decentralization contributed to encouraging local governments to promote 
economic transition and growth; particularly, the central government’s 
personnel promotion incentive, which could further intensify the effect of fiscal 
decentralization.327 However, this incentive mode, which combines personnel 
incentives with economic incentives had obvious drawbacks, i.e. in the process 
of competition for growth, local governments always paid more attention to 
infrastructures and important projects related to short-term economic 
performance, but overlooked the input in long-term human resources and public 
service.328 This phenomenon was more serious in undeveloped areas, which had 
a backward economy and insufficient financial resources; thus, directly 
weakening the undeveloped areas’ development potential. In addition, in this 
“overlapped” powerful incentive system, local governments would compete 
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with each other for all available resources. Excessive competition would not 
only make the coordination and cooperation among governments become “a 
castle in the air”, but also cause a tremendous waste of resources, which can be 
proven by the previously mentioned competition for the title of poverty-stricken 
county and the difficulty in cooperation in and between regions. The above 
mentioned incentive deviation resulted in the failure of regional cooperation, 
and greatly discounted the effect of the state’s regional balanced development 
policy and relevant resources input.  
In the second place, the direct collision of structure control and local 
incentives resulted in policy failure. In the long-term fiscal decentralization 
system, local governments gradually formed unique local interests, as well as 
the awareness and ability of maintaining local interests. To confine the damage 
done to the overall interests, caused by local self-interest, China attempted to 
strengthen the administrative structure of “uniformity between central and local 
governments”, so as to control local governments by the vertical departments’ 
power. In this direct “colliding” monitoring pattern, the central government’s 
“vertical” power must continue to be strengthened, along with the enhancement 
of local governments’ “horizontal” power, which would directly result in a 
continuous open and secret competition between the central vertical 
departments and local governments. This would; thus, bring about “the most 
brain-consuming thing”; perplexing China’s development. When it came to the 
concrete regional development, the contradiction between central structure 
control and local incentives might result in the failure of regional policy, which 
is mainly reflected in the following aspects. Firstly, the complex relationship 
between the central and local governments creates institutional space for the 
game between local governments and the central government, i.e. local 
governments always selectively implement or resist any central policy involving 
their own interest and maintain a negative attitude towards regional cooperation 
that may damage their short-term economic benefits. Secondly, the central 
“vertical” departments’ enhanced ability can be directly transferred to the 
central government’s improved ability of monitoring local governments; the 
long-term “vertical” segmentation greatly decentralizes the central 
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government’s power in the field of regional coordination, while the “vertical” 
departments actually still have significant powers of the administrative approval 
and special subsidy granting, and these special powers protect “vertical” 
agencies’ departmental benefits, which creates numerous difficulties relating to 
the central government’s integration of regional coordination ability. Thirdly, 
within the existing system, since all local governments bearing similar functions 
are responsible for the common superior government, they always treat their 
“competitors” with an attitude of “implementing regional blockade, 
undermining each other’s work, and sacrificing principle for profit”, for the 
express benefit and maximization of the head in their jurisdictional territory or 
region; thus, resulting in a series of problems like local protectionism, 
governments’ vicious competition, high convergence of industries, and 
overexploitation of common resources. This situation obviously goes against the 
establishment of an intergovernmental collaboration mechanism and the 
achievement of a regional balanced development. At last, in the existing control 
system, China has established local governments of a similar size on the 
principle that “one size fits all” in all regions throughout China, without 
considering their economic development, population size, resource endowment, 
economic structure and geographic location, which may cause the central 
government’s financial aid or transfer payment funds to be consumed by public 
organizations; thereby, resulting in the failure of regional policy. 
 
4.4.3. Improvements of Administrative Decentralization in Regional 
Development 
According to the description above, it can be determined that, although the 
present administrative power distribution mode promoted China’s overall 
progress in history, its implied contradictions hindered the implementation of 
an inter-regional balanced coordination strategy in China. In future development, 
the administrative power distribution between central and local governments 
should be further adjusted, on the principle of maintaining and sustaining the 
central government’s control ability, while arousing local governments’ 
enthusiasm. More specifically, the following improvements should be made.  
212 
In the first place, the personnel incentive mechanism should be improved and 
a scientific political performance assessment system should be constructed. 
Based on admitting the practicality of the present political performance 
assessment mechanism, to prevent a problematic political performance 
assessment mechanism from causing incorrect incentives to local governments, 
future reforms should be structured from the following three aspects. Firstly, 
indicators such as the quality of public service, the efficiency and efficacy of 
economic development and the state of environmental protection for political 
performance assessment should be added. The difficulty with this measure is to 
effectively locate and determine the GDP-like indicators which are objective, 
concise and measurable enough to accurately reflect various other social 
progress, distinctly apart from economic growth. Seen from the present inquiry, 
it is most difficult to conduct relevant and accurate experiments. For instance, 
the State Environmental Protection Administration and the State Statistics 
Bureau jointly launched the “Green GDP” assessment project in 2014, but their 
profound disagreements relating to the selection of indicators and the local 
governments’ boycott, resulted in a zero tolerance for constructive inquiry 
concerning this project. Secondly, the achievements of regional poverty 
alleviation and regional joint development should be listed within the scope of 
all cooperators’ performance assessment, while the pattern of closed local 
interests should be broken, and the interaction and collaboration of local 
governments in and between regions should be encouraged. The difficulty with 
this measure is to codify the methods and standards of identifying various 
cooperators’ contributions. According to the existing practice of regional 
cooperation, explicit shared measures for performance assessment have not yet 
been established. Thirdly, public opinion and public satisfaction should be listed 
within the scope of officials’ political performance assessment. In general, 
extensive exploration of this reform has been conducted throughout China. 
Central ministries, such as the Organization Department of the Central 
Committee of the CPC and the State Statistics Bureau, as well as governments 
of provinces covering Hebei, Shandong, Gansu and Guangdong have carried out 
an investigation on public satisfaction utilizing a variety of methods and also 
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listed it in the scope of officials’ political performance assessment. This reform 
means the transformation of the current personnel incentive mechanism, i.e., 
instead of directly relating incentives to economic development, the government 
takes the public attitude and preference as an important method for encouraging 
officials, utilizing the power of public scrutiny and accountability. Nevertheless, 
the difficulty with this reform is to establish a collective nationwide public 
satisfaction evaluation system, which would include a clear subject, 
expectations, consistent standards, neutral operation and objective results.  
In the second place, the structured central control mode should be adjusted 
with the establishment of a systematic structure to promote and enhance the 
relationship between the central government and local governments. Along with 
the optimization of government behavioral patterns through market-oriented 
reforms and the improvement of the central fiscal situation by an effective 
revenue-sharing system reform, the importance of a structured central 
government control mode, based on the uniformity between central and local 
governments starts to decline. The central government explicitly proposed in the 
process of the “Super-Ministry System” reform since 2008, “According to all 
levels of government’s responsibilities, local governments’ organization setting 
should be reasonably adjusted. Within the quotas determined by the central 
government, organizations to be uniformly should be corresponding from 
superiors to subordinates and other organizations should be set according to 
local conditions.” In other words, the uniformity between central and local 
governments is no longer the unique feature of China’s governmental structure. 
Therefore, to ensure the state’s overall development and regional balance, future 
reforms should continue in the following direction. Firstly, the central 
government’s macro-control function should be adjusted and merged, central 
ministries’ power relationship, in respect of regional development, should be 
gradually adjusted and integrated, and low efficiency, because of “coexistence 
of multiple departments”, should be reduced. In particular, regional 
coordinating agencies’ grades and resource integration ability should be 
enhanced, and the implementation of the current regional development 
strategies should be ensured. Secondly, the rigid system of “the uniformity 
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between central and local government” should be further amended. Local 
governments should be endowed in an institutionalized way, with autonomous 
power in terms of organization structuring and personnel allocation, and the 
number of financial-support personnel in the central and western regions should 
be moderately reduced, according to the economic situation and social 
development, so that the central and western regions can “go forward with 
burdens discarded” in development. Thirdly, local governments’ self-interest 
behavior should be controlled through macro methods; such as finance and tax, 
while vertical administrative instruction should be avoided as far as possible in 
the competition with local governments, and an institutional environment with 
benign competition and interaction among local governments should be created 
slowly and systematically. 
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Chapter 5 Decentralization of Public Services and 
Regional Disparities: an Exploration of China 
 
Introduction 
Public service is a generic term that refers to the practical activities that a 
government, by means of multiple mechanisms and approaches, and through its 
public sector departments, performs on behalf of the public. The government 
delivers various goods both material and immaterial, in response to the demands 
and needs of the public, and in order to adequately maintain public interest.  329 
In recent years, the public service function of governments has become one of 
the most contentious issues in society, and there are conflicting opinions over 
the supply approach of public service. The perception that a public 
administration is an independent domain of public service supply has been 
popular ever since Woodrow Wilson posited the political administrative 
dichotomy, 330 in which administrative organs and officials began to be known 
as the holders of public services. The best organizational pattern from which 
public programs are delivered is a stratified bureaucracy, because such a 
structure is more efficient and rational, compared with political officials who 
can be strongly influenced by voters. Thereafter, public choice theory was a 
method that could be used to study the particular mode of governmental service; 
this involved applying economic measurements, and raising the notions of the 
“economic man” hypothesis, “utility maximization” and “public goods”, as we ll 
as making use of mathematical models in an effort to determine the most 
efficient public service supply mode.331  
Since the 1980s, the idea of the New Public Administration, “steering, not 
paddling”, 332 has been developed as a paradigm of government reform. Private 
business organizational models should be applied in public sectors so as to 
increase efficiency in bureaucratic organizations; and public organizations can 
                                                   
329 Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. (2000). The new public service: Serving rather than steering. Public 
Administration Review, 60(6), 549-559. 
330 Goodnow, F. J. (1967). Politics and administration: A study in government. Transaction Publishers, p1-5. 
331 Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2007). The new public service: Serving, not steering. ME Sharpe, p2-8. 
332 Osborne, D. (1993). Reinventing government. Public Productivity & Management Review, 6(1), 349-356. 
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also improve the supply mode of public goods by cooperating with private 
sectors, or even by subcontracting particular services. As a result, the supply of 
public services need no longer be monopolized by public organizations and 
government officials. However, private sector organizations have increasingly 
been identified as suitable participants in public services, since they can help to 
provide services that are more efficient, more economical, and more 
differentiated. However, scholars have recently been criticizing the privatization 
of public services by exposing public organizations and their marketing ideas, 
and by discussing the internal nonconformities between market principles and 
political principles (such as fairness, justice, equality, and democracy). For 
example, Denhardt and Denhardt proposed the idea of a “new public service”,  
333 advocated “Serving, not Steering”, and emphasized that “to establish a kind 
of new public service mode based on civil rights, democracy and serving for 
public interest replaces the current dominant mode based on economic theory 
and self-interest”. In such a pattern, the public sector, private sector, social 
organizations and individual citizens can all participate in the process of public 
service supply, in which public interest is considered as its core. 
From the findings above, it is easy to assume that scholars have extensively 
researched and discussed the provisions, principles and modes of public service; 
and have extensively commented on the duties and advantages of administrative 
organizations, the private sector and social organizations to/for citizens. 
However, there are no detailed descriptions regarding the respective 
responsibilities of central and local governments, which are both responsible for 
offering public services. Fiscal federalists have argued, 334 “Local governments 
not only know the local condition very well, but also have the political power to 
adjust the output of local public goods according to the local condition and 
flavor.” Local governments therefore have informational superiority, and so they 
may offer differentiated services on the basis of local citizens’ preferences, and 
thus increase the efficiency of the supply of services. By contrast, the “one size 
                                                   
333 Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2007). The new public service: Serving, not steering. ME Sharpe, p110-125. 
334 Sellers, J. M., & Lidström, A. (2007). Decentralization, local government, and the welfare 
state. Governance, 20(4), 609-632. 
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fits all” service supply modality of central governments is not only inefficient, 
but cannot match the needs of all citizens. However, welfare state theorists 
believe that a relatively centralized political system is needed to ensure a general 
and fair public service supply, because domineering local governments and 
interest groups may be an impediment to new policies of the welfare state. 
Moreover, the amount of public services offered by the local governments 
amounts to an inequality in terms of regional benefits, which is against the 
general principles of public service. Pragmatically, the successful practices of 
the Scandinavian welfare states are the result of welfare policies formulated and 
supervised by relatively compartmentalized sections of their central 
governments. 335 
According to empirical studies, there is no agreement or consensus in the 
academic world on whether decentralization of public services may enhance 
supply efficiency or expand regional disparities. Costa Font discovered that, by 
calculating the relevant economic data for Spain (dating from 1999 to 2005),336 
there have been narrowing regional disparities of public services in fields such 
as education, medical treatment, and endowments in different regions of Spain. 
Obinger et al. 337 argued that decentralization may strengthen the veto power 
of local governments (after studying public service supply modes in Austria, 
Germany, Sweden and some other countries); and that decentralization could 
hinder the establishment of a generally equitable national public service delivery 
system. Besley and Coate 338 discovered that the allocation of public service 
resources by a centralized political system may lead to enhanced competition 
among different regions, resulting in more aggressive regions garnering more 
resources, thereby resulting in inequality. If the public service policy 
implementation is coordinated by representatives from different negotiating 
regions, then conflicts may be dispelled in the legislative process.  Through 
                                                   
335 Huber, E., & Stephens, J. D. (2001). Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global 
markets. University of Chicago Press. 
336 Costa‐Font, J. (2010). Devolution, Diversity and Welfare Reform: Long‐term Care in the ‘Latin Rim’. Social 
Policy & Administration, 44(4), 481-494. 
337 Obinger, H., Leibfried, S., & Castles, F. G. (Eds.). (2005). Federalism and the Welfare State: new world and 
European experiences. Cambridge University Press. 
338 Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political 
economy approach. Journal of Public Economics, 87(12), 2611-2637. 
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comparative analyses of many developed welfare states, Sellers et al. 339 
determined that Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and similar countries that 
enjoy generally equitable public service systems tend to have relatively 
impeccable decentralized systems. It is evident the level of decentralization in 
these countries is apparently higher than most other welfare states, both in terms 
of the legal process of decentralization, and in terms of the control of financial 
revenue and expenditure of local governments. Therefore, to some extent, both 
decentralization and a generally equal welfare system can coexist. After 
conducting a comparative study of the power structures in Switzerland, 
Denmark, Austria and Ireland, Biela et al340 claimed that centralized countries 
would find it difficult to offer differentiated public services, and that 
disagreements and internal friction can arise in the provision of public services 
in federal states. Therefore, decentralization as a horizontal coordination 
mechanism is regarded as the best public service supply mode. By analyzing 
data for China, Russia, Chile, Argentina and another 75 developing countries 
spanning 25 years, Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya 341  discovered that 
decentralization contributes to an improvement in the equality of public services 
in a country that has a powerful national party. However, if a government merely 
applies decentralization, there is no obvious effect of fiscal decentralization.  
From the brief summary above, it is apparent that there is no consensus on 
public service supply modes or the regional disparities of public services. 
Scholars have proposed and used a diverse range of definitions of public service 
and decentralization, and some may have applied ineffective research methods. 
Therefore, the focus of this chapter is on the transitions in the Chinese public 
service supply mode and on China’s regional disparities, and the possible 
relationship between these patterns. 
     
                                                   
339 Sellers, J. M., & Lidström, A. (2007). Decentralization, local government, and the welfare 
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5.1 Historical Changes of Chinese Public Service Supply Mode 
     
Scholars have yet to reach a basic consensus or agreement on the correct 
means of extending public services. 342 For example, some scholars divide 
public services into sovereign services (judiciary, police, national defense); 
social and cultural services (education, medical treatment, sanitation, social 
insurance); and economic services (infrastructure construction related to 
economic development). Some other scholars divide public services into 
political public services (legislation, judiciary, administration, national defense); 
social public services (employment, social insurance, education, medical 
treatment, recreation and sports); and commercial public services (post and 
telecommunications, communication, transportation). Furthermore, public 
services are continuously expanding due to improvements in society and with 
the increasing demands of the public. For the sake of convenience and 
comparability, the public services discussed in this chapter refer to basic public 
services that improve people’s lives and their overall well-being and 
development. 
 
5.1.1 China’s public service supply mode prior to the reform and 
opening-up era 
After the establishment of the new People’s Democratic Republic of China, 
the Chinese Communist Party didn’t copy the highly centralized political and 
economic system of the Soviet Union, but attempted to use a combination of 
methods relating to central planning and decentralization, so as to stimulate the 
initiative from both central and local governments following a primary 
stabilization of the national economy. In 1958, the central government began to 
decentralize its economic power by devolving planning, project evaluation and 
approval, tax-raising powers, and business and finance policy to local 
governments. The central government also devolved various public service 
functions such as education, medical treatment and culture. This approach 
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became the public service mode, whereby the central government exercised 
authority in terms of policy-making and basic principles, while local 
governments became responsible for policy implementation and for managing 
specific transactions. In theory, public services of whatever type would be “sub-
contracted” to a subordinate layer of government, 343 and so the lowest tier 
would become the direct provider of basic public services. This practical 
operating process is termed “dan wei” (单位, work unit or unit)344 whereby 
institutions in cities and people's communes in villages provide public services 
in the broadest possible aspects. 
In reference to the cities, Mao Zedong, at the Second Session of the Seventh 
Conference in 1949, proclaimed,  
 
“We should unite most of the Chinese people involving the organizations of 
politics, military, economy, culture and other areas, so as to overcome the 
undisciplined condition of the old China, and we can take advantage of the 
great people’s collective power to advocate the people’s government as well 
as the people’s liberation army and to establish a new China with 
independence, democracy, peace, unity, prosperity and power.”  345  
 
With its profound advances in socialist transformation and with the 
acceleration of construction in China’s cities, the “dan wei” approach gradually 
became the main governing instrument in Chinese cities throughout the period 
of planned economy. “Dan wei” is also about the recombination of services, 
including production, organizational, and social basic public service supply 
functions. “Dan wei” has a substantial influence on urban residents’ production 
and lives (both geographically and temporally), but it also comprises a large 
proportion of basic services that should be offered by a national, central 
                                                   
343 Zhou, L. A. (2004). The Incentive and Cooperation of Government Officials in the Political Tournaments: An 
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344 Note: A unit or dan wei (单位) is the name given to a place of employment in the People's Republic of China. 
Workers were bound to their work unit for life. Each dan wei created their own housing, child care, schools, clinics, 
shops, services, post offices, etc. 
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government, including housing, medical treatment, sanitation, education, and 
security. A typical example of this aspect is the so-called “social service 
supported by enterprises”.  
In Chinese villages, people’s communes perform a similar function to the 
“dan wei” services in the cities. Communes have a producing function, and they 
also provide medical treatment and public health services, together with cultural 
education and various other public services. The cost of basic public services is 
fixed and managed by the farmers themselves, except for a small part of the 
financial budget at the county level. A portion of the income produced by the 
people’s commune is collected via a national agricultural tax, labeled “public 
grain”; part of this is reserved for production expenses and management costs, 
and there is a storage fund for education, medical treatment, public health and 
social insurance; finally, the remaining money is distributed as income among 
the farmers. 346 
One example is the provision of education.  347  From 1950 to 1952, the 
Chinese government adopted the principle of “unified charges” and high 
centralization, and put a three-level educational management system into 
practice: central, regional, and provincial/city levels. The aim of this measure 
was to ensure an adequate supply of revenue for educational expenses during 
these turbulent economic circumstances, so that the Chinese educational 
structure could be transformed from the old to the new system within such a 
brief period of time. Whilst regions were being abolished, and amidst sudden 
political and economic changes, China began to employ an educational financial 
system that was based on “dividing income and expenses, level-to-level 
administration, [and] concentrating on particular emphasis”. Under this system, 
educational management authorities were established at a local level. Due to the 
spread of the decentralization movement in 1958, in terms of educational 
services, “central departments and local government [began to] cooperate with 
each other”. The administrative authority of educational business and expenses 
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were both devolved to local government. Meanwhile, the local government was 
required to negotiate with the administrative department for education when 
establishing the educational budget of the subordinate government, and had to 
submit it to the people’s council. There was disorder and chaos within the 
educational system in the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution; however, in 
1972 the “earmark” system was launched through an earmarking method, in 
order to ensure and establish a stable input of revenue “earmarked” for 
educational expenditure. However, since the proportion of educational 
expenditure by local government was too small at that time, it was not possible 
meet the basic requirements of educational development. Generally, during this 
period, expenditure on higher education, trade schools and technician training 
schools was arranged and financed by both central and local governments. 
Elementary education was implemented through cooperation among the state, 
factories and village communities; urban elementary education was funded by 
local financial departments and factory enterprises; and village education was 
funded by both community organizations and local financial sectors. 
As shown in Figure 5-1, before the year 1958, under a relatively concentrated 
system of public services, around 8% of the national fiscal expenditure went on 
science, education, culture, and health; following the decentralization of public 
services, in 1958 the proportion increased slightly to 9%, an effort of the “Great 
Leap Forward.” Afterwards, the economic regulations caused the percentage to 
fall slightly, but then it rose suddenly to above 12% in 1962, and above 10% 
prior to the “Cultural Revolution”. The “Cultural Revolution” apparently 
influenced the expenditure of public services, since expenditure on science, 
education, culture and health only accounted for about 6% of national fiscal 
expenditure in 1970. 
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Figure 5-1 Proportion of China’s national fiscal expenditure on national science, 
education, culture and health before the reform and opening-up policy era 
Source: State Statistics Bureau: 60 Years of Compilation of Statistics in the New China , China Statistics Press, 2010. 
 
As powers and responsibilities for public services were being transferred to 
the local governments, the proportion of local public expenditure on local 
science, education, culture and health rose from 54% in 1952 to 73% in 1953. 
After the further transference of public service authority to local governments 
in 1958, the proportion rapidly rose to 81%. As the “adjustment, consolidating, 
enriching and improving” in the economy took place, the proportion of local 
public service expenditure on these services began to decline to about 70% by 
1965. After the start of the “Cultural Revolution”, the controlling force of the 
central government upon national public services was continuously falling, 
while the proportion of local public service expenditure began to increase. It 
should be pointed out that, from 1966 to 1970, the absolute value of expenditure 
for national public service declined from ￥5.168 billion to ￥4.365 billion. 
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Figure 5-2 Proportion of national fiscal expenditure on local science, education, culture 
and health prior to the reform and opening-up era348 
Source: State Statistics Bureau: 60 Years of Compilation of Statistics in the New China , China Statistics Press, 2010. 
 
5.1.2 The public service supply mode during the period of the fiscal 
contract system 
When the reform and opening-up policy was enacted, the Chinese fiscal 
system was transformed from “egalitarianism”, to “serving meals to different 
diners from different pots”, in the transition to a socialist market economy 
system. The fundamental aspects of this reform included setting clear 
boundaries between local and central governments (in terms of revenue and 
expenditure), and increasing local financial autonomy, in order to arouse 
enthusiasm, autonomy and responsibility at a local government level. There also 
occurred fiscal decentralizing, whereby the responsibility for delivering public 
services was decentralized to local government. However, during this period, 
there were some adjustments regarding the precise responsibilities of central and 
local government departments: local governments continued to operate and 
manage expenditure on public services, including local agriculture; forestry and 
water conservation; industry, traffic and business departments; as well as 
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operating expenses for culture, education, science and public health services, 
pensions, and the social relief fund. It is necessary to point out that there were 
two major defects in the public service decentralization system at that time. First, 
although most public service authorities were decentralized down to a local level 
“symmetrically”, the allocation of finance appeared to be “asymmetric”, which 
led to different tax bases and proportionally unbalanced public spending; as a 
result, the expense of providing public services varied among regions. Second, 
the contract system between the central and provincial governments was 
relatively clear, but the authority-responsibility relationship of local 
governments below provincial level was relatively obscure; thus, responsibility 
for public service expenditure tended to be decentralized down to the level of 
the county municipality. 
Taking education as an example, from 1980, the arrangement of educational 
expenditure was divided by changing the system from a centralized one to that 
of “dividing by central and local government”, with central finance (in the 
central government) being primarily responsible for spending on national 
colleges and universities, trade schools and technician training schools; local 
governments were responsible for spending on local colleges, universities, and 
elementary and secondary schools. There was a clear demand in Decisions about 
Reform of the Educational System in 1985 that “the increase [in] educational 
appropriation [spending] of central and local government should be higher than 
the increase of financially recurring income”. The Chinese government 
encouraged the creation of multiple channels for capital raising, and urged 
enterprises, social organizations and individuals to manage schools and 
contribute money to help economically disadvantaged applications secure 
advanced educational opportunities. As for primary education in rural areas, 
there were stipulations in the document, Opinions on Several Issues about 
Preliminary Education System Reform in Rural Areas by the State Education 
Commission and Ministry of Finance in 1987:  
 
“After the local has taken charge of elementary education, the four levels - 
province, prefecture-level city, county-level city and village - should make 
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sure [perform] their duties respectively. At the same time, the key emphasis is 
the division of power between county and village.”  
 
As for urban elementary education, the State Education Commission issued 
in its pamphlet, Opinions on Further Enhancing the Leaders of Elementary and 
Secondary Schools in Enterprises in 1987:  
 
“Elementary and secondary schools run by enterprises and public 
institutions should implement the leadership system that takes education 
institutions as the principal thing, and the leadership system of local 
education department as supplements.”  
 
From the description above, it can be determined that, in addition to a partial 
deployment of responsibilities for spending on higher and professional 
education, most of the other educational public service functions were delegated 
to local governments, particularly county municipalities, which are responsible 
for funding basic education (primary and secondary schools). 
As shown in Figure 5-3, it is evident that following the fiscal decentralization 
reform (characterized by “serving meals to different diners from different pots”), 
the proportion of national fiscal expenditure on national science, education, 
culture and health declined somewhat, from 16.24% in 1982 to 15.79% in 1985. 
After 1985 there was rapid growth, from 17.9% in 1986 to 22.7% in 1992. 
Overall, the decentralization of both fiscal expenditure and responsibilities for 
public service expenditure during this period was beneficial, and resulted in an 
increase in the proportion of fiscal expenditure on these public services. 
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Figure 5-3 Proportion of national fiscal expenditure on national science, education, 
culture and health during the period of the financial contract 
Source: State Statistics Bureau: 60 Years of Compilation of Statistics in the New China, China Statistics Press, 2010. 
 
It is evident from the graph in Figure 5-4 that the proportion of national fiscal 
expenditure on local science, education, culture and health expenditures 
fluctuated sharply during this period, although levels were around 83% during 
most years; there occurred a sharp a rising trend after 1992. In general, the 
proportion was around a higher level following the decentralization of public 
service expenditures. 
 
Figure 5-4 Proportion of national fiscal expenditure on local science, education, culture 
and health during the era of “serving meals to different diners from different pots” 
349 
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Source: State Statistics Bureau: 60 Years of Compilation of Statistics in the New China, China Statistics Press, 2010. 
 
5.1.3 The public service supply mode after the revenue-sharing system 
reform 
 
The revenue-sharing system reforms included specifications on central and 
local governments’ income sources and forms of expenditure. The central 
government became primarily responsible for expenditure on national defense, 
foreign affairs, administration (of central state departments), and macro-control 
and regional coordination funds. Meanwhile, local governments became 
responsible for the following: 
 
“…the expenses necessary for operating government offices, [the] economy, 
and the career development in the region. It specifically includes: local 
administrative fees, public security…expenses, parts of the armed police, 
militia operating expenses, the basic [local] construction investment…the 
local enterprises’ expenditure [on] technological transformation and the trial 
production of new products, expenditure for supporting agriculture, urban 
maintenance and construction funds, [and] the operating expenses [and] 
various expenditures in local culture, education and health…[and] price 
subsidy expenditures…” 350 
 
Overall, local governments bear the most responsibilities for providing basic 
public service functions, while the central government is responsible for 
expenditure on public security departments, culture, education, health, and 
science. 
 
Table 5-1 Main expenditures of Chinese governments at all levels 
 Level Types Characters  Main expenditure responsibilities 
National 
Central 
government 
National 
Operation of central government; national 
security; diplomacy; investment and 
subsidies of state-owned enterprises; key 
                                                   
350 http://news.hexun.com/2008/1994fszgg/ 
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national construction projects; macro-control; 
education through universities under the 
Ministry of Education; social security of 
state-owned enterprises; cultural facilities 
belonging to central government.   
Provincial 
Provinces and 
Autonomous 
regions 
Regional 
Internal operations; investment and 
subsidies in level-owned enterprises; key 
infrastructures in provinces. 
Municipalities 
Combination 
of urban and 
rural 
Internal operations; investment and 
subsidies of level-owned enterprises; key 
infrastructures in metropolitan areas.  
Prefecture 
Level 
Regions Regional 
Internal operations; investment and 
subsidies in level-owned enterprises; key 
infrastructures at this level.  
Prefecture-
level cities 
(with counties) 
Combination 
of region 
and urban 
Internal operations; investment and 
subsidies of enterprises owned by government 
departments of this level; education in cities; 
city construction; unemployment insurance, 
pensions and unemployment relief.  
Prefecture-
level cities 
(without 
counties) 
Urban 
Internal operations; investment and 
subsidies of level-owned enterprises; city 
construction; unemployment insurance, 
pension and unemployment relief. 
County 
level 
Counties Regional 
Internal operations; education; health 
and medical care; subsidies for rural/county 
level infrastructure and township 
construction; birth control. 
County-level 
city 
Combination 
of region 
and urban 
Internal operations; education; health and 
medical care; subsidies for rural/county level 
infrastructure and township construction; 
birth control. 
Township 
Level 
Townships Rural 
Internal operations; rural education; birth 
control. 
Source: Feng Xingyuan: Study of Public Service Authorization Clarification of Chinese Government at All Levels, 
Review of Economic Research, 2005 (26), p89. 
 
Table 5-1 lists the main expenditure items of all levels of the Chinese 
government, and Table 5-2 details the proportions of central and local 
government expenditure on different public services.  Based on the data in 
both tables, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
First, the data in the tables are evidence of extensive decentralization. Local 
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governments shoulder much of the burden of education, medical treatment, 
social security and many other public service functions. According to the data, 
from 2010 to 2011, 94.08% of the expenditure on education, 95.29% of 
expenditure on social security, and 98.71% of expenditure on health and medical 
treatment came from local government. According to international practice, 
such basic public services have strong externality and there may be spillovers, 
and so multilevel finance and transfer payments from central government will 
be needed. However, in China, the transfer payment system is imperfect, the 
basic public services are largely controlled and funded by local government, 
which, to some extent, leads to a further dislocation of the central and local 
powers. 
 
Table 5-2 Proportions of Main National and Local Expenditures from 2010 to 2011  
Expenditure 
items 
Rate of 
central 
expenditure  
Rate of 
local 
expenditur
e  
Accounting for total 
central expenditure 
Accounting for total 
local expenditure 
General Public 
Services 
8.56% 91.44% 5.35% 11.15% 
Public 
Security 
16.18% 83.82% 5.88% 5.95% 
Armed Police 73.86% 26.14% 4.58% 0.32% 
Education 5.92% 94.08% 5.29% 16.40% 
Science and 
Technology 
50.91% 49.09% 11.09% 2.09% 
Culture, Sport 
and Media 
9.86% 90.14% 1.04% 1.86% 
Social Safety 
Net 
4.71% 95.29% 2.93% 11.58% 
Medical and 
Healthcare 
1.29% 98.71% 0.45% 6.66% 
Environmental 
Protection 
2.83% 97.17% 0.44% 2.96% 
Community 
Affairs 
0.16% 99.84% 0.07% 8.15% 
Agriculture 
Affairs 
4.45% 95.55% 2.47% 10.36% 
Transportation 14.02% 85.98% 5.60% 6.70% 
Purchasing 33.28% 66.72% 3.95% 1.54% 
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Vehicles 
Exploration 
and 
Information 
12.71% 87.29% 2.93% 3.93% 
Commerce 
and Services 
5.88% 94.12% 0.51% 1.60% 
Financial 
Supervision 
70.13% 29.87% 2.78% 0.23% 
Post-
earthquake 
Recovery  
5.80% 97.10% 0.23% 0.76% 
Land and 
Weather 
14.31% 85.69% 1.26% 1.47% 
Housing 
Security 
11.54% 88.46% 2.20% 3.29% 
Grain and Oil 
Reserves 
42.40% 57.60% 3.18% 0.84% 
Other 
Expenditures 
3.09% 96.91% 0.53% 3.26% 
Source: State Statistics Bureau: China Statistical Yearbook 2010, China Statistics Press, 2011; China Statistical 
Yearbook 2011, China Statistics Press, 2012.  
 
Second, public service responsibility was decentralized subordinately, level 
by level. This was performed in response to the inertia of the “bao gan” (contract 
system) throughout much of modern China's history, as well as the fuzzy 
boundaries among government layers in terms of responsibilities. Under the 
revenue-sharing system reforms, a higher level government tier passed 
responsibility for public services down to the next level. As a result, “almost 70% 
of public expenditure in China [is conducted by departments at] provincial [level] 
and below the provincial level, of which more than 55% of expenditure [is 
conducted by departments at] city, county and village levels, [and there is] 
especially…heavy expenditure responsibilities on township levels”.  351 
According to a report by the World Bank, township governments shoulder 55% 
to 60% of the bill for basic education, public health and other public services 
with a strong spillover. This kind of situation intensifies local governments’ 
                                                   
351 Feng, X. (2010). The competition between local governments: theory, analytical framework and Empirical 
Research, Yilin Press, p157. (In Chinese). 
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financial burdens and runs against the grain of equalization in terms of public 
service provision. 
 
5.2 Current Decentralization of Public Services and Regional 
Disparities  
 
Public service authorities and distribution of responsibilities between 
government layers are among the key issues that are discussed in academic 
circles. Theoretically speaking, depending on the range of beneficiaries, public 
goods can be divided into national public products and local public products.  352 
The beneficiaries of the former are evenly distributed throughout the territory 
of the nation as a whole, and examples of relevant public products include 
national defense, and international diplomacy. Beneficiaries of the latter tend to 
be more local, and examples of local public products include parkland 
management, firefighting, and public security. There is also a third category of 
public goods, for which redistribution is essential, for instance, social insurance 
and health care, as well as public services where there are spillovers, such as 
education. Apparently, these kinds of public goods are provided more efficiently 
by local governments, which can more reliably meet the requirements and 
expectations of the public. However, other features such as spillovers and social 
values beyond service (such as fairness, equality, and justice) are better 
delivered by higher-level government departments or the central government, 
which can also deliver fiscal transfer payments, which in turn are spent by the 
local government. 
In China, education, healthcare and social security (along with other public 
services and management responsibilities) have been the responsibility of local 
governments for several years. In addition to China’s current political structure, 
in which there is “uniformity between central and local government”, the  
responsibility for fundamental public services has been decentralized, level after 
level, down to governments below the provincial level. Since there has been no 
                                                   
352 Ostrom, V., Tiebout, C. M., & Warren, R. (1961). The organization of government in metropolitan areas: a 
theoretical inquiry. American political science review, 55(4), 831-842. 
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effective balanced fiscal transfer payment system, this decentralization of public 
services has led to numerous problems. The first is a structural inadequacy of 
public services. One example is expenditure on medical treatment and 
healthcare. Of total expenditure on healthcare in 2007, expenditure on 
government, social services, and personal hygiene accounted for 20.3%, 34.5% 
and 45.2%, respectively. 353 Compared with a typical level of 70% of total 
expenditure in OECD countries, the proportion of government expenditure on 
these services in China is probably too small. Second, there is a heavy financial 
burden for basic public services. Ever since the reform of the tax system 
(especially after the abolition of agricultural tax), local governments in counties 
and villages that have had to undertake more than half of all public service 
functions do not have stable and sufficient financial resources to support the 
necessary expenditure. In some cases this has resulted in a reduction of local 
government offices at the grass-roots level, and the withdrawal of some local 
public services. 354 Third, the expenditure of public service is directly linked to 
the level of local financial resources. If there are insufficient transfer payments 
from higher levels of government, the decentralization of public services can 
lead to regional disparities in healthcare, education, and social security. 355 
 
5.2.1 Decentralization of and regional disparities in public services 
First, there exist regional disparities of public services in terms of expenditure 
on public service. As shown in Table 5-3, expenditure on science, education, 
culture and health in the Eastern region account for 23.16% of the total regional 
public expenditure; the levels in the Central region are around 22.29%; and 
those in the Western region are around 21.47%. As is the case with the level of 
economic development, the level of regional public service expenditure in China 
reflects an economic differential from east to west. Regional public expenditure 
on science, education, culture and health in the provinces of Fujian, Jiangsu and 
                                                   
353 http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-02/17/content_1233236.html. 
354 Zhang, X., & Kanbur, R. (2005). Spatial inequality in education and health care in China. China Economic 
Review, 16(2), 189-204. 
355 Hofman, B., & Guerra, S. C. (2007). Ensuring inter-regional equity and poverty reduction. In Fiscal 
Equalization (pp. 31-59). Springer US. 
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Zhejiang reached more than 26% of total regional expenditure, while the 
proportions in the western provinces of Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Qinghai is 
below 19%. Overall, there exists a positive correlation between the level of basic 
public expenditure in each province and the level of economic development 
level in the province. The basic public expenditure in less developed areas is not 
only less than other regions, but accounts for an even smaller proportion of their 
own regional fiscal expenditure as well. 
 
Table 5-3 Proportion of regional public expenditure on science, education, culture and 
health across China in the total expenditure, 1997- 2008 
Western average 21.47% Eastern average 23.16% Central average 22.29% 
Inner Mongolia 18.16% Beijing 23.05% Shanxi 23.58% 
Guangxi 25.88% Tianjin 22.38% Jilin 19.84% 
Chongqing 19.38% Hebei 24.28% Heilongjiang 19.71% 
Sichuan 20.62% Liaoning 17.54% Anhui 22.75% 
Guizhou 27.03% Shanghai 19.56% Jiangxi 22.83% 
Yunnan 24.97% Jiangsu 26.08% Henan 25.90% 
Tibet 17.06% Zhejiang 26.62% Hubei 21.80% 
Shaanxi 22.08% Fujian 28.55% Hunan 21.89% 
Gansu 21.21% Shandong 25.27%   
Qinghai 17.91% Guangdong 21.35%   
Ningxia 20.34% Hainan 20.03%   
Xinjiang 23.05%     
Source: State Statistics Bureau: 60 Years of Compilation of Statistics in the New China , China Statistics Press, 2010. 
 
Second, there are regional disparities in public services in terms of the quality 
of public services offered. Because of the vast scope of basic public services, it 
is difficult to utilize an index that describes them accurately; therefore, the more 
widely used Human Development Index (HDI)356has been chosen as the standard 
with which to judge the quality of public services across China. HDI consists of 
three indexes: the life expectancy index (to measure the level of medical and 
health services in specific areas); the education index (based on measurements 
of total years spent in education and the enrollment rates of the population in 
particular areas, which altogether form the local mean educational level); and, 
the living index (which reflects the income level of a particular area). Generally, 
                                                   
356 Note: the method of calculation can been found in China National Human Development Report 2013. 
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these three indexes of HDI are related to people’s standard of health, education 
and living, which both relatively and objectively reflect the level of basic public 
services in a region. As shown in Table 5-4, it is clear that the quality of public 
services is characterized by a decreasing tendency from east to west. The HDI 
of the eastern provinces is at an average of 0.745. According to the standard of 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), most of the eastern 
provinces all enjoy a high HDI. The average value of the central provinces is 
0.686; Jilin, Heilongjiang and Shanxi have a high HDI, while other provinces 
have medium development indexes. The average value across the western region 
is 0.681, among which only Inner Mongolia has a high HDI. As for sub-indexes 
such as healthcare, education, there is also a declining tendency from east to 
west. In terms of the life expectancy index, Beijing and Shanghai have the 
highest scores (0.952 and 0.953, respectively), while Yunnan and Tibet have the 
lowest scores (0.784 and 0.762, respectively). The highest readings for 
education are for Beijing and Shanghai (0.837 and 0.808, respectively), and the 
lowest scores are for Guizhou and Tibet (at 0.586 and 0.498, respectively).  
 
Table 5-4 HDI of all provinces/cities of China in 2010 
Provinces 
Life expectancy 
index 
Education 
index 
Income 
index 
HDI 
index 
Beijing 0.952  0.837  0.694  0.821  
Tianjin 0.932  0.779  0.692  0.795  
Hebei 0.870  0.676  0.561  0.691  
Liaoning 0.892  0.737  0.618  0.740  
Shanghai 0.953  0.808  0.699  0.814  
Jiangsu 0.896  0.719  0.650  0.748  
Zhejiang 0.913  0.700  0.645  0.744  
Fujian 0.882  0.676  0.610  0.714  
Shandong 0.893  0.686  0.613  0.721  
Guangdong 0.894  0.696  0.624  0.730  
Hainan 0.891  0.660  0.536  0.680  
Eastern 
average 
0.906  0.725  0.631  0.745  
Shanxi 0.869  0.699  0.547  0.693  
Jilin 0.889  0.715  0.576  0.715  
Heilongjiang 0.886  0.710  0.554  0.704  
Anhui 0.871  0.640  0.516  0.660  
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Jiangxi 0.860  0.651  0.519  0.662  
Henan 0.864  0.664  0.540  0.677  
Hubei 0.868  0.696  0.558  0.696  
Hunan 0.866  0.677  0.539  0.681  
Central 
average 
0.872  0.682  0.544  0.686  
Inner 
Mongolia 
0.861  0.689  0.634  0.722  
Guangxi 0.872  0.634  0.516  0.658  
Chongqing 0.881  0.667  0.556  0.689  
Sichuan 0.866  0.645  0.520  0.662  
Guizhou 0.809  0.586  0.452  0.598  
Yunnan 0.784  0.604  0.476  0.609  
Tibet 0.762  0.498  0.487  0.569  
Shanxi 0.865  0.699  0.554  0.695  
Gansu 0.826  0.631  0.480  0.630  
Qinghai 0.791  0.613  0.537  0.638  
Ningxia 0.845  0.658  0.552  0.674  
Xinjiang 0.828  0.660  0.542  0.667  
West average 0.833  0.632  0.526  0.651  
Source: China National Human Development Report 2013, UNDP, June 2013 
  
In general, the decentralization of public services is incomplete, since local 
governments hold a majority of public service responsibilities, and many of 
them still rely on transfer payments from the central government’s exchequer 
system. The disparity in the funding of public services directly affects the 
quality of public services, and is the cause of the regional disparities in terms of 
education, healthcare, sanitation, and other public services. 
 
5.2.2 Decentralization of public services, and regional public service 
barriers 
According to the model of fiscal federalism, local government authorities 
have a better understanding of the issues facing local residents, and so local 
governments have more sufficient information about residents’ preferences. 
Therefore, in contrast to central government, local governments can provide 
differentiated and more efficient public services. However, scholars have noted 
that residents can freely flow between different regions, and so they can select 
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different public services within different regions by means of “foot voting”.  357 
In the process of this “flow”, there is an optimal allocation of public service 
resources. However, some scholars have mentioned that not all residents can 
afford to migrate freely across regions. Even if citizens are able to migrate, 
differences among public services do not form the only factor for the flow.  358 
Therefore, it is difficult, during decentralization, to maximize the efficiency of 
public service supply. In addition, there are scholars who fear that when citizens 
are free to select a higher quality public service in another region, this may 
amount to a large population flow, which may increase the financial burden for 
the local government providing that service. Therefore, in order to prevent the 
area from becoming a “welfare magnet”, local governments should compete in 
order to reduce expenditure on public services, although this could result in a 
decrease in the overall welfare level across the country. Theoretically, 
decentralization of public services does not necessarily lead to an increase in the 
efficiency, quality or level of public services provision, but may instead lead to 
a series of problems in the delivery of public services. 
In China, although the duty for providing public services has been 
decentralized to local governments, for a long time the barriers of the household 
registration system impeded the free flow of citizens across the regions. China's 
household registration system was not only designed to be a means of population 
registration and management, but also had two functions: 359 “the first is to 
prevent the mass flow of rural labor, especially [an] out-flow [of] agricultural 
[laborers]… the second is to ensure…essential [services in urban areas] and the 
lowest social welfare supply, so that [there is an] institutional arrangement [that] 
repels [the] rural population…” The household registration system is associated 
with “various daily necessities, personnel job placement and [a] social welfare 
system”; 360 and thus forms a barrier between urban and rural public services. 
                                                   
357 Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A pure theory of local expenditures. The journal of political economy, 64(5), 416-424. 
358 Faguet, J. P. (2004). Does decentralization increase government responsiveness to local needs: Evidence from 
Bolivia. Journal of Public Economics, 88(3), 867-893. 
359 Cai, F. (2011). Hukou system reform and unification of rural–urban social welfare. China & World Economy, 
19(3), 33-48. 
360 Chan, K. W., & Zhang, L. (1996). The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and 
Changes. Chinese Sociology & Anthropology, 29(1), 15-26. 
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After the mid-1980s, following the closure of the household contract 
responsibility system for rural workforces, rural laborers began to migrate to 
urban areas. Moreover, the state also issued a series of policies to relax the 
restrictions of the household register system upon population flow, such as the 
abolition of the sales system (which included a certain quantity of grain 
produced by farmers). However, at the same time, the additional benefits of 
urban household registration were not fully available. The floating population 
still could not enjoy equal treatment alongside urban residents in terms of 
fertility services, education, labor insurance, and pensions. 
Ever since the beginning of the 21st century, China's labor force has been 
continuously migrating from all parts of the country, mainly by travelling to the 
east coast and metropolitan areas to find non-agricultural work. They have made 
indelible contributions to the economic development and social prosperity of 
Chinese cities. In the process of urbanization, the expansion of urban 
conurbations poses a great demand for both labor and land. In order to allow 
developers to obtain human resources from rural areas, the Chinese government 
has relaxed the household registration system within the eastern provinces and 
metropolitan areas, and so local farmers have begun to gain more social and 
public services. However, due to the management of territories under the 
household registration system, the external floating population that is 
contributing to local economic and social development is still excluded from 
local public services; migrant workers are unable to enjoy equal education, 
healthcare, social security, or other public services. The barriers separating 
public services between urban and rural areas gradually turned into barriers 
between different regions, which have resulted in an immobilized trend of public 
service disparities among different areas. 
Moreover, for many years, China’s local municipal governments have always 
served as major resource controllers and distribution centers of public services. 
Chinese cities are grouped into (i) directly controlled municipalities, (ii) sub-
provincial capital cities, (iii) municipalities with independent planning status, 
(iv) provincial capital cities, (v) prefecture-level cities, (vi) county-level cities, 
and (vii) other types of cities. The economic development and social 
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management powers vary among these different categories. In general, in the 
Chinese political system, central departments and local governments cooperate 
with each other. However, the higher the status of the city, the closer it is to the 
center of political power, and thus the stronger its bargaining power, and the 
more public service resources it obtains. When Bian Yanjie and her colleague 
conducted a comprehensive survey on Chinese society in 2003, 361  they 
discovered that the higher a city’s political status, the better its resources for 
public services. In other words, the variation in the quality of public services 
among China’s regions is not only the result of economic development, but is 
also associated with China's system of asymmetric decentralization. In Table 5-
5, the overall expenditure on education, science and technology of local 
governments in Chinese cities in 2009 is ranked. It should be mentioned that 
among these top 20 cities are 4 directly controlled municipalities, and 12 sub-
provincial cities. Zhengzhou is a provincial capital city, whereas Suzhou, Wuxi 
and Foshan are the only prefecture-level cities. Most of the cities in the table are 
located in eastern coastal areas. Xiamen is 18 th among the 20 cities in terms of 
expenditure on education, science and technology. Yet its total expenditure is 
even higher than that of the western provinces, including Guizhou, Yunnan, 
Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet. There is a similar trend in terms of 
spending on medical and health services. In summary, the mode system of level 
decentralization and asymmetric decentralization in China forms an important 
barrier to an equally high quality public service throughout its regions. 
 
Table 5-5 Ranking of urban local government expenditure on education and science in 
2009 (billion Yuan) 
R Cities 
Scienc
e 
Educatio
n 
Tota
l 
R Cities 
Scienc
e 
Educatio
n 
Tota
l 
1 Shanghai 21.51 33.81 
55.3
2 
11 Dalian 1.81 4.25 6.06 
2 Beijing 12.50 35.26 
47.7
7 
12 Suzhou 1.40 4.47 5.88 
3 Shenzhen 7.92 13.66 
21.5
8 
13 Wuhan 0.95 4.83 5.78 
                                                   
361 Yu, B. & Dahai, H. (2006). Structural Barriers, Institutional Transformation and Resource Differentials: The 
Chinese General Social Survey Report. Social Sciences in China, 5, 012. 
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4 Tianjing 3.36 15.81 
19.1
7 
14 Ningbo 1.08 4.46 5.54 
5 Guangzhou 3.12 9.74 
12.8
6 
15 Wuxi 1.15 3.79 4.93 
6 Chongqing 0.63 8.79 9.42 16 Qingdao 0.79 3.93 4.71 
7 Hangzhou 1.87 6.33 8.20 17 Harbin 0.51 4.11 4.62 
8 Nanjing 1.28 5.84 7.13 18 Xiamen 0.84 3.77 4.61 
9 Foshan 0.84 5.89 6.74 19 Chengdu 0.47 4.00 4.46 
10 Shenyang 1.35 5.25 6.60 20 Suzhou 0.41 3.80 4.21 
Source: State Statistics Bureau (2011): China City Statistical Yearbook 2010 , China Statistics Press. 
     
Overall, China’s decentralization of public services, its long-term 
implementation of the household registration system (which produced a dividing 
line between urban and rural areas), as well as its pyramid-shaped government 
power structure, have resulted in the concentration of public service-based 
resources in eastern coastal and metropolitan areas, which form the regional 
disparities in terms of basic public services. A worsening in these regional 
disparities in public services will only strengthen public service barriers. Since 
the quality of public services in eastern coastal areas and metropolitan areas is 
much higher than in other regions, this could be resulting in a “welfare magnet” 
that attracts people from the rest of the country. When a large population 
migrates into a city, the incomers will share public service resources with local 
residents, and this increases the burden of fiscal expenditure upon the local 
government. The only avenue is to continue imposing or strengthening the 
household registration system and the barriers of public service, in order to 
prevent such a burden from increasing. Because of this vicious circle, the idea 
of balancing the notion of a uniform level of public service quality across China 
with that of a freely flowing population remains a dream. Although the state has 
called for a reform of the household registration system on several occasions, 
the more public services and households there are in a region, the harder it is to 
advance reforms. 362 It is also difficult to try and solve the disparities in public 
services by reforming the household registration system in less developed 
regions. Thus, there remains much work to be done to break the barriers, and to 
                                                   
362 Cai (2010b), “Labor market development and expansion of rural and urban employment”, in Cai (ed.), 
Transforming the Chinese Economy, 1978—2008, Leiden Boston：Brill． 
241 
ensure that the quality of public services across China’s regions is uniform.  
 
5.2.3 Decentralization of public services and reverse subsidies for less 
developed areas 
There is a redistribution element to the provision of public services, whereby 
a standard operation and equal value is applied throughout the country – 
examples include access to justice, and national laws. There is also a production 
element to the provision of public services that can be used to improve the level 
of human capital in certain areas, and to provide firm foundation for the 
development of the economy across the nation. Many scholars agree that the 
provision of public services is an important or perhaps the only function of, a 
government. 363 In China’s multilayered governmental structure, basic public 
services have a strong spillover feature. There may be people who “hitchhike” 
into regions where they can receive free public services, and so public service 
providers will become increasingly reluctant to offer public services. In order to 
prevent this kind of spillover, Denhardt and Denhardt 364  suggest that 
government departments at different levels should be allocated duties in a 
reasonable and pragmatic way. Through methods such as transfer payment, joint 
burdens and cooperative supply, the benefits and costs of services provided by 
an administrative jurisdiction can be controlled internally. In China, most of the 
supply duties of public services have been decentralized to local governments. 
Since the balanced transfer payment system is imperfect, the household 
registration system has been used to internalize and control the spillover and 
externality of public services. 
Prior to the reform and opening up era, the size of the mobile population was 
relatively small. Management approaches have been used to define the duties 
and necessary expenditure on public services by local governments. China's 
mobile population has generally been flowing from rural to urban areas, from 
inland to coastal areas, from small cities to large metropolitan cities. As a result, 
                                                   
363 Hughes, O. E. (2012). Public management and administration. Palgrave Macmillan, p88-96. 
364 Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. (2000). The new public service: Serving rather than steering. Public 
Administration Review, 60(6), 549-559. 
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the more highly economically developed coastal and urban areas have 
effectively become beneficiaries. Under the aegis of the household registration 
barrier, local governments in these prosperous regions do not have to spend 
money providing basic public services for these migrants (whose names are not 
under local household registries); and these regions directly utilize human 
capital from other regions. Therefore, although local governments in mid-
western and rural regions are investing substantial financial and related 
resources in education, healthcare and social security, the people who benefit 
from these services are increasingly moving away and are not contributing to 
the local economy. As more people migrate to coastal and urban areas, they 
accelerate the development of these prosperous areas. Therefore, these people 
effectively form “reverse subsidies from less developed areas towards 
developed regions”. 365 This condition widens the gap in terms of the quality of 
public services between regions, and discourages local government officials in 
underdeveloped regions from providing a full suite of public services, which in 
turn further undermines the developmental potential of underdeveloped regions.  
 
Table 5-6 Populations registered in other provinces based on educational status 
(thousands) (continued over-page) 
Current residence Total Illiteracy 
Primary 
school 
High 
school 
College and 
university 
Postgraduate 
National 82653  1242  14316  57526  9184  385  
Beijing 6809  54  639  4457  1559  99  
Tianjin 2925  30  480  2129  279  8  
Hebei 1349  22  248  849  224  6  
Liaoning 1719  23  335  1116  234  12  
Shanghai 8589  156  1298  5928  1133  75  
Jiangsu 7113  105  1328  5088  567  25  
Zhejiang 11278  237  2972  7616  438  15  
Fujian 4124  56  969  2893  198  8  
Shandong 2032  41  322  1316  345  9  
Guangdong 20874  138  2596  16672  1439  29  
Hainan 561  9  96  341  114  2  
Eastern average 6125  79  1026  4400  594  26  
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Eastern total 67374  872  11283  48404  6529  286  
Eastern proportion 81.5% 70.2% 78.8% 84.1% 71.1% 74.4% 
Shanxi 893  15  171  614  91  3  
Jilin 440  7  70  245  113  5  
Heilongjiang 490  11  90  275  111  4  
Anhui 688  20  124  409  130  6  
Jiangxi 579  7  71  282  215  4  
Henan 570  10  76  362  117  4  
Hubei 974  18  149  544  252  11  
Hunan 699  8  95  404  186  7  
Central average 667  12  106  392  152  5  
Central total 5333  95  848  3134  1213  43  
Central proportion 6.5% 7.7% 5.9% 5.4% 13.2% 11.1% 
Inner Mongolia 1385  45  299  916  122  3  
Guangxi 798  11  137  524  121  5  
Chongqing 911  16  164  480  242  9  
Sichuan 1089  21  186  600  268  14  
Guizhou 724  18  173  459  70  3  
Yunnan 1171  31  333  695  107  4  
Tibet 162  10  42  99  11  0  
Shanxi 941  12  117  543  261  10  
Gansu 414  10  75  251  74  4  
Qinghai 303  16  70  187  29  1  
Ningxia 348  13  83  216  36  1  
Xinjiang 1699  73  507  1018  99  3  
Western average 829  23  182  499  120  5  
Western total 9946  274  2186  5988  1442  56  
Western 
proportion 
12.0% 22.1% 15.3% 10.4% 15.7% 14.5% 
Source: State Statistics Bureau (2011): China Population Census Data2010, China Statistics Press. 
 
The populations of registered households in other provinces nationwide are 
listed in Table 5-6 (data is sourced from China’s sixth census). It is evident that 
there is a flow of people from the central and western provinces to the eastern 
coastal provinces. Developed provinces such as Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Guangzhou have attracted large floating populations of people 
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who are therefore not listed on local household registers. Based on the data in 
the sixth census, most migrants have moved away from districts in China’s 
central region. In 2010, 48% of migration originated from the central region, of 
which the net out-migration rates of Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hunan, Hubei were 
all above 10%; the net out-migration rates of Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou in the 
western region were around or above 10%; while there was net immigration into 
Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. 
Among the people who migrated into the eastern region who were enrolled in 
education, 37.02 million were attending junior middle school, and they 
accounted for 85% of the entire flowing population who were attending junior 
middle school. There is a substantial flow of junior middle school children into 
eastern provinces, and the local governments in these eastern provinces are not 
obligated to fund their education. About 70% of the flowing population who 
possess a college degree or one of a higher classification migrated into eastern 
coastal areas, and this is contributing to a serious “brain drain” in the central 
and western regions, which is not conducive to the economic development in 
the central and western regions. Due to the Western Development policy and 
other relevant policies, the flux of migration into the western region is better 
than that of the central region, now that there are more highly talented, educated 
people moving into this region. However, the investment in compulsory 
education and higher education by local governments in the central and western 
regions cannot do not fully translate into local economic development (based on 
the same level of human capital), because of the great population flow into 
eastern, more developed areas (see Table 5-6). This results in the unreasonable 
pattern of long-term reverse subsidies from the central and western regions to 
the more developed areas in the eastern region. 
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Figure 5-5 Proportion of total expenditure on science, education, culture and health 
expenditures by provinces with net emigration, 1997- 2008 
Source: State Statistics Bureau (2010): 60 Years of Compilation of Statistics in the New China, China Statistics Press. 
 
These long term inverse subsidies may weaken the willingness of government 
officials to deliver public services in regions with declining populations. As 
shown in Figure 5-5, there has been a fluctuating decline in the proportions of 
provincial government expenditure on science, education, culture and health 
care. For example, in Anhui, the proportion of expenditure on science, education, 
culture and health in 1997 was 27%; this fell by 17% from 1997 to 2008; in 
Jiangxi, the proportion declined from 26% to 17%; in Sichuan the proportion 
fell from 25% to 13%. This explains, to a certain extent that in provinces with 
declining populations, expenditure on public services including science, 
education, culture and health does not translate into local economic 
development and a large part of fiscal expenditure is expended on human capital 
that is migrating to other regions. This migration might generate a rise in 
China’s GDP development in the short term, but in the long term it will 
exacerbate regional disparities in terms of public services, and will damage the 
economic development potential of less developed areas. 
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5.3 Public Service Decentralization and Regional Development - 
Exploration and Reflection 
 
Economic and political scholars have spent years debating on whether public 
services should be provided by a central government, or provided by a local 
government. Scholars, such as Hayek, Stigler and Tiebout have made classical 
interpretations of the advantages of public service supply by local governments. 
Decentralization of public services to lower government levels has been 
practiced in several countries. Generally speaking, the basic argument by such 
scholars is that local governments have more convenient and complete access to 
local information and are more aware of local people’s preferences, and can 
therefore provide information to the central government.  366 The “foot voting” 
mechanism formed by the free movement of citizens can ensure a good match 
between public service supply and citizens’ preferences,  367  and in a 
decentralized system, competition among local governments can result in more 
efficient public services. Based on the above theories, some scholars further 
propose that decentralized supply is effective when public services are 
heterogeneous and when there are no spillovers in regions; otherwise, the central 
government is a more effective provider of public services.  368 Some scholars369 
have even proposed limitations on the decentralization of public services, by 
direct and effective citizens’ supervision of a decentralized government, and 
“yardstick competition” among local governments.  These two conditions can 
help to redress information asymmetry sufficiently and effectively. Residents 
can evaluate the effectiveness of local public services by comparing them with 
those provided by other local governments. However, since the 1990s, scholars 
have been examining the problems caused by the decentralization of public 
services, and they are increasingly of the opinion that a decentralized system 
                                                   
366 Stigler, G. J. (1957). Perfect competition, historically contemplated. The Journal of Political Economy, 65(1), 1-17. 
367 Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. The Journal of Political Economy, 64(5), 416-424. 
368 Oates, W. E. (1993). Fiscal decentralization and economic development. National Tax Journal, 46(2), 237-243. 
369 Dethier, J. J., Ghanem, H., & Zoli, E. (1999). Does Democracy Facilitate the Economic Transition? An Empirical 
Study of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. World Bank Publications. 
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may not always improve public service quality for the following reasons:  370 (i) 
residents will not move away solely because they want to access different, better 
public services; (ii) local governmental operations may not always meet 
efficiency standards; (iii) compared with central government, local governments 
tend to show poor governing ability; (iv) competition among heterogeneous 
local governments can intensify regional differentiation. 
China has been decentralizing public services to local governments ever since 
the 1950s, and the responsibility for delivering basic public services in China 
are borne by local governments. During the past six decades there have been 
several readjustments and reallocations in terms of the types and funding of 
public services by the Chinese government. However, throughout this period, 
local governments have always been responsible for delivering basic public 
services. Local governments have always been responsible for more than 70% 
of the national public service expenditure, and as much as 90% of local 
government expenditure goes into health, education, social security, and similar 
services. 371This ratio is much higher than those for local governments in the 
United States and in other federal states. China’s 50-year decentralization of 
public services is a fascinating case on the relationship between decentralization 
and balanced regional development. 
 
5.3.1 Exploration of decentralization of public services and regional 
development 
On the whole, many scholars believe that the establishment of an effective 
basic education system and medical system contributed greatly to China’s 
economic development. 
Upon the founding of the new China, the government established a centralized 
planning system, and took responsibility for delivering public services. This 
centralized mode of public service guaranteed an effective supply of relevant 
funds and the transformation of new and old public service systems within a 
                                                   
370 Fu, Y., & Zhang, Y. (2007). Chinese style decentralization and structural bias of fiscal expenditure: Price of 
competition for growth. Management World, 3, 4-11. 
371 Li, L. C. (2010). Central‐local relations in the people's Republic of China: Trends, processes and impacts for 
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short period, which thus provided a solid foundation for national development 
and social stability. However, decision makers in the central government quickly 
recognized that their centralized model of public services was inefficient. Hence, 
during the first decentralization of financial power, public services were 
devolved to local governments, and a supply system was created whereby 
“central departments and local governments cooperate with each other”. Local 
governments were responsible for funding and managing public services. Under 
the political and economic climate of The Great Leap Forward, public services 
were expanded rapidly and unreasonably. In a later adjustment, financial and 
administrative power was again concentrated in central government, while local 
governments delivered public services. The central government only adopted 
“earmarks” for some essential services such as education in order to guarantee 
the necessary expenditure on basic public services. At the start of the reform and 
opening up era, a “fiscal responsibility” system was implemented, whereby local 
governments had clearer responsibilities in terms of public service expenditures. 
The local governments still took charge of public service spending in local 
farming, forestry, water conservation, industry, transportation, culture, science, 
health, pensions, and social assistance. The central government was primarily 
responsible for the formulation of relevant policies, and for providing a small 
part of the national public service. The reform of the tax-sharing system in 1994 
resulted in a continuation of the earlier system, with local governments 
assuming responsibility for the vast majority of public services. Since 2002, due 
to the strengthening of central finance and the widening of public service gaps 
among regions, the central government began to increase balanced transfer 
payments and tried to balance the regional differences in terms of public services 
through compulsory education transfer payments, rural cooperative medical 
transfer payments, and countryside transfer payments. Generally speaking, 
decentralization is the chief characteristic of the public sector in China. The 
Chinese government has worked to guarantee the efficiency of public service 
investment, and has developed a basic public service system nationwide using 
fewer resources. 
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5.3.2 Reflection on decentralization of public services and regional 
development 
Due to the traditional “administrative contracting system” and the impact of 
specific historical circumstances, local governments control most of the public 
services in China. In addition, in the existing political structure there is 
“uniformity between central and local government”, wherein public service 
responsibilities are delegated to government departments below the provincial 
government layer. Meanwhile, due to the absence of both a clear incentive 
mechanism (regarding public service development) and a central control 
mechanism for public service equalization, the current public services system in 
China is affected by a number of problems, including inadequacy, regional 
disparity, and structural barriers: 
First, the lack of a local incentive mechanism leads to an overall inadequacy 
of a public service. Historically, public services were regarded as the inherent 
functions of local governments. The central government provides clear 
incentives for local economic development by shifting fiscal and administrative 
power down to local levels. However, in China the decentralization of public 
services has not been accompanied by a clear incentive mechanism, and so the 
quality of local services in specific areas does not affect local government 
officials’ economic interests and promotions. Thus, local officials have no direct 
incentive to develop or improve the public services. In light of China’s 
remarkable economic growth, the scale and quality of public services provided 
by some local governments simply do not meet the requirements for economic 
and social development. Education, healthcare and other public services in some 
regions are plagued by inefficiency, and there are stark contrasts in the quality 
of public services among China’s regions because public services are controlled 
directly to the local government. Moreover, since there may be less motivation 
among officials in lower tiers of government to develop public services, central 
government tends to shift responsibilities for running public services down to 
these lower levels - this is termed “isomorphic responsibility”. As a result, 
“Nearly 70% of the public spending occurs in provincial and [lower levels of] 
government, among which over 55% of public spending [is conducted at] 
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municipal, county and township levels…the county and township governments 
burden a heavy spending responsibility.” 372  This situation aggravates the 
financial burden among grass-roots local governments. In addition, a lack of 
financial resources is another reason for an overall inadequacy in Chinese public 
services. 
Second, the absence of a central control mechanism leads to regional 
disparities in terms of public services. Despite the decentralization of financial 
and administrative powers, no clear central control mechanism for the 
decentralization of public services has yet been established. The central 
government only takes charge of the formulation of relevant polices and 
guidelines, while the local governments are responsible for policy 
implementation and fund raising. For a long time, the central government has 
been short of relevant funds and power to properly conduct appropriate 
supervision on the delivery of public services by local governments. Therefore, 
the developmental policies pertaining to public services that are formulated by 
the central government cannot usually be implemented. In the document, 
China’s Education Reform and Development Outline (published in 1993), the 
following is clearly proposed: 
 
“Raise the proportion of state government spending on education 
(including financial funding for all levels of education; urban and rural 
education surcharges; organized funding for primary and secondary schools 
by businesses; partial tax deductions and exemptions for school-run 
industries) up to 4% of total GDP by the end of this century and reach the 
average level of developing countries in the 1980s.”  
 
However, due to the lack of a central control mechanism, local governments 
are not taking the initiative in terms of investments, so this goal was not 
achieved until 2012. In addition, as most of the public services have a significant 
spillover, local governments tend to prevent their areas becoming so-called 
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“welfare magnets” and will not permit outsiders to partake of the social welfare 
that is designated for local residents, particularly when the central control 
mechanism is absent. This system is different to those in some Western countries, 
whose local governments have a “dip competition” on public services. However, 
local governments in China can use the household registration system as a 
barrier to prevent the influx of outsiders gaining access to local public services. 
If things continue in this way, the incoming population that makes contributions 
to the local economic and social development shall be excluded from the local 
public service system, and they cannot equally share in education, medical 
treatment, social security, or other public services. As a result, the public service 
gaps among different regions become entrenched. It should also be noted that, 
because of the absence of a central control system as well as the existence of 
barriers to local public services, the developed coastal and urban areas have 
become the actual beneficiaries of what is a population migration from the mid-
west to the east. Because they are protected by the household registration barrier, 
these areas need not have to provide basic public services to the incomers, since 
those people are not recorded on local residence registers. At the same time, 
these regions can take direct advantage of talented human capital coming from 
other regions. In fact, this is effectively a subsidy of public services in 
prosperous areas by the less developed areas. This unjust situation widens the 
regional gaps in terms of public services, which results in further unbalanced 
regional development. 
 
5.3.3 Improvements to decentralized public services and regional 
development 
Due to these aforementioned problems, the Chinese government needs to 
establish a more equal incentive and control system over public services, and 
apply some of the methods used by governments in some foreign countries:  
(1) There should be a combined incentive system for both upper and lower 
levels of government that are responsible for supplying public services. In theory, 
there are two methods to encourage local public services supply: one is to 
integrate the development of public services into a local performance evaluation 
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system, and link that to the promotion of local government officials; the other 
method is to empower local residents by enabling them to evaluate local public 
services and supervise the public services of local government through a 
democratic method. It has been proved that public services should be subject to 
a performance evaluation system. However, there is one problem - public 
services are complicated, and it is difficult to establish an objective and 
measurable adjustment standard. Moreover, there is the danger that “one 
generation plants the trees under whose shade another generation rests”, which 
makes the establishment of a performance evaluation mechanism for public 
services more difficult. The expansion of local democracy can encourage local 
governments to more carefully meet the needs and preferences of citizens, and 
improve public service supply. 373 However, in the current political structure, 
most officials are not elected directly by the people, and superior government 
departments conduct performance evaluations; therefore, an incentive 
mechanism would not function properly above the grass-roots local government 
layer. There is a need to include basic public services, such as education, 
medical treatment and social security, under a performance evaluation system, 
in order to encourage local governments to improve investment in and 
management of basic public services. Furthermore, the Chinese government 
should tackle the overall inadequacy and structural differences in its public 
services as soon as possible by establishing standards, both domestic and foreign, 
which can be used to measure the quality of public services. There also needs to 
be more inner party democracy, including competitive elections, so that the 
people, party members and NPC members can be allowed to supervise local 
public services; large groups of party members and ordinary citizens are direct 
clients, 374 and so they should persuade the government layers to provide public 
services that meet people’s preferential needs. 
(2) Build a standard control system for public services, which is dominated 
by the central government. Public services affect people’s living standards and 
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economic development potential; furthermore, the provision of public services 
affects and can strengthen national identity. Most modernized nations operate 
public service systems that are of a uniform scale and quality nationwide; such 
a system needs a strong central government. Of course, due to the complexity 
of the public services as well as limited access to information by central 
government, the central government should not directly control each and every 
specific public service function, but it should guarantee a consistent quality of 
basic public services throughout the nation via fiscal transfer payments and by 
formulating standards. Both central and provincial governments must be able to 
raise sufficient revenues, support one another and invest in education, medical 
treatment, and social security. The provision of public services should no longer 
be tied to the household register. The central government should ensure a 
balanced transfer of payments so that public services in backward regions can 
be improved, and so that a generally consistent level of basic public services 
nationwide can be guaranteed. In addition, since certain public services such as 
education, healthcare and social security are characterized by homogeneity and 
economies of scale, a uniform minimum standard should be applied across the 
country so as to reduce spillovers between regions. The implementation and 
provision of basic public services should be supervised and subject to evaluation 
mechanisms. Institutionalized methods should be used to strengthen the powers 
of the central government over public services. 
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Conclusions 
 
1. Preliminary Conclusions 
Unequal regional development is a worldwide issue which affects a nation’s 
sustainable economic development, and which may also threaten social stability, 
national unity, and state security. Therefore, decision makers in all countries 
have paid significant attention to this issue and have attempted to coordinate 
regional development by every available means. Governments in many 
developed countries have instrumented regional governance. Most of these 
states have endeavored to provide financial aid, manpower support, and 
infrastructural development to less developed regions in an effort to encourage 
large-scale regional development.  There occurred substantial economic 
rehabilitation and rapid development in these countries immediately after the 
Second World War. However, due recent economic stagflation and financial 
retrenchment, most developed countries can no longer provide sufficient capital 
and adequate policy support to their less developed regions. In addition, many 
countries’ decision makers and scholars have recognized that regional 
development policies led by central government tend to be inefficient. This 
results in a tremendous waste of resources, and there may also be a failure to 
realize the real demands of less developed regions, which may exacerbate 
conflict between less developed regions and more developed regions. As well 
as reflecting on the failures of centralized regional intervention policies, policy-
makers in some countries have tried to inspire local governments’ enthusiasm 
for development and cooperation through power decentralization policies. In an 
effort to sustain efficiency, they have attempted to achieve a more dynamic 
balance of regional development by effecting orderly, sustained competition and 
voluntary cooperation among different regions. In addition, international 
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank have proposed potential power 
decentralization models in published research reports, and have popularized 
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them among developing countries.375 
In China there has been substantially unequal levels of development among 
its regions, although in recent years the divide (in terms of development) 
between coastal and inland areas has been reduced. Its government has been 
achieving this via large-scale regional productivity allocation, which has been 
ongoing ever since the founding of the People’s Republic of China. China’s 
regional development plan is primarily led by the central government, and the 
purpose of every “Five-Year Plan” is to uniformly arrange and plan regionally 
balanced development. This is particularly the case with the regional 
development strategy, which is predominantly focused on development of the 
western region in China. As a result, substantial fluxes of capital, technological 
enhancement and talents have transferred to undeveloped regions, while 
investments in large-scale infrastructure construction and in large and medium-
sized projects have transformed China’s regional development pattern in a 
relatively short period of time. However, in contrast with that of the Soviet 
Union, the regional development strategy by the Chinese Central Government 
has not been adequately supported by a consistently centralized system. 
Throughout the history of PRC, the central government has decentralized 
economic development, business management and policy-making decisions to 
local governments, and has enhanced the efficiency and efficacy of regional 
development by empowering local governments. Despite the saying that 
“centralization leads to deadlock and decentralization leads to chaos”, the 
central government has always considered power decentralization to be an 
important means of solving China’s developmental issues. More predominantly, 
ever since the “revenue-sharing system” reform, power division between the 
central government and local governments has begun to be institutionalized, i.e. 
the central government retains power and authority over the distribution of fiscal 
resources for macro control, while local governments have an institutional 
commitment toward autonomous development. Many scholars argue that this 
“Chinese-style decentralization” is, by far, the most important secret of China’s 
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miraculous economic growth.376 
Since China’s economy continues to develop rapidly, the inequality among its 
regions (in terms of development) is not a mere linear problem of productivity 
allocation, but a multi-dimensional issue that concerns economic growth, social 
progress, structural transformation, quality of public services, and 
environmental protection. Policy makers therefore need to consider whether 
China should strengthen the central government’s dominance in regional 
development, or encourage autonomous competition and voluntary cooperation 
among local governments by intensifying power decentralization. This project 
is an analysis of the relationship between power decentralization and regionally 
balanced development in China. Power decentralization is not merely financial 
power decentralization. In this dissertation, its influence on regional 
development has been analyzed from three distinctive aspects: financial power 
decentralization, administrative power decentralization, and public services. 
The following preliminary conclusions are drawn: 
First, an unstable, nonstandard and asymmetric decentralized financial system 
directly results in regional financial and economic disparity. Prior to the Reform 
and Opening-Up era, the central government invested a large amount of political, 
economic, administrative, and human resources. Its aim was to coax 
development of the central and western regions through productivity allocation 
and “third-line” construction. However, the powers of the central and regional 
governments were centralized and decentralized (respectively) to an excessive 
degree. China’s central government wielded excessive political and 
administrative power, which resulted in cynicism among local government 
officials. Local governments always adjusted their policies according to the 
political climate, economic laws, or national strategies. This led to a classic 
situation where “centralization leads to deadlock and decentralization leads to 
chaos”. In fact, an unstable macro economy inflicts greater harm upon less 
developed regions with poorer economic foundations, and exacerbates regional 
disparity. After the Reform and Opening-up mandate was issued, power in 
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central government began to be distributed among local governments, and data 
on governmental revenues and expenditure gradually become transparent. 
Nevertheless, because an asymmetric power division had been in existence for 
many years, the eastern coastal regions were noticeably more privileged in terms 
of financing and tax revenues; they attract talent from other regions, and taxation 
tends to be lower. In central and western regions in China there are higher tax 
rates, and their own public expenditures are more limited. This vicious circle 
has continued to weaken the central and western regions’ development potential, 
and additionally, since China’s balanced transfer payment system is not yet 
complete, regional disparity continues to grow.  
Second, a rigidly large government, segmented government structure, and 
provincial government incentives hinder coordination and cooperation in and 
among regions; this altogether weakens the effect of China’s regionally balanced 
development strategy. In contrast to its decentralized financial system, China’s 
administrative system has always been relatively centralized. Its central 
government controls local governments by intervening in these provincial 
governments’ personnel arrangements, organizational settings, and incentive 
mechanisms. In contrast to Russia’s power decentralization model, many 
scholars regard this unique “dislocation” as the secret of China’s successful 
economy. 377  However, the numbers of local government personnel is 
determined by a government’s power rather than the local community’s actual 
economic condition. In the western and central regions, a large proportion of the 
working population is employed in local government. For example, 16% of 
urban workers in the western region are employed by the government - twice 
that of urban workers in the eastern region. If the size of government is too large, 
it draws excessive social resources, and, as a result, the government becomes 
“the grabbing hand” that weakens the central and western regions’ 
developmental potential. China’s lengthy “horizontal and vertical” 
governmental structure, characterized by isomorphic responsibility, has caused 
continued conflict between local governments and the central government. This 
                                                   
377 Blanchard, O., & Shleifer, A. (2001). Federalism with and without Political Centralization: China versus Russia. 
IMF Staff Papers, 171-179. 
258 
situation tends to aggravate wastage during the course of regional policy 
coordination, and inhibits both the formulation of an effective coordination 
mechanism among departments and a cooperation mechanism among local 
governments. In addition, China’s central government has thrust local 
governments into a fierce “tournament” through enforced political performance 
assessments. During this process, local governments always “win” by proper or 
improper means, which are always driven by self-interest. This has resulted in 
inadequate coordination and cooperation among local governments. Other 
consequences include repeated building construction, market blockades and 
data fraud, all of which profoundly hinder proper, regionally balanced 
development. 
Third, excessively decentralized basic public services result in barriers to 
social welfare and excessive disparity in the quality of public services among 
regions, which contribute to the differing rates of development among China’s 
regions. In general, the local governments provide most of China’s public 
services. This is especially true in a system where administrative power is 
decentralized and financial power is centralized. Governments at the local level 
therefore consume a fairly large proportion of public expenditure, even if they 
do not have sufficient tax revenues.  
Without a complete transfer payment system, the decentralization of basic 
public services results in a series of problems, both actual and potential. Without 
sufficient resources to provide high quality public services, governments in less 
developed regions will only invest funds in economic growth and infrastructure 
construction for the express purpose of increasing their own political 
performance in a fierce central government-induced competition. As a result, 
the quality of public service within the central and western regions is found 
wanting. Moreover, due to their long-term economic advantages and China’s 
national preferential policy, the quality of public services in the eastern and 
metropolitan regions is far higher than that in other regions. To prevent 
themselves from becoming a “welfare magnet”, governments in developed 
regions tend to continue to exploit the household registration system in order to 
construct a “welfare barrier”; this consolidates the disparity in the quality of 
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public services among regions. In addition, there is a large-scale population 
movement across China. Governments in the eastern coastal regions and 
metropolitan regions do not bear the full ‘brunt’ of providing public services to 
floating populations, but they directly enjoy the benefits of increasing human 
capital as more citizens migrate into their jurisdictions. Meanwhile, central and 
western regions’ investment in education and healthcare is not entirely 
transformed into human capital serving the local economy. Altogether this 
amounts to a “reverse subsidy” from less developed regions to more developed 
regions, which significantly weakens less developed regions’ willingness to 
develop public services. 
    
2. Countermeasures 
China has faced increasingly complex regional issues, and so its government’s 
“12th Five-Year Plan” postulates an overall strategy for regional development by 
“giving full play to different regions’ comparative advantages, promoting the 
rational flow of production factors, deepening regional cooperation, driving 
benign interaction among regions, and gradually shortening regional 
development disparity”. To achieve these ambitious targets, some 
countermeasures are proposed based on the experience of OECD countries and 
the questions discussed above:  
Firstly, China must standardize and improve its financial decentralization 
system, and properly direct tax resources and preferential policies to its central 
and western regions. Ever since the reform of the revenue-sharing system, 
China’s fiscal and taxation systems began to stabilize, and this led to more stable 
regional development and a reduction in the disparity between regions, 
especially in what became a consistently stable and sustainable macro 
environment. Naturally, stability within the fiscal and taxation systems does not 
in itself result in improvements in these systems. China should continue its 
reform and innovation policies by effectively optimizing tax revenue allocation 
between central government and local governments. This will result in 
improvements in their expenditure, and a standardization of their revenue and 
expenditure systems. It is worth noting that China’s long-term fiscal and 
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taxation policies tend to benefit eastern coastal regions, not least because 
economic development in the central and western regions was far lower than 
that of the eastern region at the start of the Reform and Opening Up era. 
Although the central government has established preferential fiscal and taxation 
policies for the central and western regions ever since, they are still inadequate 
since the eastern regions still enjoyed substantially higher tax revenues and low 
tax rates. Therefore, the government should scientifically assess the central and 
western regions’ comparative advantages so that it can more accurately guide 
industries, capital, talents and technologies into the central and western regions. 
Moreover, China’s government should continue to improve the equalized 
financial transfer payment system. Specifically, the state should merge the 
administrative departments which deal with transfer payments, reduce the 
number of special transfer payments, and optimize the computational formula 
for equalized transfer payments. Moreover, the state should intensify its 
guidance and supervision of transfer payment capital in an effort to (i) restrain 
vested interests, (ii) enhance the reallocation potential of the transfer payment 
system, and (iii) guarantee sufficient expenditure for public services and 
economic development within the central and western regions. 
Secondly, China’s central government should also decentralize its 
administrative powers and adjust its rigid vertical and horizontal structure, so 
that it can become more attentive to localized problems. As has been observed 
with regional development policies in other countries, for sustainable, 
regionally balanced development to occur there must be comprehensive 
regulation by the central government, and voluntary cooperation between local 
governments. China’s governmental structure is the most significant barrier 
which hinders both effective coordination among central government 
departments and enhanced cooperation among local governments. Therefore, 
once it has completed the necessary scientific assessment, China’s central 
government should permit local governments some latitude in terms of decision-
making power and recruitment of government employees. Moreover, it should 
moderately reduce the numbers of personnel on the government payroll in the 
central and western regions, so that the central and western regions’ 
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development becomes more efficient.  
China should also continue with its the reform philosophy of the super-
ministry system, and tackle the problem of “the coexistence of multiple 
departments”. China should also optimize the governmental incentive 
mechanism. For example, the mechanism could be adapted so that regional 
poverty can be alleviated, and the progress of each region could be subject to a 
national performance assessment (which could be used to bypass the special 
interests of individual local governments). Moreover, the central government 
needs to tackle administrative conflicts by establishing a regional organization, 
which could be directly led by a superior governmental body. Furthermore, 
poverty alleviation programs should not be “county-based”, but should be 
targeted at enterprises and individual citizens. This could solve the problem of 
local governments competing against one another for funds, as well as the 
associated waste.  
China should also centralize basic public services and gradually establish a 
balanced public service system throughout the nation. In the existing public 
service system, there is often a lack of local government investment in public 
services, and the household registration system has exacerbated public service 
barriers and the ‘reverse subsidy’ phenomenon. As both central and provincial 
financial income streams become more plentiful, the central and provincial 
financial ministries should gradually assume responsibility for spending money 
on public services including education, healthcare and social insurance, whilst 
allowing for a strong spillover effect, so that the problems of household 
registration and the public service barrier can be overcome. By applying a 
scientifically determined, balanced transfer payment capital, they should redress 
the deficiency of public services in less developed regions and guarantee a 
generally consistent quality of basic public service throughout the nation. 
Amendments should be made to the government’s incentive mechanism, and the 
proportion of public services in the performance assessment should be increased. 
The general public should be permitted to assess governmental public services 
and stimulate local governments into supplying and improving public services. 
There should be both a top-down assessment and a down-top assessment. 
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3. Research Prospect 
 The issue of unequal development in China’s regions is a complex one, 
which in this dissertation has been analyzed from the perspective of power 
decentralization. However, there are deficiencies in the methods and findings in 
this dissertation which should be considered in future research studies . 
First, the research methodology in this dissertation primarily included the 
literature review, institutional analysis and macro data sorting. However, it was 
not possible to summarize and analyze every inspirational case relating to the 
process of China’s regionally balanced development. The conclusions in this 
chapter have neither been supported nor tested by a large number of cases. 
Further investigation, study and analyses of other cases in regional development 
are needed. 
Moreover, there is a need to further analyze systems and institutions, and to 
further explore power allocation between central governments and local 
governments in other countries. In general, both developed countries and 
developing countries have used different institutional models and operating 
mechanisms in line with their own national condition in their efforts to achieve 
regionally balanced development. They have gained a tremendous amount of 
experience and have encountered setbacks, which are worthy of investigation. 
However, only the experiences of the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development are detailed in this dissertation, and the experiences of other 
nations’ regional governance was not evaluated. In view of this, future 
researchers should hopefully be able to continue to produce viable hypotheses 
by investigating policies (for regenerating economic growth in underperforming 
regions) in other countries. 
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